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INTRODUCTION

A very important area of constitutional law at the present time
is the negative aspect of the commerce clause: the commerce clause
as the source of constitutional limits on the power of the states to
regulate and tax entities engaged in interstate commerce.' Each
recent Term of the Supreme Court typically has seen three or more
negative commerce clause decisions, 2 and challenges to state regulation and taxation on this basis are likely to continue. In times of
1. This area is sometimes referred to as the "dormant commerce clause."
The use of the terms, "negative aspect of the commerce clause," and "dormant
commerce clause," relate to the fact that the commerce clause by its terms is an
affirmative grant of power to Congress and does not expressly impose any restriction
on the power of the states to regulate or tax interstate commerce.
A negative commerce clause challenge to state economic regulation or taxation
must be distinguished from challenges that have their basis in Congress' affirmative
exercise of the commerce power, such as when state regulation directly conflicts
with congressional regulation, see, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1
(1824), or where state regulation is preempted by a comprehensive scheme of federal
regulation, see, e.g., Fidelity Fed. Says. & Loan Assoc. v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S.
141 (1982). Not infrequently a direct conflict or preemption challenge is joined
with a negative commerce clause challenge. See, e.g., Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457
U.S. 624 (1982); infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
2. The number of opinions issued by the Court in cases involving challenges
to state regulation and taxation on negative commerce grounds in each of the
recent Terms are as follows: 1983 Term - 4; 1982 Term - 3; 1981 Term -3; 1980
Term - 5; 1979 Term - 4; 1978 Term - 2; 1977 Term - 6; 1976 Term - 4; 1975
Term - 3; 1974 Term - 2. Three cases involving negative commerce clause challenges
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economic downturn and until recently a widely-perceived energy
shortage, states may try to protect their internal economies and the
economic interests of their own residents at the expense of the
interstate economy and the interests of out-of-staters. As state regulation and taxation become more burdensome, entities engaged in
interstate commerce will rely on the negative commerce clause to
challenge particular regulations and modes of taxation. This reliance
is a matter of necessity, since state economic regulation is virtually
3
immune to challenge on due process or equal protection grounds.
For these reasons, constitutional challenges to state regulation and
taxation under the negative aspect of the commerce clause will
continue and will remain a very important area of constitutional
4
law.
The Supreme Court has long held that while the commerce
power is not an exclusively federal power, the commerce clause
operates in a negative manner to restrict the power of the states to
were heard by the Court during the 1984 Term. One was affirmed by an equally
divided court, while another was decided on equal protection rather than negative
commerce clause grounds. See infra notes 117, 134 & 138.
3. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981);
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978); New
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976). The last case invalidating state economic
regulation on due process or equal protection grounds, Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S.
457 (1957), was specifically overruled in New Orleans v. Dukes. For a discussion of
the combined due process-negative commerce clause challenge to state taxation
affecting interstate commerce, see infra notes 112-19 and accompanying text.
4. This is indicated by a reawakening of academic interest in this area.
Recent works, most of which will be discussed in the present Article, are Anson &
Schenklan, Federalism, The Dormant Commerce Clause, and State-Owned Resources, 59
TEx. L. REv. 71 (1980); Blemstein, Some Interactions of the Negative Commerce Clause
and the New Federalism: The Case of Discriminatoiy State Income Tax Treatment of Outof-State Tax-Exempt Bonds, 31 VAND. L. REv. 473 (1978); Eule, Laying the Dormant
Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425 (1982); Hellerstein, Hughes v. Oklahoma:
The Court, the Commerce Clause, and State Control of Natural Resources, 1979 Sup. CT.
R-v. 51 [hereinafter cited as Hellerstein I]; Hellerstein, State Taxation and the Supreme
Court: Toward a More Unified Approach to Constitutional Adjudication, 75 MIGH. L. REv.
1426 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Hellerstein II]; Kitch, Regulation and the American
Common Market, in REGULATION, FEDERALISM AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE 7 (Tarlock
ed. 1981); Maltz, How Much Regulation Is Too Much - An Examination of Commerce
Clause Jurisprudence, 50 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 47 (1981); McGrath & Hellerstein,
Reflections on Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 43 MONT. L. REv. 165 (1982);
O'Fallon, The Commerce Clause: A Theoretical Comment, 61 OR. L. REv. 395 (1982);
Schwartz, Commerce, The States and the Burger Court, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 409 (1979);
Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 79 Wis. L. REy. 125 (1979). There
has also been revived interest in the privileges and immunities clause of art. IV,
§ 2. See Simson, Discrimination Against Nonresidents and the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 379 (1979); Varat, State "Citizenship" and
Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 487 (1981).
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regulate or tax entities engaged in interstate commerce. 5 However,
the Court has never adequately set forth a structurally-basedconceptual
justification for a negative aspect to the commerce clause and for the
Court's reliance on the commerce clause as a basis for invalidating
state regulation and taxation affecting interstate commerce.6 A structurally-based conceptual justification is one that would be consistent
with the structure of constitutional governance established by the
Constitution. The structure of constitutional governance established
by the Constitution, hereinafter referred to as the constitutionalstructure,
both allocates and limits governmental power. It allocates power
between the federal government and the states, and between the
three branches of the federal government, and it defines the scope
and mode of exercise of federal power. At the same time, it imposes
limitations on the exercise of power by the federal government and
by the states which are designed to protect individual rights from
improper governmental interference. 7 Therefore, a conceptual justification for a negative aspect to the commerce clause and for
reliance on the commerce clause as a source of restriction on state
regulatory and taxation power is consistent with the constitutional
structure only if the justification properly can be found to inhere in
that part of the constitutional structure either allocating power or
imposing limitations on the exercise of power designed to protect
individual rights.
5. The seminal case recognizing a negative aspect to the commerce clause.
and establishing the commerce clause as a restriction on state regulatory and
taxation power is Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
See infra notes 142-43 and accompanying text. As the Court stated in Southern
Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945): "For a hundred years it has
been accepted constitutional doctrine that the commerce clause, without the aid of
Congressional legislation, thus affords some protection from state legislation inimical
to the national commerce, and that in such cases, where Congress has not acted,
this Court, and not the state legislature, is under the commerce clause the final
arbiter of the competing demands of state and national interests."
6. Academic commentators have long been concerned with the problem of
a conceptual justification for a negative aspect to the commerce clause and with
the failure of the Court to set forth clear doctrine governing the permissibility of
state regulation and taxation affecting interstate commerce. See, e.g., Bikle, The
Silence of Congress, 41 HARV. L. REV. 200, 200-04 (1927); Dowling, Interstate Commerce
and State Power - Revisited Version, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 546, 554-59 (1947) [hereinafter
cited as Dowling I]; Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 29 VA. L. REV.
1, 1-8, 17-19 (1940) [hereinafter cited as Dowling III; Eule, supra note 4, at 43537; Maltz, supra note 4, at 58-64; Powell, The Validity of State Regulation Under the
Webb-Kenyon Law, 2 S.L.Q. 112, 135-39 (1917); Shenton, Interstate Commerce During
the Silence of Congress, 23 DICK. L. REV. 139, 160-62 (1918); Sholleys, The Negative
Implications of the Commerce Clause, 3 U. Cm. L. REV. 556, 558-59 (1936); Tushnet,
supra note 4, at 126-30.
7. For a further discussion of limitations on the exercise of power in the
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Because the constitutional structure allocates power between the
federal government and the states and also imposes limitations on
the exercise of state power, it follows analytically that state power
can be restricted in one of three ways. First, certain specific powers
are denied to the states, either expressly by the Constitution, or by
necessary implication from the affirmative grant to Congress of what
is considered an exclusive power. 8 Second, since the Constitution
embodies the principle of federal supremacy, a particular exercise
of state power may be proscribed because it conflicts with or is
preempted by Congress' affirmative exercise of its delegated powers. 9
These two methods of restriction obviously relate to the allocation
of power part of the constitutional structure. The third method of
restriction relates to the limitation of governmental power. The
constitutional structure see Sedler, The Legitimacy Debate in ConstitutionalAdjudication:
An Assessment and a Different Perspective, 44 OHIo ST. L.J. 93, 120-36 (1983).
8. Certain powers that are expressly granted to Congress by art. I, § 8,
are expressly and absolutely denied to the states by art. I, § 10, cl. 1. These include
the powers to enter into treaties, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and coin
money. Other powers granted to Congress, such as the power to lay imposts on
duties or exports, and the power to engage in war, are expressly denied to the
states by art. I, § 10, cl. 2, 3, unless Congress gives its affirmative consent to the
exercise of state power. The matter of denial of certain specific powers to the states
by necessary implication from the affirmative grant of power to Congress relates
to the question of whether the federal power is an "exclusive" one. See infra notes
390-93, 397-404 and accompanying text. A federal power is "exclusive" only when
the nature of the power is such that it could not concurrently exist in two sovereigns,
because the exercise of that power by one sovereign would necessarily be incompatible
with the exercise of the same power by another sovereign. See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 196 (1819). Research has disclosed no case where
the Court has specifically held that the exercise of state power over the matter in
issue was prohibited by necessary implication from the affirmative grant of an
exclusive power to Congress, or that any power granted to Congress under art. I,
§ 8, but not expressly denied to the states by art. I, § 10, was an exclusive federal
power. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (copyright power not
an exclusive federal power). Certain examples of an exclusive federal power, however,
come readily to mind, such as the naturalization and immigration power, under
art. I, § 8, cl. 4, see, e.g., Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259, 269 (1817); the
power to fix the standard of weights and measures under art. I, § 8, cl. 5; and the
postal power under art. I, § 8, cl. 7. Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, also provides for exclusive
federal power over federal property.
9. While the principle of federal supremacy is textually embodied in art.
VI, § 2, it can also be contended that this principle follows from the constitutional
structure. The premise here is that since the federal government is given certain
specific powers by the Constitution while the states retain the general sovereign
power they possessed prior to the adoption of the Constitution, the specific grant
must control over the general reservation, so that an exercise of federal power
within the constitutional grant of authority controls over an inconsistent exercise
of state power. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405-06 (1819);
see also THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 203, 204-05 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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Constitution imposes a number of limitations on the exercise of state
power designed to protect individual rights, such as the limitations
contained in the fourteenth amendment.' 0
The structural problem with a negative aspect to the commerce
clause arises because the commerce clause as a source of restriction
on state regulatory and taxation power does not clearly come within
any of these three structural methods of restriction. The Constitution
does not expressly prohibit the states from regulating or taxing
entities engaged in interstate commerce. The Court has long held
that the commerce power is not an exclusive federal power that
implicitly prohibits all state regulation or taxation affecting interstate
commerce." By definition, the negative aspect of the commerce
clause comes into play only when Congress has not affirmatively
exercised its commerce power, so there is no question of direct
conflict or preemption. The Constitution by its terms does not
recognize a "right" on the part of entities engaged in interstate
commerce to be free from state regulation or taxation. Furthermore,
the Constitution does not expressly impose any limitation on the
power of the states to regulate or tax interstate commerce. It could
be argued, therefore, that once the Court held that the commerce
power was not an exclusive federal power, the commerce clause could
not by its own force operate to impose any restriction on state regulatory
12
and taxation power.
For the above reasons, it would seem incumbent on the Court
to delineate precisely the structural basis for concluding that the
commerce clause has a negative aspect serving as a source of
restriction on state regulatory and taxation power. This the Court
has not done. In an almost casual manner, it has invoked two
alternative conceptual justifications for a negative aspect to the
commerce clause: the diminution of power justification and the
implied intention of Congress justification. Under the diminution of
power justification, the affirmative grant of the commerce power to

10. As will be demonstrated, limitations on governmental power designed
to protect individual rights may be found in the internal inferences of the Constitution
as well as in its text. See infra notes 477-83 and accompanying text.
11. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 229 (1851). See infra
notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
12. Chief Justice Taney had strongly maintained that the commerce power
was not an exclusive federal power and that it did not by its own force impose
any restriction on the power of the state to regulate interstate commerce. Nonetheless,
he silently acquiesced in the Court's holding in Cooley. See the discussion of Taney's
position in F. FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY
AND WHITE 46-73 (1937).
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Congress under article I, section 8, even though not exclusive, diminishes
the power of the states to regulate or tax interstate commerce. Under
the implied intention of Congress justification, the failure of Congress
to authorize expressly state regulation or taxation of interstate comnmerce in certain circumstances impliedly indicates congressional intention to preclude state regulation or taxation in those13 circumstances. As
the Court stated in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona:
[T]he states have not been deemed to have authority to
impede substantially the free flow of commerce from state
to state, or to regulate those phases of the national commerce
which, because of the need of national uniformity, demand
that their regulation, if any, be prescribed by a single authority. Whether or not this long-recognized distribution of
power between the national and the state governments is
predicated upon the implications of the commerce clause
itself, or upon the presumed intention of Congress, where
Congress has spoken, the result is the same.
And in California v. Zook,' 4 it is stated simply:
Certain first principles are no longer in doubt. Whether as
inference from congressional silence, or as a negative implication from the grant of power itself, when Congress has
not specifically acted we have accepted the Cooley case's broad
delineation of the areas of state and national power over
interstate commerce.
The Court has gone no further. It has never related either the
diminution of power justification nor the implied intention of Congress justification to the constitutional structure. It has never explained why the affirmative grant of a nonexclusive power to Congress
could diminish to any extent the exercise of the reserved general
regulatory and taxation powers of the states. Nor has it explained
how Congress could exercise its legislative power by silence, when
article I, section 7 specifically sets forth the mode for the exercise
of legislative power, requiring affirmative action by both houses of
Congress and concurrence by the President. The Court has simply
asserted its role as the "final arbiter of the competing demands of
'
state and national interests" '15
where state regulation or taxation

13.
14.
15.

325 U.S. 761, 767-68 (1945) (citations omitted).
336 U.S. 725, 728 (1949).
Southern Pacific Co., 325 U.S. at 769.
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affects interstate commerce and has sought standards by which to
define the appropriate scope of state power in these areas. The lack
of a fully-developed and structurally-based conceptual justification
for a negative aspect to the commerce clause, and for the use of
the commerce clause as a restriction on state regulatory and taxation
power, has contributed to the admitted lack of clarity in negative
6
commerce clause doctrine.'
17
At the same time, however, the Court's institutional behavior
in dealing with the negative commerce clause as a restriction on
state regulatory and taxation power is most revealing. Two distinct
patterns of institutional behavior emerge, depending on the discriminatory nature of the regulation or tax in question. Where the essential
effect of the challenged regulation or tax has been to discriminate
against or disadvantage interstate commerce or out-of-state interests
in favor of local commerce or in-state interests because of the interstate
nature of that commerce or the out-of-state nature of those interests,
the Court consistently and without exception has held such regulation
or tax to be unconstitutional. 8 This consistent pattern has been
followed from the 1870's to the present time.' 9 It is with respect to
nondiscriminatory regulation and taxation that the Court's institutional behavior has fluctuated dramatically. At the present time,
however, nondiscriminatory regulation and taxation almost invariably
20
have been sustained.
The focus of this Article will be on the relationship between the
Court's institutional behavior and a structurally-based conceptual
justification for a negative aspect to the commerce clause. We will
subject the negative commerce clause to analysis in terms of con2
stitutional structure, which the Court has so pointedly omitted. '

16. See supra note 6.
17. The Court's institutional behavior refers to what the Court does in the
process of constitutional adjudication, and is analyzed in terms of the results that
the Court reaches in that process. The Court's institutional behavior is not always
consistent with the Court's articulated doctrine and sometimes diverges sharply
from that doctrine. The "law" of the Constitution is thus a reflection of the
interaction between the Court's articulated doctrine and the results the Court
reaches in the application of that doctrine. For a further discussion of the Court's
institutional behavior, see Sedler, supra note 7, at 109-20.
18. This assumes that the state is not acting as a market participant or that
the discriminatory regulation has not been expressly authorized by Congress. See
infra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
19. The leading case setting forth the nondiscrimination principle under the
negative commerce clause is Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875). See infra
notes 204-08 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 76-110, 130-33 and accompanying text.
21. An analysis in terms of constitutional structure has a number of elements.
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Looking to the ways that the exercise of state power can be restricted
under the constitutional structure, we will consider whether a conceptual justification can be found for reliance on the commerce clause
in its negative aspect as the source of a restriction on state power
to regulate or tax interstate commerce. We will demonstrate that
neither the diminution of power justification nor the implied intention
of Congress justification properly can be found to inhere in that
constitutional structure. We will also demonstrate that another justification sometimes asserted for a negative aspect to the commerce
clause, the free trade principle which purportedly originated in the
historical context of the commerce clause, finds no support in that
context.
We will then demonstrate, in light of the historical context of the
commerce clause,2 2 that the commerce clause may be viewed as
embodying the nondiscriminationprinciple; that a major historical reason
for the affirmative grant of the commerce power to Congress was
to prevent discrimination by the states against interstate commerce
and out-of-state interests in favor of local commerce and in-state
interests. When so viewed, the commerce clause properly can be
relied on as the source for finding a right on the part of entities
engaged in interstate commerce and on the part of out-of-state
interests not to be subject to discrimination or disadvantage because
of the interstate nature of that commerce or the out-of-state nature
of those interests. This right is found in the internal inferences of the
Constitution rather than in its text, 23 but once recognized, it provides
constitutional protection against discriminatory state regulation and
taxation of interstate commerce in the same manner as if it were
expressly contained in the Constitution.
It involves a consideration of the underlying theory of the allocation of power under
the Constitution and of the underlying theory of the Constitution as the source of
protection of individual rights against governmental action. It places great importance
on the respective roles of the federal and state governments in our constitutional
scheme and on the bases for finding constitutional restrictions on the existence or
exercise of governmental power. It also involves a consideration of the Constitution
as a whole and of the relationship between its different provisions. Finally, under
such an analysis, careful attention is paid to text and historical context of constitutional provisions and to the functions of the different provisions in our constitutional
scheme.
An analysis in terms of constitutional structure, however, does not go beyond
trying to find answers to constitutional questions in the structure of constitutional
governance established by the Constitution. It should not be confused with "structuralism" as a methodology in legal analysis or otherwise. Cf Kennedy, The Structure
of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 209 (1979).
22. For a discussion of the meaning of historical context, see infra note 450.
23. For a discussion of the meaning of internal inferences of the Constitution,
see infra notes 477-83 and accompanying text.
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The thesis of this Article, therefore, is as follows: The commerce
clause does not by its own force operate negatively to restrict the
power of the states to regulate or tax entities engaged in interstate
commerce. The commerce clause, however, is the source of a right
on the part of entities engaged in interstate commerce and out-ofstate interests to be free from discrimination or disadvantage because
of the interstate nature of that commerce or the out-of-state nature
of those interests. It thus follows that what the negative commerce
clause prohibits is discrimination or disadvantage against interstate
commerce or out-of-state interests because of the interstate nature
of that commerce or the out-of-state nature of those interests.
Part I of the Article will explore the Court's approach to the
negative commerce clause as a restriction on state regulation and
taxation. It will first discuss the Court's current approach and the
results that the Court has reached in the application of that approach.
This analysis will reveal that, as a practical matter, the Court is
now invalidating all discriminatory regulation and taxation and
generally upholding nondiscriminatory regulation and taxation. Part
I will next review the Court's approach from an historical perspective,
tracing the Court's evolution toward its present approach. It will
then take a retrospective view of the Court's current approach and
its approach from an historical perspective. This will demonstrate
that while the Court's institutional behavior with respect to the
negative commerce clause as a general limitation on state regulatory
and taxation power has fluctuated dramatically, the Court has followed a completely consistent pattern of institutional behavior regarding discriminatory regulation and taxation. Without exception
it has invalidated all state regulation and taxation that has had the
effect of discriminating against interstate commerce or out-of-state
interests in favor of local commerce or in-state interests because of
the interstate nature of that commerce or the out-of-state nature of
those interests.
Part II of the article will discuss the conceptual justifications
that have been advanced for a negative aspect to the commerce
clause and will demonstrate that the only conceptual justification
that can withstand analysis in terms of constitutional structure is
that the commerce clause embodies the nondiscrimination principle.
It is this principle that may be relied on as the source of a right to
be free from state regulation and taxation discriminating against
interstate commerce or out-of-state interests because of the interstate
nature of that commerce or the out-of-state nature of those interests.
Thus, the Court's consistent pattern of institutional behavior and
the results that it has reached in the application of its current
approach are in accord with what we maintain is the only proper
structurally-based conceptual justification for a negative aspect to the
commerce clause.
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Part III will discuss further considerations relating to the nondiscrimination principle: the power of Congress to authorize discriminatory regulation or taxation, the relationship between the nondiscrimination principle of the negative commerce clause and the
privileges and immunities clause of article IV, and the constitutionality of discrimination in favor of local commerce and in-state interests
where the state is acting as market participant or dispenser of benefits.
I.

THE COURT'S APPROACH TO THE NEGATIVE COMMERCE
CLAUSE AS A RESTRICTION ON STATE REGULATION
AND TAXATION

A.

The Court's Current Approach

The Court's current approach to the negative aspect of the
commerce clause as a restriction on the exercise of state power has
been articulated differently with respect to regulation and taxation.
For this reason, these areas will be discussed separately, although
the results of the Court's decisions are substantially the same in
both areas. Despite the articulated difference in approach, the results
of the Court's decisions have been to invalidate all discriminatory
regulation and taxation and generally to sustain nondiscriminatory
regulation and taxation.
1.

Regulation

Ever since Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,24 the Court's approach
to the negative commerce clause as a restriction on state regulatory
power has been articulated in terms balancing competing national and
state interests. "[R]econciliation of the conflicting claims of state
and national power is to be attained only by some appraisal and
accommodation of the competing demands of the state and national
interests involved.' '25 The Court recently observed that the balancing
of interests approach has been applied in its negative commerce
clause cases for the past fourty-five years, 26 and the commentators
generally are agreed that this has been the prevailing mode of
analysis.27 The general test, as articulated in Pike v. Bruce Church, 28
and repeated in a number of subsequent cases, 29 is as follows:
24.

325 U.S. 761 (1945).

25. Id. at 768-69. The Court recently repeated this language in Arkansas Elec.
Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 390 (1983).
26. 461 U.S. at 391.
27. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 326-27 (1978);
Blumstein, supra note 4, at 500; Hellerstein I, supra note 4, at 63, 67-68.
28. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
29. See, e.g., Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982); Kassell v.
Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670-71 (1981); Minnesota v. Clover
Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 (1981); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S.
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Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local
purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree.
And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of
course depend on the nature of the local interest involved
and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser
impact on interstate activities.3 0
The application of the balancing approach differs, however, depending on whether the challenged regulation is "discriminatory."
Where the state has not regulated "even-handedly," in the sense
that the regulation, either expressly or in practical effect, discriminates
against or disadvantages interstate commerce or out-of-state interests
in favor of local commerce or in-state interests, the degree of scrutiny
is stricter and the burden of justification on the state is correspondingly greater. In that circumstance, "the burden falls on the State
to justify [the discriminatory treatment] both in terms of the local
benefits flowing from the statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at
stake."'"

Therefore, under the Court's articulated approach, there is a
balancing of competing national and state interests, with the method
of analysis and the degree of scrutiny dependent upon whether the
challenged regulation by its terms or in practical effect discriminates
against or disadvantages interstate commerce or out-of-state interests
in comparison with local commerce or in-state interests. In practice,
there have been two types of negative commerce clause challenges:
"discrimination" and "undue burden." Both grounds of challenge,
however, are accommodated within the balancing of interests approach. Thus, it is theoretically possible for a "discriminatory"
regulation to be sustained if the state satisfies its burden with respect
to the substantiality of the asserted state interest and the unavailability
of nondiscriminatory alternatives. Furthermore, a "nondiscriminatory" regulation may be invalidated if the Court finds that on
balance it imposes an "undue burden" on interstate commerce.
322, 331 (1979); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 441-42
(1978); Great At. & Pac. Tea Go. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 371-72 (1976).
30. 397 U.S. at 142 (citation omitted).
31. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333,
353 (1977) (citations omitted).
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While the Court has expressly applied this approach to all of
the regulation cases before it, the results that the Court has reached
would indicate that, in fact, the Court is following a very different
kind of approach. The results of the cases indicate that, with the
exception of the recent decision in Edgar v. Mite Corp.,32 which clearly
could have been decided the same way on other grounds, the "undue
burden" rationale has been limited to state regulation of transportation and, even there, the latest decisions can be explained on
discrimination grounds. With these exceptions, as long as the effect
of the challenged law has been truly even-handed, the Court has
not invalidated a state regulation on "undue burden" grounds,
despite the adverse impact of the regulation on the "free flow of
commerce." Conversely, where the Court has concluded that the
challenged regulation did not regulate "even-handedly," but had
the effect of discriminating against or disadvantaging interstate commerce or out-of-state interests in favor of local commerce or in-state
interests, it has always invalidated the regulation despite the cogency
of the asserted state interest.3 3 The Court has found either that the
asserted state interest was impermissible because it was avowedly
protectionist, 34 or that the asserted state interest could be advanced
by nondiscriminatory alternatives. 3 As a practical matter, nondiscriminatory alternatives will always be available, so that in the twopronged application of the balancing of interests approach, discrim3 6
inatory regulation necessarily will fail to pass constitutional muster.
Indeed, as the Court has sometimes stated, "where simple economic
protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtual per se rule of
37
invalidity has been erected."1
32. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
33. See infra notes 41-43 & 49-51.
34. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (preservation
of landfill space by barring access of out-of-state waste); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig,
Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935) (protection of New York milk producers from "destructive" out-of-state competition).
35. See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432
U.S. 333 (1977) (ban on use of superior grading standards of state of origin
unconstitutional where asserted consumer protection purpose could be accomplished
by permitting state of origin grading in addition to required grading); Dean Milk
Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (barring access of milk to local market produced
elsewhere unconstitutional where asserted health purpose could be accomplished
by inspection at place of production or acceptance of federal health standards).
36. The fact that nondiscriminatory alternatives always will be available is
a strong indication that the failure to employ those alternatives was motivated by
a "protectionist" purpose. In Hunt, for example, the "uniform grading" requirement, which prohibited the use of the superior Washington grading standards, was
adopted at the instigation of the North Carolina apple growers. 432 U.S. at 352.
37. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (citations omitted);
see also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 (1981).
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In practice then, the Court's application of the balancing of
interests approach draws a sharp distinction between "discrimination" challenges and "undue burden" challenges. While this distinction purportedly relates to differing standards of review, 38 in
practice it becomes result-dispositive. Discriminatory regulations have
always been invalidated, but when the discrimination challenge fails,
the undue burden challenge is virtually certain to fail as well 9
It is submitted, therefore, that outside of the transportation area,
and apart from Edgar v. Mite Corp. ,40 the results in all of the regulation
cases depend upon whether or not the challenged regulation has
been found to discriminate against interstate commerce or out-ofstate interests in favor of local commerce or in-state interests. The
outcome in all of these cases can be explained consistently in terms
of the following operative principle: Where the essential effect of the
regulation is to discriminate against or disadvantage interstate commerce or outof-state interests in favor of local commerce or in-state interests because of the
interstate nature of that commerce or the out-of-state nature of those interests,
the regulation is violative of the negative commerce clause. Conversely, where
the essential effect of the regulation is not discriminatory, as defined
above, the regulation is not violative of the negative commerce
clause, despite the "burden" it may place on interstate commerce
or the incidental advantage it may produce for some segment of the
local economy.
The key elements of this operative principle look to whether the
essential effect of the regulation is to discriminate against interstate
commerce or out-of-state interests in favor of local commerce or instate interests and to whether the discrimination is because of the
interstate nature of that commerce or the out-of-state nature of those
interests. The clearest cases illustrating this operative principle are
those where there is express discrimination in favor of local commerce
or in-state interests at the expense of interstate commerce or outof-state interests, and those where there is no discrimination whatsoever in favor of local commerce or in-state interests.
The first category consists of cases where the state regulation
expressly barred the entry of out-of-state products or businesses into

38. In Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979), the Court stated
that facial discrimination, "at a minimum . . . invokes the strictest scrutiny of
any purported legitimate local purpose and of the absence of nondiscriminatory
alternatives." For further discussion of differing standards of review, see Maltz,
supra note 4, at 49-54; Hellerstein I, supra note 4, at 67-69.
39. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981);
Exxon Corp. v. Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
40. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
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the state, 41 embargoed local products or resources from the interstate
market, 42 or gave local residents preferential access to local products
or resources. 43 Regardless of the cogency of the asserted state interest
in these cases, such as protecting the wholesale milk price structure
in Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig Inc. ,4 or protecting the environment in
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 45 such overt discrimination and blatant
protectionism simply has not been permitted. As the Court observed
in Philadelphia v. New Jersey: "Whatever New Jersey's ultimate purpose, it may not be accomplished by discriminating against articles
of commerce coming from outside the State unless there is some

reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently.' '46 The
second category includes price-fixing cases,4 7 where there was no
discrimination in favor of local interests, and where the effect of the

regulation failed to provide even an incidental advantage for some
segment of the local economy over a competitive segment of the
interstate economy. In these cases, local consumers felt the effect of
the price-fixing in exactly the same manner as the out-of-state
48
consumers; discrimination was completely absent.

41. See, e.g., Lewis v. B.T. Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980);
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Great Ad. & Pac. Tea
Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S.
511 (1935).
42. See New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982);
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
43. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982); Polar Ice
Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361 (1964). H.P. Hood & Sons,
Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949), also falls into this category. The basis of
the Court's decision in Hood was that the license was denied "on the articulated
ground that such facilities would divert milk supplies needed by local consumers,"
so that the license denial "discriminated against interstate commerce." See Cities
Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179, 188 (1950) (citing
Hood). If the license had been denied on the ground that an additional depot in
the area would lead to "destructive competition in a market already adequately
served," there would have been no negative commerce clause violation notwithstanding that Hood intended to sell the milk in the interstate market. See Tuscan
Dairy Farms, Inc. v. Barber, 45 N.Y.2d 215, 380 N.E. 2d 179, 408 N.Y.S.2d
348, aff'd mem., 439 U.S. 1040 (1978).
44. 249 U.S. 511 (1935).
45. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
46. Id. at 626-27.
47. See, e.g., Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179
(1950); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943); Milk Control Bd. v. Eisenberg
Co., 306 U.S. 346 (1939).
48. The fact that the price-fixing regulations substantially increased the
prices of goods moving in interstate commerce was not deemed to produce an
"undue burden" on interstate commerce.
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Another series of cases illustrating this operative principle are
those where the Court found that the essential effect of the regulation
was to discriminate against or disadvantage interstate commerce or
out-of-state interests in favor of local commerce or in-state interests
because of the interstate nature of that commerce or the out-of-state
nature of those interests. This category of cases includes Dean Milk
Co. v. Madison,49 Hunt v. Washington State Apple Commission,5 and Pike
v. Bruce Church.5 1 The "protectionist motive" was obvious in all of
these cases either from the terms of the regulation 2 or from its
application in the particular case. 53 The Court, however, has generally
rejected "improper motivation" as a relevant consideration in constitutional analysis,5 4 and instead has accepted the state's asserted
purpose at face value. It has then gone on to find that the asserted
purpose could be advanced by nondiscriminatory alternatives and
has held the challenged regulation to be unconstitutional.
In Dean Milk, the regulation by its terms prevented milk processors
in other states from having access to the Madison milk market and
thus gave local milk producers an effective monopoly in that market. 55
As the Court noted: "In thus erecting an economic barrier protecting
a major local industry against competition from without the State,
Madison plainly discriminates against interstate commerce. ' ' 5b The
reference to "plainly discriminat[ing] against interstate commerce"
makes it clear that for negative commerce clause purposes the focus
is on discriminatory effect, rather than on discriminatory intent, and
that so long as the essential effect of the regulation is to discriminate
49.
50.
51.

340 U.S. 349 (1951).
432 U.S. 333 (1977).
397 U.S. 137 (1970).

52. See Deen Milk, where the regulation prevented the sale in Madison of
any milk produced at a plant more than five miles from the center of Madison.

53.

See Hunt, where the uniform grading standards requirement was adopted

at the instigation of North Carolina apple producers, see supra note 36 and Pike,
where the practical effect of the Arizona regulation, as applied to the activities of

Bruce Church, would have resulted in economic advantage to Arizona workers and
suppliers over California workers and suppliers, see infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.

54.

See, e.g., United States v. O'Brian, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).

55.

It was immaterial, for negative commerce clause purposes, that Wisconsin

milk producers outside of Madison were also disadvantaged. 340 U.S. at 354 n.
4. However, a Wisconsin milk producer outside of Madison that was engaged in
interstate commerce also would be entitled to invoke the protections of the negative
commerce clause and thus would have standing to challenge the regulation on that
basis. For negative commerce clause purposes, the relevant discrimination is against

interstate commerce in favor of local commerce, not against nonresidents in favor
of residents. See infra notes 514-33 and accompanying text.
56. 340 U.S. at 354.
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against interstate commerce or out-of-state interests, 5it
is not necessary
7
to show that such discrimination was "intended.
In Hunt, the practical effect of the regulation was to disadvantage
Washington apple growers in comparison to North Carolina apple
growers by denying to the Washington growers the competitive
advantage they would otherwise have had because of Washington's
superior grading standards. Because the regulation had this effect,
it amounted to discrimination against interstate commerce for negative commerce clause purposes and, as always, the purportedly
neutral state interest could be advanced by nondiscriminatory alternatives. 5 As Hunt makes clear, discrimination for negative commerce
clause purposes may take the form of a denial of a competitive
advantage due to the out-of-state origin of the products, as well as
a ban on entry of out-of-state products or an embargo on in-state
products.5 9 It is the protectionist effect of the regulation and the
practical discrimination against, or the disadvantage to interstate
commerce or out-of-state interests because of the interstate nature
of that commerce or the out-of-state nature of those interests that
is unconstitutional.
'Although Bruce Church contains the classic exposition of the
balancing approach, and was expressly decided under an "undue
burden" analysis, the result in the case is fully consistent with the
operative principle herein set forth. If Bruce Church had been
compelled to move its packing shed to Arizona, it necessarily would
have been more likely to employ Arizona workers and to contract
with Arizona suppliers than it would be if it were permitted to pack
the Arizona-grown cantaloupes in California. The practical effect of
the Arizona regulation, therefore, was to favor Arizona economic
interests over California economic interests.6 0 This point seemed very

57. This is in accordance with the Court's long-standing interpretation of
the nondiscrimination principle of the negative commerce clause. See infra notes
215-29 and accompanying text.
The contrast between the "effects" standard under the nondiscrimination
principle of the negative commerce clause and the "intent" standard under the
nondiscrimination principle of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause
raises some very provocative questions, which are obviously beyond the scope of
the present writing. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Personnel
Adm'r. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
58. See supra note 35.
59. 432 U.S. at 351-53.
60. Pike thus presents a clear example of what is meant by discrimination
against out-of-state interests in favor of local interests, as opposed to discrimination
against interstate commerce in favor of local commerce. The regulation applied to
all cantaloupes grown in California and offered for sale, regardless of whether the
grower was engaged in interstate commerce or in purely local commerce. Thus,
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analysis. The Court

discussed at length the earlier case of Toomer v. Witsell, 61 where it
had invalidated a South Carolina law requiring shrimp boats fishing

in the maritime belt off South Carolina to unload and pack their
catch in that state. The Court noted that the effect of requiring the
work to be done in South Carolina would have been to "divert to
South Carolina employment and business which might otherwise go
to Georgia.' '62 In Bruce Church, as in Toomer, the practical effect of
the regulation would have been to favor local interests over out-ofstate interests, and it is this type of discrimination that is prohibited
by the negative commerce clause.
It is important to note that in Dean Milk, Hunt, and Bruce Church,
the essential effect of the regulation was to discriminate against or
disadvantage interstate commerce or out-of-state interests in favor of
local commerce or local interests because of the interstate nature of
that commerce or the out-of-state nature of those interests. In all of
these cases, the practical discrimination was between groups that
were similarly situated except for their in-state and out-of-state
location: the Madison and out-of-state milk producers in Dean Milk;
the North Carolina and Washington apple growers in Hunt; the
Arizona and California workers and suppliers in Bruce Church.
The importance of the interstate nature of the commerce or the
out-of-state nature of the interests as the basis of the discrimination
becomes most significant in cases where the Court rejected the
discrimination claim and upheld the challenged regulation. 63 This
category of cases includes Breard v. Alexandria,64 Exxon Corp. v.
Maryland,65 and Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. ,66 where at least
one of the effects of the challenged regulation was to provide an
advantage for some segment of the local economy over a competitive
segment of the interstate economy. In these cases, the regulations
were upheld because they did not produce a discriminatory effect
for negative commerce clause purposes. Whatever discrimination was
produced by the regulation was not between groups that were
there was no discrimination against entities engaged in interstate commerce, such
as Bruce Church. But because Bruce Church was subject to the regulation and
because its interests were intertwined with unidentified out-of-state workers and
suppliers, it could challenge the regulation, as applied to its activities, as being
violative of the negative commerce clause. See infra note 495.
61. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
62. Id. at 403 (quoted in Bruce Church, 397 U.S. at 146).
63. In so doing, the Court also rejected the claim that the challenged
regulation imposed an "undue burden" on interstate commerce.
64. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
65. 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
66. 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
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similarly situated except for their in-state and out-of-state location. 67
Thus, the essential effect of the regulation was not to discriminate
against or disadvantage interstate commerce or out-of-state interests
because of the interstate nature of that commerce or the out-of-state
68
nature of those interests.
In Breard, the purpose of the ordinance was to protect householder
privacy and the regulation prohibited all door-to-door commercial
solicitation. 69 In one area of commercial solicitation, subscriptions
67. The question of what constitutes a discriminatory effect for negative
commerce clause purposes was the basis of the disagreement between Justice Stevens,
writing for the Court, and Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Exxon. Justice Stevens
emphasized that the challenged regulation did not distinguish between independent
retailers and producer-marketeers. 437 U.S. at 125-26. Justice Blackmun maintained
that there was "discrimination against interstate commerce," because the producermarketeers were interstate operators while the independent retailers were "overwhelmingly local businessmen." Id. at 137. Professor Eule says that the "fundamentally different definitions of discrimination" employed by Justices Stevens and
Blackmun in Exxon demonstrate the Court's "failure to identify, unambiguously
who or what it is that state legislatures may not discriminate against." Eule, supra
note 4, at 444-45. The Court, however, has identified "who" is protected against
discrimination: the protection extends to entities engaged in interstate commerce
and to out-of-state interests. See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
The disagreement between Justices Stevens and Blackmun relates to the kind of
discrimination that the negative commerce clause prohibits and, as the holding in
Exxon makes clear, the kind of discrimination that the negative commerce clause
prohibits is discrimination against interstate commerce or out-of-state interests
because of the interstate nature of that commerce or the out-of-state nature of those
interests. Since the discrimination in Exxon was not between in-state and out-of-state
independent retailers, there was no discrimination against interstate commerce
because of the interstate nature of that commerce, and thus no discrimination
within the meaning of the negative commerce clause. 437 U.S. at 125-26.
68. In Exxon, for example, a motiviating factor behind the enactment of the
regulation indeed may have been to protect Maryland retail service stations against
competition from interstate producer-marketeers. However, since that regulation
did not produce a discriminatory effect for negative commerce clause purposes, the
motivation behind the enactment of the regulation was constitutionally irrelevant.
See supra note 54.
69. Note that the Court held that the ordinance was not violative of the
first amendment. 341 U.S. at 641-45. Although the decision was premised on the
now discarded assumption that commercial speech receives relatively little first
amendment protection, the same result would probably be obtained under the
Court's current commercial speech doctrine. That doctrine distinguishes between
the protection afforded to commercial and noncommercial speech, so the fact that
the ordinance might be unconstitutional as applied to noncommercial speech would
not be result-dispositive. See generally Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141
(1943) (a municipal ordinance forbidding a person from distributing handbills-as
applied to a person distributing religous pamphlets-invalid under the first amendment). The state's interest in protecting householder privacy probably would be
held to outweigh the solicitor's interest in face-to-face contact with potential customers. Cf Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
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to national magazines, the regulation had the effect of favoring local
retail merchants over interstate magazine solicitors because the latter
could operate effectively only by door-to-door solicitation.7 ° But the
regulation also had the effect of favoring local retail merchants over
local solicitors with respect to the sale of magazines and every other
product. Thus, the discrimination was not against interstate commerce or out-of-state interests because of the interstate nature of that
commerce or the out-of-state nature of those interests. The discrimination against interstate magazine solicitors was a by-product of a regulation
which, for the purpose of protecting householder privacy, had the effect of discriminating against solicitors-both local and interstate-in
favor of local retail merchants. Since the regulation impacted equally
on local and interstate solicitors, its essential effect was not to discriminate
against groups that were similarly situated except for their in-state and
out-of-state location, and it thus was not violative of the negative commerce clause. 7
In Clover Leaf, the state enacted an "environmental protection"
regulation designed to reduce the amount and type of material
entering the state's solid waste system. The primary effect of the
regulation was felt by milk producers and milk container producers,
who were prevented from packaging milk for sale in the Minnesota
market in plastic, nonreturnable containers. This effect was felt equally
by Minnesota milk producers and packagers and by out-of-state milk
producers and packagers. 72 A secondary effect of the regulation was
to increase the sale of pulpwood at the expense of plastic resin
because only paperboard milk containers, derived from pulpwood,
could be used in the Minnesota milk market. Because plastic resin
was produced entirely by non-Minnesota firms, and pulpwood was
a major Minnesota industry, the effect of the regulation was not to
favor Minnesota pulpwood producers over out-of-state pulpwood
producers. The actual effect was to favor all pulpwood producers,
both in-state and out-of state, over resin producers, who were all
out-of-state. Again, since the discrimination was not between groups
that were similarly situated except for their in-state and out-of-state
location, there was no impermissible discrimination for negative
commerce clause purposes.

70. The importance of door-to-door solicitation in obtaining subscriptions
to national magazines was established by the record. 341 U.S. at 635 n.18.
71. The Court did not discuss separately the "undue burden" claim, merely
noting that "[wie cannot say that this ordinance of Alexandria so burdens or
impedes interstate commerce as to exceed the regulatory powers of that city." Id.
at 641.
72. 449 U.S. at 471-72.
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In Exxon, the regulation was designed to favor retail service
stations, practically all of which were local, over producer-marketeers
who were necessarily interstate operations.7 3 While there were a few
interstate retail service stations in Maryland, the result would not
have been different if all the retail service stations had been local.
Here again the discrimination was between different groups, retail
service station operators and producer-marketeers, not between groups
that were otherwise similarly situated except for their in-state and
out-of-state location. As the Court noted: "The fact that the burden
of a state regulation falls on some interstate companies does not, by
itself, establish a claim of discrimination against interstate commerce." 74 Since there was no discrimination against interstate commerce or out-of-state interests because of the interstate nature of that
commerce or the out-of-state nature of those interests, the negative
commerce clause was not violated.75
Thus, outside of the transportation area, and except for Edgar
v. Mite Corp., the results in all of the regulation cases can be explained
76
consistently in terms of an overriding principle of nondiscrimination.
The negative commerce clause is violated when-and only whenthe essential effect of the regulation is to discriminate against or
73. 437 U.S. at 125. This would have been true even if some of the
producer-operators had their principal place of business in Maryland, which none
did. Id. at 126.
74. Id. at 126.
75. Id. The Court also rejected the "undue burden" claim on the ground
that there was no showing that the supply of petroleum products coming into
Maryland had been diminished because of the regulation. Id. at 127.
76. In Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20 (1974), the Court
held that Mississippi's refusal to enforce an interstate contract for the sale of cotton
at the insistence of a noncomplying foreign corporation was violative of the negative
commerce clause. Cases such as Allenberg analytically involve a specialized application
of the nondiscrimination principle. The issue in these cases is whether the foreign
corporation's business activities in the state are sufficient to justify requiring the
corporation to comply with the state's foreign corporation licensing laws. Compare
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Say-On-Drugs, Inc., 366 U.S. 276 (1961), with Dahnke-Walker
Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282 (1921). If the local activities are sufficient,
the compliance requirement may be enforced by barring suits by noncomplying
foreign corporations, notwithstanding that the corporation is engaged in interstate
commerce and that the suit is on an interstate contract. In such circumstances,
the bar is not imposed because the foreign corporation is engaged in interstate
commerce, but because it has failed to comply with a requirement to which it is
properly subject. However, if the corporation's local activities are insufficient to
justify the compliance requirement, the state has no legitimate basis for barring a
suit by that corporation on what is necessarily an interstate contract. Such a bar
would be unconstitutional because the state would be discriminating against suits
on interstate" contracts by denying those suits the same access to its courts that it
provides for suits on local contracts.
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disadvantage interstate commerce or out-of-state interests in favor
of local commerce or in-state interests because of the interstate nature
of that commerce or the out-of-state nature of those interests. Where
such discrimination has not been found to exist, the Court has not
invalidated any regulation on the ground that it imposes an "undue
burden" on interstate commerce."
The Court has recognized an exception to the nondiscrimination
principle when the state is acting as a market participant and has
held that the negative commerce clause is completely inoperable in
that situation.7 8 Thus, the state can limit its purchases of products
to resident sellers,7 9 limit its sales of products produced by stateowned businesses to resident buyers," and require that its contractors
81
give employment preference on state contracts to state residents.
Let us now consider the transportation cases and Edgar v. Mite
Corp.,82 which were expressly decided on "undue burden" grounds.
In the relatively older transportation cases of Southern Pacific Co. v.
Arizona,"' and Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines,8 4 the challenged regulations
were truly nondiscriminatory, equally applicable in every respect to
local commerce and interstate commerce, and provided no competitive advantage to local commerce. These two cases represent exceptions to the nondiscrimination principle and are examples of the
Court's invalidation of state regulations on pure "undue burden"
grounds. 85 The results in the more recent transportation cases,

77. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 127 (1978); Breard
v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 633-41 (1951).
78. See infra notes 548-67 and accompanying text.
79. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
80. Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
81. White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S.
204 (1983). Such preferences, however, may violate the privileges and immunities
clause, art. IV, § 1. See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of
Camden, 104 S. Ct. 1020 (1984).
82. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
83. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
84. 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
85. Another exception can be found in Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373
(1946), where the Court used the negative commerce clause to invalidate racial
segregation on interstate buses at a time when it was not ready to hold unconstitutional all state imposed racial segregation. Since Virginia also required racial
segregation on intrastate buses, Morgan, strictly speaking, represents another case
in which the Court invalidated a state regulation that did not discriminate against
interstate commerce in favor of local commerce on "undue burden" grounds. It
is difficult to believe, however, that Morgan was anything more than one of the
"narrower ground" holdings, such as Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), that
ultimately culminated in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Its
negative commerce clause rationale should be deemed to have been superseded by

1985]

THE NEGATIVE COMMERCE CLA USE

Raymond Motor Co. v. Rice 6 and Kassell v. Consolidated Freightways,87
however, can be explained consistently with the nondiscrimination
principle. s 8 Although, in both cases, the Court applied the balancing
approach and invalidated the challenged regulations on "undue
burden" grounds, the length of vehicle restrictions in both cases
contained exemptions that were found to favor local interests. This
"protectionism" was significant in the Court's balancing analysis.
In Kassell, the challenged regulation prohibited the use of sixtyfive feet double trucks in Iowa, but it contained an exception
permitting cities that abutted the state line to adopt the length
limitations of adjoining states for use within the city limits and in
nearby commercial zones. In addition, an Iowa truck manufacturer
could obtain a permit to ship trucks that were as long as seventy
feet, and permits were available to move oversized mobile homes
from one location in Iowa to another, or for delivery to an Iowa
resident.8 9 Justice Powell, writing for the plurality, concluded that
the exemptions, designed to benefit local economic interests, weakened the asserted safety justification and contributed to striking the
balance against the regulation's constitutionality.9 " Justices Brennan
and Marshall, concurring in the result, viewed the purpose of the
regulation, in light of the exemptions, as discouraging interstate
truck traffic on Iowa's highways, thus constituting an impermissible
"protectionist" purpose under the negative commerce clause.'
In Raymond, there were a number of exemptions from Wisconsin's
fifty-five feet truck length limit. One exemption permitted Wisconsin
industries to transport their products from Wisconsin to other states
without a reciprocal exemption for out-of-state industries to transport
their products through Wisconsin. 92 These exemptions were relied
on by the Court to belie the asserted safety purpose and to invalidate
the regulation on "undue burden" grounds.93

the equal protection rationale of Brown and its progeny. See the per curiam decision
in Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903, aff'g 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956).
86. 434 U.S. 429 (1978).
87. 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
88. Note that state regulation of the length of motor vehicles moving in
interstate commerce has now been preempted by federal law. See 49 U.S.C. § 2316
(Supp. 1983).
89. 450 U.S. at 666.
90. Justice Powell stated: "[]ess deference to the legislative judgment is due
. . . where the local regulation bears disproportionately on out-of-state residents
and businesses." Id. at 675-76.
91. Id. at 685-87.
92. The Raymond exceptions were discussed in Kassell, id. at 675-76.
93. 434 U.S. at 446-47.
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The results in Kassell and Raymond can be analyzed under the
nondiscrimination principle by focusing on the exemptions that
expressly discriminated against interstate commerce and out-of-state
interests in favor of local commerce and in-state interests. Consistent
application of the nondiscrimination principle should preclude allowance of any exemptions in safety regulations that expressly or in
practical effect discriminate against interstate commerce or out-ofstate interests in favor of local commerce or in-state interests. A
safety regulation containing such an exemption should be declared
unconstitutional; the state should regulate in an evenhanded manner
by removing the exemption or by foregoing the regulation. 9 4 A
parallel analysis can be drawn with respect to the requirement of
content neutrality in the first amendment area. Where the state
adopts otherwise permissible time, place and manner limitations,
but makes an exception for certain expression based on the content
of that expression, the regulation is facially invalid as violative of
the first amendment. For example, a time, place and manner
limitation on picketing that contains an exemption for picketing
connected with a labor dispute, violates the requirement of content
neutrality and is, therefore, unconstitutional.9 5 Likewise, safety regulations that contain exemptions favoring local commerce or in-state
interests should be held to violate the negative commerce clause.
On this basis, Kassell and Raymond can be brought within the ambit
of the nondiscrimination principle, leaving Southern Pacific and Bibb
as the only transportation cases falling outside.
Finally, Edgar v. Mite Corp.99 merits discussion. If ever there was
a case where the Court was absolutely clear as to the result it wanted
to reach, but had great difficulty in arriving at a doctrinal basis to
sustain that result, Edgar is that case. Whereas the six Justices who
reached the merits 97 all agreed that applying Illinois business takeover
law to an attempted takeover of a Delaware corporation with its
principal place of business in Connecticut was invalid, they had
great difficulty agreeing on the doctrinal basis for the invalidity.
Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun,
shared the view that all state regulation of corporate takeover and
tender offers was preempted by federal law.98 Justice White, joined
94. For a somewhat different view as to the constitutional effect of exemptions
in safety regulations, see Tushnet, supra note 4, at 156-63.
95. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Chicago Police Dep't v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
96. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
97. Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Rehnquist contended that the case was
moot. Id. at 655-67.

98.

Id. at 630-40.
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by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stevens and O'Connor, further
contended that the application of the Illinois law was unconstitutional
because it was "a direct restraint on interstate commerce and . . .
has a sweeping extraterritorial effect." 99 These four Justices also
found the law to be unconstitutional under the "Bruce Church balancing test"'"' on the ground that, "the burden imposed on [interstate
commerce] must not be excessive in relation to local interests served
by the statute." 10
'
The Edgar Court's plurality opinion invalidates application of the
Illinois law on "undue burden" grounds. The Court, however,
should have reached the result it obviously wanted on completely
different grounds. The appropriate constitutional vehicle for invalidating the application of the Illinois law in Edgar was the full faith
and credit clause, 0 2 not the negative commerce clause. In the "undue
burden" part of his opinion, Justice White emphasized the broad
sweep of the Illinois law and expressed great concern over the effect
of conflicting state takeover laws on takeover efforts directed at
interstate corporations. Justice White noted: "The Act thus applies
to corporations that are not incorporated in Illinois and have their
principal place of business in other states. Illinois has no interest in
regulating the internal affairs of foreign corporations.""" Additionally, "[i]f Illinois may impose such regulations, so may other States;
and interstate commerce in securities transactions generated by tender
offers would be thoroughly stifled.' 0 4 It is precisely these kind of
concerns which the full faith and credit clause was intended to
address.
The full faith and credit clause, as Justice Stevens has observed,
was "designed to transform the several States from independent
sovereignties into a single, unified Nation.' 0 5 The primary function
of the full faith and credit clause has been to compel recognition of
judgments reached in sister states.' 0 6 In certain limited circumstances,
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 642.
Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
457 U.S. at 643-46.
102. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
103. 457 U.S. at 645-46.
104. Id. at 642.
105. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 322 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (citations omitted).
106. See Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935). See
generally Reese & Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 COLUM.
L. REv. 153 (1953). As a general proposition, a state court must recognize a final
judgment entered by a sister state court unless the court of rendition lacked
jurisdiction in the constitutional sense or the judgment was subject to collateral
attack in the state of rendition. The full faith and credit clause also embodies the
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however, the "federal interest in national unity," reflected in the
full faith and credit clause, also requires a state to refrain from
applying its own law to a transaction or situation that is connected
with more than one state.10 7 For example, with respect to the internal
affairs of a corporation that carries on its activities in a number of
states, the Supreme Court has long held, as a matter of full faith
and credit, that the law of the state of incorporation must govern
the validity of a deficiency assessment against stockholders of a
08
If decorporation or members of a fraternal benefit association.
in
others
invalid
and
states
some
in
valid
were
ficiency assessments
function
not
could
association
benefit
fraternal
or
the corporation
effectively on a national basis. In that circumstance, the "federal
interest in national unity" requires the application of a uniform law
to govern the validity of the deficiency assessment, and the most
appropriate law for that purpose is the law of the state of incorporation.
For the same reasons set forth by Justice White in Edgar, the
"federal interest in national unity" requires the application of a
uniform law to takeovers and tender offers involving interstate
corporations.10 9 Thus, Illinois, which was neither the state of incorporation nor the state of the corporation's principal place of business,
could not, consistent with full faith and credit, apply its law to
regulate a takeover attempt directed toward that corporation. Therefore, the holding of unconstitutionality in Edgar should have been
based on a full faith and credit clause analysis. It was completely
unnecessary for the Court to have relied upon "undue burden on
interstate commerce" grounds.
Since the result in Edgar can be explained on the basis of full
faith and credit requirements, and since the results in Kassell and
Raymond can be brought within the ambit of the nondiscrimination
principle, only Southern Pacific and Bibb remain as pure "undue
burden" cases after almost forty years of negative commerce clause
decisions in the regulation area." 0 The results in all of the other
nondiscrimination principle and prohibits discriminatory refusal to enforce claims
existing under the law of a sister state. See infra notes 490-94 and accompanying
text.
107. See Sedler, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law: The Perspective of
Constitutional Generalism, 10 HoFSTRa L. REV. 59, 99-100 (1981).
108. See Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935); Supreme Council of
Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531 (1915).
109. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
110. As stated previously, Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946), in
retrospect, should not be considered a negative commerce clause case. See supra
note 85.
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cases can be explained in terms of the nondiscrimination principle:
the negative commerce clause precludes discrimination or disadvantage against interstate commerce or out-of-state interests in favor of
local commerce or in-state interests because of the interstate nature
of that commerce or the out-of-state nature of those interests. All
state regulations having this kind of discriminatory effect have been
held unconstitutional by the Court and, conversely, nondiscriminatory state regulation generally has not been invalidated on "undue
burden" grounds. 1 '
This result oriented explanation of the Court's negative commerce
clause decisions in the regulation area can be reconciled with a
structurally-based conceptual justification for a negative aspect to the
commerce clause. The nondiscrimination principle, which has been
the operational basis of the Court's decisions in these cases, has
been followed consistently by the Court, in both the regulation and
the taxation area, throughout the time that it has relied on the
negative commerce clause to invalidate state regulation and taxation.
The nondiscrimination principle is the only structurally proper basis
for invalidating state regulation and taxation under the negative
commerce clause. Therefore, the sole prohibition of the negative
111. In United States Brewers Ass'n v. Healy, 692 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1982),
summarily aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 265 (1983), the Second Circuit invalidated a Connecticut
beer price affirmation law as "plac[ing] an unconstitutional burden on interstate
commerce." Id. at 276. The law required beer brewers to file a monthly schedule
stating the per unit price that it would charge Connecticut wholesalers for its
products in the following month, and a sworn affirmation that its posted per
unit prices would be no higher than its prices for corresponding units sold in
any state bordering Connecticut during that month. It also contained provisions
designed to insure that beer would be offered to Connecticut wholesalers on the
same terms that it was offered to wholesalers in adjacent states. The contention of
the brewers that the law had a discriminatory effect on interstate commerce was
rejected by the district court, and was not considered by the Second Circuit. Id.
at 281 & n.12, 282. Rather, the Second Circuit found that the law placed an
"undue burden" on interstate commerce because it had the practical effect of
regulating the prices that the brewers could charge to wholesalers in neighboring
states. Id. at 282. In the earlier case of Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter,
384 U.S. 35 (1966), the Supreme Court had upheld, against a negative commerce
clause challenge, a New York price affirmation law requiring liquor manufacturers
to sell liquor in New York at a price no higher than the lowest price at which
sales were made anywhere in the United States during the preceding month. The
Healy court distinguished Seagram on the ground that the Connecticut law would
control the brewers' future conduct in the neighboring states. 692 F.2d at 283.
The Supreme Court's summary affirmance of the Second Circuit's decision does
represent a case where the Court sustained an "undue burden" challenge. However,
summary dispositions have little precedential value in the Supreme Court. See
Edleman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 670-71 (1974). Thus, the summary affirmance
in Healy does not undercut the Court's general rejection of "undue burden"
challenges to nondiscriminatory state regulation.
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commerce clause is discrimination or disadvantage against interstate
commerce or out-of-state interests because of the interstate nature
of that commerce or the out-of-state nature of those interests. Under
the Court's current approach to the negative commerce clause as a
restriction on state regulation, there has been an almost complete
concurrence between the results reached by the Court in the cases
coming before it and the structurally-based conceptual justification
that will be advanced below for a negative aspect to the commerce
clause.
2.

Taxation

The negative commerce clause as a restriction on state taxation
affecting interstate commerce has had a tortuous evolution. As a
part of that evolution, negative commerce clause limitations tended
to be merged with due process limitations and, as a result, a combined
due process-negative commerce clause challenge was asserted against
state taxation affecting interstate commerce. In Complete Auto Transit,
Inc. v. Brady, 112 decided in 1977, the Court articulated a completely
new approach toward permissible state taxation of interstate commerce. State taxation of interstate commerce would be sustained
when four elements were satisfied: (1) the tax is applied to an activity
having a substantial nexus with the taxing state; (2) the tax is fairly
apportioned to that activity; (3) the tax does not discriminate against
interstate commerce; and (4) the tax is fairly related to services
13
provided by the state."
Despite the continued due process-negative commerce clause
linkage under this approach, elements (1), (2), and (4) of the Complete
Auto Transit test clearly involve due process considerations of "reasonableness and fairness." 1 4 They are similar to the "minimum
contacts and fundamental fairness" criteria" 5 which govern the
constitutional permissibility of a state's exercise of judicial jurisdiction
over nonresidents and foreign corporations,"16 and emanate from the
same constitutional concerns. Whenever a state attempts to tax
entities that are engaged in interstate commerce and carry on activities
connected with more than one state, as when it attempts to exercise

112. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
113. Id. at 279. The Court upheld a state "privilege tax," measured by a
percentage of gross income, as applied to a contract motor carrier that hauled
vehicles in interstate commerce.
114. Id. Note that "fairness" is required in both elements (2) and (4).
115. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
116. See R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 115-29 (2d ed.
1980), for a discussion of the minimum contacts and fundamental fairness criteria.

19851

THE NEGATIVE COMMERCE CLA USE

judicial jurisdiction over nonresidents and foreign corporations, territorially-based due process considerations of reasonableness and
fairness come into play. In the judicial jurisdiction context, these
considerations focus on the connection between the defendant and
the forum state seeking to exercise jurisdiction, or on the connection
between the transaction giving rise to the litigation and the forum
state. In the taxation context, these considerations similarly focus
on the connection between the activity on which the tax is based
and the taxing state, and on the fair apportionment of the tax to
that activity, and may be expressed in terms of "substantial nexus,"
"fair apportionment," and "fair relation to services provided."
They arise out of a due process concern with reasonableness and
fairness because the subjects of state taxation are engaged in interstate
commerce and are carrying out their business activities in more than
one state. The particular form of taxation, in order to be reasonable
and fair as a matter of due process, must take this factor into
account. Elements (1), (2), and (4) of the Complete Auto Transit test are
the concrete means of measuring the due process concern with the
117
reasonableness and fairness of the particular form of taxation.
Therefore, only the third element of the Complete Auto Transit
test finds its source in considerations relevant to the negative commerce clause. Just as the negative commerce clause precludes discriminatory regulation of interstate commerce, it precludes
discriminatory taxation of interstate commerce, and the Court has

117. In Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 21920 (1980) the Court stated:
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes two
requirements for such state taxation [of the income of a business operating
in interstate commerce]: a "minimal connection" or "nexus" between
the interstate activities and the taxing State, and a "rational relationship
between the income attributed to the State and the intrastate values of
the enterprise." The tax cannot be "out of all appropriate proportion to
the business transacted by the [enterprise] in that State.
Id. (citations omitted).
In Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Cory, 726 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1984), aff'd.
by an equally divided court, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985), the Ninth Circuit invalidated on
negative commerce clause ground California's regulations computing "rent" for
the leasing of state owned tidelands and submerged lands based on the volume of
oil in interstate and foreign commerce passing over the leased property. The court
found that this method of computing "rent" was unreasonable, because it failed
to reflect the value of the land and was not directed toward compensating the state
for the use of the land. This rationale would indicate that the decision more
properly should have been based on due process rather than negative commerce
clause grounds. The court also found a violation of the import-export clause because
95% of the oil entering California was in foreign commerce and the method of
computing "rent" could have a discriminatory effect on foreign commerce.
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consistently so held. When a state taxation scheme, expressly or in
practical operation, discriminated against interstate commerce or outof-state interests in favor of local commerce or in-state interests, it
was held unconstitutional, both before and after Complete Auto Transit."8
As the Court has stated:
One of the fundamental principles of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence is that no State, consistent with the Commerce
Clause, may "impose a tax which discriminates against
interstate commerce . . . by providing a direct commercial
advantage to local business." This antidiscrimination principle "follows inexorably from the basic purpose of the
Clause," to prohibit the multiplication of preferential trade
areas destructive of the free commerce anticipated by the
Constitution." 19
As in the regulation area, the focus is on the discriminatory effect
of the tax. The tax must be analyzed in light of its actual effect,
considered in conjunction with the other provisions of the state's
scheme of taxation, and the inquiry must be directed toward whether
the tax, "will in its practical operation work discrimination against
interstate commerce. ',120 Thus, in Maryland v. Louisiana,'2' Louisiana's
"first use" tax on certain uses of natural gas brought into the state
was held to be unconstitutional because it contained various credits
and exclusions, the essential effect of which was to encourage the
use and production of natural gas in Louisiana rather than in other
states.' 22 This being so, it "unquestionably discriminate[d] against
interstate commerce in favor of local interests,"' 23 and thus was
24
unconstitutional. In Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission,'
the Court invalidated a New York state stock transfer tax which
imposed a greater tax liability on out-of-state sales than on in-state
sales, with the obvious effect of extending a competitive advantage
to sales on New York stock exchanges at the expense of sales on
25
regional exchanges.
118. See infra notes 347-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
pre-CompleteAuto Transit cases. Professor Hellerstein states that the protection afforded
interstate commerce against state taxation is "essentially a guarantee of nondiscriminatory treatment." Hellerstein II, supra note 4, at 1448.
119. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 754 (1981) (citations omitted).
120. Id. at 756.
121. Id. at 725 (1981).
122. Id. at 756-58.
123. Id. at 756.
124. 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
125. The fact that the favorable tax treatment extended to in-state sales by
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Again, as in the regulation area, the tax is discriminatory within
the meaning of the negative commerce clause only when it discriminates against interstate commerce or out-of-state interests because of
the interstate nature of that commerce or the out-of-state nature of
those interests. In Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana,126 the Montana
coal severance tax was challenged as being discriminatory, in violation
of the negative commerce clause, because ninety percent of the coal
was shipped out-of-state, with the effect that the tax was borne
primarily by out-of-state consumers. The Court sharply rejected this
challenge, noting that the tax was based entirely on the amount of
coal consumed and not on any distinction between in-state and outof-state consumers. 127 Therefore, the Court was "not confronted here
with the type of differential tax treatment of interstate and intrastate
28
commerce that the Court has found in other 'discrimination' cases."
The Court also made it clear that there was no "undue burden"
limitation on the power of the states to tax interstate commerce. It
flatly rejected the contention that the negative commerce clause gives
residents of one state a right of access at "reasonable prices" to
resources located in another state that is richly endowed with such
resources. The only right of access that the Court found to be
recognized by the Constitution is the same right of access that is
129
enjoyed by the residents of the state where the resource is located.
Apart from the discrimination cases, in the wake of Complete Auto
Transit, state taxation of interstate commerce has invariably been
upheld. 30 In the process, the Court has overruled a number of
nonresidents did not obviate the negative commerce clause violation. While discriminatory tax treatment of nonresidents in comparison to residents is violative of
the privileges and immunities clause of art. IV, § 2, Austin v. New Hampshire,
420 U.S. 656 (1975) (tax unconstitutional because it fell exclusively on nonresidents
and was not imposed similarly upon residents), in Boston Stock Exchange it was the
discrimination against interstate commerce in favor of local commerce-independent
of the residence of the seller-that was the basis of the constitutional violation. See
infra note 526 and accompanying text.
126. 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
127. Id. at 618. In this sense, the effect of the tax was the same as that of
a price fixing scheme which impacted equally on in-state and out-of-state consumers.
See supra note 48.
128. Id. at 618. See also McGrath & Hellerstein, supra note 4, at 169-71.
129. 453 U.S. at 622-23.
130. The Court has, however, invalidated some state schemes of taxation
affecting foreign commerce. In Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441
U.S. 434 (1979), the Court invalidated, on negative commerce clause grounds, the
application of California's ad valorem property tax to cargo containers of Japanese
companies, which were used exclusively in foreign commerce and which were based,
registered, and subjected to full value property taxes in Japan. The Court assumed
that the California tax would be constitutional in its application to instrumentalities

916
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of interstate commerce, but went on to say that commerce clause analysis operated
differently where foreign commerce was involved. Where foreign commerce was
involved, there was no "authoritative tribunal capable of ensuring that the aggregation of taxes is computed on no more than one full value," so that foreign
commerce might be subjected to the risk of a double tax burden to which domestic
commerce was not exposed. Id. at 447-48. The Court also discussed the "international complications" that could result from state taxes on instrumentalities of
foreign commerce, and found that the application of California's ad valorem property
tax to Japan Line's containers "prevents the Federal Government from 'speaking
with one voice' in international trade." Id. at 453.
Japan Line was distinguished in Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd.,
103 S.Ct. 2933 (1983), where the Court upheld California's inclusion of the "business
income" of foreign subsidiaries in the "unitary business" formula used to determine
the tax liability of an American corporation doing business in California. The
Court emphasized that the tax in Container Corp. fell on an American corporation,
rather than on a foreign corporation and concluded that there were no significant
foreign policy implications in California's decision to include the "business income"
of the foreign subsidiaries in its determination of the American corporation's tax
liability.
The decision in Japan Line is properly explained on the basis of federal power
over foreign policy, rather than on the basis of the negative commerce clause. The
federal government's control over foreign policy, reflected both in the foreign
relations power of the President, see United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 U.S. 304 (1936), and in the foreign commerce power of Congress, may be
relied upon to invalidate the application of state law where such application would
be inconsistent with federal control over foreign policy. For example, federal control
over foreign policy dictates that what is considered "an act of state" under federal
law be recognized as such by state courts in litigation coming before them. Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). Similarly, state laws providing
for the escheat of a decedent's estate where an alien heir's country would not allow
American citizens reciprocal rights of inheritance have been invalidated as "an
intrusion by the State into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts
to the President and the Congress." Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968).
By the same token, the "international complications" that the Court in Japan Line
found could result from the states' application of ad valorem property taxes to cargo
containers owned by foreign companies and used exclusively in foreign commerce,
should render such application unconstitutional as inconsistent with federal control
over foreign policy. The distinction of Japan Line in Container Corp., on the basis
of the absence of foreign policy implications in the latter case, is a further indication
that Japan Line is more properly explained on grounds of interference with federal
power over foreign policy.
Due process considerations also may operate differently where state taxation
affects foreign commerce rather than interstate commerce. For example, the connection between American corporations and their foreign subsidiaries may be
sufficiently attenuated so as to preclude the states from treating the subsidiaries as
part of a "unitary business" related to the corporation's activities in the taxing
state. In ASARCO v. Idaho Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307 (1982), and F.W.
Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dep't, 458 U.S. 354 (1982), the Court
held that there was insufficient control over an American corporation's foreign
subsidiaries to justify including dividends received from those subsidiaries in the
corporation's net income, and that such inclusion, therefore, was violative of due
process. Compare these cases with Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes,
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earlier cases that had substantially limited the taxing power of the
states.' 3' The recent cases generally have involved apportionment
formulae designed to reach the income of foreign corporations doing
business in the state. The Court has upheld the apportionment
formula in every case, making it clear that the states have broad
discretion in deciding precisely how to allocate the foreign corporation's gross income to its activities in the taxing state. 3 2 In practice,
therefore, the results under the Court's current approach to the
permissibility of state taxation of interstate commerce indicate that
the only limitation imposed by the negative commerce clause is that
the tax be nondiscriminatory in its practical operation. 33 When the
actual effect of the tax is found to be discriminatory, it will be
34
invalidated without further inquiry.

445 U.S. 425 (1980), where the corporation's integrated petroleum enterprise
included wholly and partially owned foreign subsidiaries and affiliates, which
provided the major share of its foreign source dividend income. That dividend
income thus was related to the corporation's sale of petroleum products in the
taxing state and constitutionally could be subject to taxation in that state.
131. See Hellerstein II, supra note 4, at 1444-46; Kitch, supra note 4, at 3031. The Court also has held that the application of a nondiscriminatory ad valorem
property tax to foreign imports shipped into the state is not prohibited by the
import-export clause of art. I, § 10, cl. 2, overruling earlier precedents to the
contrary. Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976); Hellerstein II, supra
note 4, at 1427-34; see also Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Co., 104 S. Ct. 1837
(1984). The import-export clause is similar to the negative commerce clause in that
it only prohibits discriminatory taxation against imports.
132. See Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. 2933
(1983); Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980); Mobil
Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980); Moorman Mfg. Co.
v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978); see also Washington Revenue Dep't v. Association
of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734 (1978).
133. Following Complete Auto Transit, the Court has not found any nondiscriminatory state taxation of interstate commerce, as opposed to foreign commerce,
to be violative of due process. See supra note 130 for a discussion of nondiscriminatory
state taxation of foreign commerce. For an application of the Complete Auto Transit
test to uphold severance taxes imposed by an Indian tribal authority, see Merrion
v. Kicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
134. In the 1983 Term, the Court invalidated three state taxing schemes that
expressly discriminated against interstate commerce in favor of local commerce. See
Bacchus Imports v. Dias, 104 S. Ct. 3049 (1984) (Hawaii's exemption of certain
locally-produced alcoholic beverages from a 20% excise tax imposed on liquor at
wholesale); ARMCO, Inc. v. Hardesty, 104 S. Ct. 2620 (1984) (West Virginia's
exemption of locally manufactured goods from a gross receipts tax); Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 104 S. Ct. 1856 (1984) (New York's allowance of a corporate
tax credit upon accumulated income of a subsidiary domestic international sales
corporation, but not upon accumulated income of a subsidiary nondomestic international sales corporation).
In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 105 S. Ct. 1676 (1985), the Court,
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The Court's Current Approach: A Summing Up

Thus far this Article has reviewed the Court's current approach
to the negative commerce clause as a restriction on the power of
the states to regulate and tax interstate commerce. It is our conclusion that, in the regulation area, although the articulated approach
is to balance competing state and national interests, and although
under that approach a regulation of interstate commerce can be
invalidated on either "discrimination" or "undue burden" grounds,
the results of the cases indicate that the Court actually is following a very different line of analysis. Apart from the relatively
older transportation cases, Southern Pacific and Bibb, and apart from
Edgar v. Mite Corp., which would have been decided more appropriately on full faith and credit grounds, the results in all of the
regulation cases can be explained consistently in terms of the nondiscrimination principle which was set forth above. When the essential
effect of the regulation is to discriminate against or disadvantage
interstate commerce or out-of-state interests in favor of local commerce or in-state interests because of the interstate nature of that
commerce or the out-of-state nature of those interests, the regulation
violates the negative commerce clause. Conversely, where the essential effect of the regulation is not discriminatory, as defined above,
it will not be invalidated on the ground that it imposes an "undue
burden" on interstate commerce.
In the taxation area, the four-element approach that the Court
articulated in Complete Auto Transit represented a completely new
approach toward permissible state taxation of interstate commerce.

in a 5-4 decision, invalidated on equal protection grounds an Alabama taxing
scheme that taxed out-of-state insurance companies doing business in Alabama at
three to four times the rate at which domestic insurance companies were taxed.
Discriminatory state taxation of out-of-state insurance companies is not subject to
negative commerce clause challenge because of specific congressional authorization
of state regulation of out-of-state insurance comapanies. See infra notes 136-38 and
accompanying text. The Court, however, found that, despite the congressional
authorization, the promotion of domestic business by discriminating against nonresident competitors was not a legitimate state purpose under the equal protection
clause. But see id. at 1684 where Justice O'Connor, in dissent, contended that "[t]he
Court's analysis casts a shadow over numerous congressional enactments that, adopted
as federal policy 'the type of parochial favoritism' the Court today finds
unconstitutional."
In Williams v. Vermont, 105 S. Ct. 2465 (1985), a Vermont motor vehicle use tax
granted credit to residents for sales tax paid to a reciprocating state, but denied
such a credit to new residents who bought and registered the vehicles outside of
Vermont before becoming Vermont residents. The tax was challenged on negative
commerce clause grounds and equal protection grounds. The Court found the
resulting discrimination to be violative of equal protection but did not consider the
negative commerce clause challenge. Id. at 2474.
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The only element of that approach that properly finds its source in
the negative commerce clause, however, is the nondiscrimination
element; the other three elements involve due process considerations.
Following Complete Auto Transit, the Court has invalidated discriminatory schemes of taxation, but has upheld all other state taxation
of interstate commerce against combined negative commerce clausedue process challenges. The operative principle in practice, therefore,
is thht the nondiscrimination principle and the commerce clause in
its negative aspect is now utilized by the Court to invalidate state
regulation and taxation that discriminates against or disadvantages
interstate commerce or out-of-state interests because of the interstate
nature of that commerce or the out-of-state nature of those interests.
There are two qualifications to the nondiscrimination principle.
One, alluded to earlier, is that the nondiscrimination principle is
not applicable when the state acts as a market participant, limiting
its purchases of products to resident sellers or its sales of products
produced by state-owned businesses to resident buyers, or requiring
that its contractors give employment preference to state residents on
state contracts. 135 The second qualification, repeatedly emphasized
by the Court, is that Congress can expressly authorize state regulation
or taxation of interstate commerce which would otherwise be constitutionally impermissible. 13 6 Thus, since Congress has expressly
removed all restrictions on the authority of the states to regulate
and tax the insurance business, California's "retaliatory tax" on
foreign insurance companies, based on the insurance laws of their
home state, did not violate the negative commerce clause, 37 which
would have been the case in the absence of congressional authori38
zation.
135. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text. The constitutional basis
for this qualification, from a structural perspective, will be discussed infra in the
text.
136. White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204,

213 (1983).
The Commerce Clause is a grant of authority to Congress, and not a
restriction on the authority of that body. Congress unlike a state legislature

authorizing similar expenditures, is not limited by any negative implications
of the Commerce Clause in the exercise of its spending power. Where
state or local government action is specifically authorized by Congress, it
is not subject to the Commerce Clause even if it interferes with interstate
commerce.
Id. New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 340 (1982); Western
& S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 652-53 (1981) ("If
Congress ordains that the State may freely regulate an aspect of interstate commerce,
any action taken by a State within the scope of Congressional authorization is
rendered invulnerable to Commerce Clause challenge.").
137. Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648

(1981).
138.

Id. See also Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976).
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The discussion thus far has been limited to an analysis of what
the Court has been doing in practice under its articulated approach
to the negative commerce clause as a restriction on state regulation
and taxation. Whether the Court's actions have been consistent with
a structurally-based conceptual justification for a negative aspect to
the commerce clause has not yet been considered. Nonetheless, the
implications of this analysis for the thesis presented herein are clear.
Precisely because the operative principle in practice has been the
nondiscrimination principle, this principle is more likely to support
a structurally-based conceptual justification for a negative aspect to
the commerce clause. This is particularly so in light of the analysis
of the Court's approach from an historical perspective, which is
presented below.
B. The Court's Approach from an Historical Perspective
As this discussion indicates, the primary reason for analyzing
the Court's approach from an historical perspective is to demonstrate
that in both the regulation and the taxation areas, the Court has
adhered consistently to the nondiscrimination principle, while it has
fluctuated dramatically and inconsistently in its treatment of the
constitutional permissibility of discriminatory regulation and taxation.
This analysis also will reveal that the Court clearly has set forth a
structurally-based conceptual justification for the negative commerce
clause as the source of a constitutional prohibition against discriminatory state regulation and taxation, but has not adequately developed a similar justification for the negative commerce clause as
the source of a constitutional restriction on discriminatory state
regulation and taxation affecting interstate commerce. In addition,
an understanding of the Court's past institutional behavior with
respect to the negative commerce clause, and the Court's evolution
toward its present approach, may assist in the evaluation of the
different structurally-based conceptual justifications that have been
advanced for a negative aspect to the commerce clause. 19
But see Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 105 S. Ct. 1676 (1985).
In Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Federal Reserve Sys. Bd. of Governors, 105 S.
Ct. 2545 (1985), the Court found that section 3(d) of the Bank Holding Company
Act of 1956, the Douglas Amendment, furnished "specific authorization" for
Connecticut and Massachusetts to adopt statutes permitting bank holding companies
in New England states-but in no other state-to acquire banks located in Massachusetts and Connecticut, provided that the New England state granted reciprocal
privileges to bank holding companies located in Massachusetts and Connecticut.
139. Such an analysis has not been done previously. The tendency on the
part of present day commentators has been to begin with Southern Pacific and to
assume that prior to that time the Court did not have a clearly defined approach
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The historical evolution of the Court's approach to the negative
commerce clause as a restriction on state regulation and taxation
can be traced from the seminal Cooley140 case to the Court's current
aproach. The discussion is divided appropriately into two parts: (1)
from Cooley to Southern Pacific; and (2) from Southern Pacific to the
advent of the Court's current approach.14 1 This analysis will reveal
that from Cooley to Southern Pacific, the Court's approach to the
negative commerce clause as a restriction on state regulation and
taxation was in terms of allocation of power. Insofar as the Court
attempted to set forth a structurally-based conceptual justification
for a negative aspect to the commerce clause, it was that the
affirmative grant of the commerce power to Congress under article
I, section 8, operated to diminish the states' exercise of the reserved
general regulatory and taxation power with respect to interstate
commerce. Under this view, while the states were not deprived of
the power to enact regulations affecting entities engaged in interstate
commerce or to impose taxes on such entities, they were deprived
of the power to regulate or tax interstate commerce itself. In practice,
this meant that if the Court characterized a particular regulation or
tax as a regulation or tax on interstate commerce itself, it was
unconstitutional as beyond the authority of the states. If it was not
so characterized, it was within the proper exercise of the states'
reserved general regulatory and taxation power, notwithstanding that
the regulation or the tax affected entities engaged in interstate
commerce. This allocation of power approach was replaced by the
balancing of interests approach in Southern Pacific with respect to the
validity of state regulation affecting interstate commerce. In the
taxation area, although the approach was somewhat modified and
later eroded, it was not fully abandoned until Complete Auto Transit.
to the permissibility of state regulation and taxation affecting interstate commerce.
The present analysis will "set the historical record straight,' so to speak. For a
comprehensive review of the Court's decisions under both the affirmative and
negative aspects of the commerce clause as of 1932, see B. GAvIT, THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

(1932). In appendices to this work,

Professor Gavit has catalogued every commerce clause decision of the Supreme
Court. This cataloging has facilitated the historical analysis in the present Article.
Since most of the post-1945 cases are included in constitutional law casebooks or
major texts, it was only necessary to do "volume by volume" research for the
period 1932-45.
140. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
141. This division results in some time frame problems. Southern Pac. Co.
v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), is chosen as the division point because it marks
the adoption of the Court's current articulated approach to the permissibility of
state regulation affecting interstate commerce. The Court's current approach to the
permissibility of state taxation of interstate commerce, however, was adopted in
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), and represents a
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Quite independently of the allocation of power approach, however, in the years following Cooley the Court also invoked the
nondiscrimination principle to invalidate all state regulation or taxation discriminating against or disadvantaging interstate commerce
or out-of-state interests. Whenever the practical effect of a regulation
or tax was "protectionist" -when it discriminated against interstate
commerce or out-of-state interests because of the interstate nature
of that commerce or the out-of-state nature of those interests-the
Court invariably held the regulation or tax to be unconstitutional.
It did not matter that the regulation or tax, if nondiscriminatory,
would have been sustained as not constituting a regulation or taxation
of interstate commerce itself. The discriminatory effect of the regulation
or tax rendered it unconstitutional, and it was firmly established
that the commerce clause operated negatively to preclude all such
discriminatory state regulation or taxation. In the period from Cooley
to Southern Pacific, then, the allocation of power approach and the
nondiscrimination principle operated in tandem. State regulation or
taxation affecting interstate commerce could be invalidated either on
the ground that it was discriminatory or on the ground that it
constituted a regulation or taxation of interstate commerce itself.
In the period following Southern Pacific, hoxever, the Court's
articulated approach with respect to the constitutionality of state
regulation and taxation affecting interstate commerce diverged. In
the taxation area, the Court continued to follow the allocation of
power approach, but was influenced by the "free trade" principle
which it viewed as being embodied in the commerce clause. As a
result, the Court scrutinized state taxation schemes more strictly and
was more disposed toward invalidating nondiscriminatory state taxation. In the regulation area, although the Court substituted the
balancing of interests approach for the allocation of power approach,
in practice nondiscriminatory state regulation generally was sustained.
In both the regulation and taxation areas, however, all discriminatory
state action continued to be invalidated. The results in the regulation
completely new approach to the permissibility of such taxation. Prior to Southern

Pacific, both doctrinally and in practice, the Court followed the same approach to
the permissibility of state regulation and taxation affecting interstate commerce.
The Court did not completely abandon that approach in the taxation area until
Complete Auto Transit. Nonetheless, the Court's approach to the permissibility of
state taxation of interstate commerce, beginning in the late 1930's, was influenced
significantly by its articulation of the "free trade" principle, and the Court was
more disposed than it previously had been to invalidate state taxing schemes applied
to entities engaged in interstate commerce. The change in the operation of the
Court's approach in the taxation area thus coincided generally with the Court's
adoption of a new articulated approach in the regulation area. For these reasons,
Southern Pacific seems to be an appropriate division point in our historical analysis.
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and taxation areas were brought back into accord by the Court's
application of the balancing approach in the regulation area, and
the completely different approach to the permissibility of state taxation
affecting interstate commerce taken by the Court in Complete Auto
Transit. In practice, this has meant that all discriminatory regulation
and taxation have been invalidated, while nondiscriminatory regulation and taxation generally have been sustained.
1.

From Cooley to Southern Pacific

The differing views on the Court as to the effect of the affirmative
grant of the commerce power to Congress on the power of the states
to regulate and tax interstate commerce, and the Court's decisions
leading up to Cooley, have been reviewed extensively elsewhere and
will not be repeated here. 4 2 The Court's holding in Cooley was
obviously a compromise. between the view that the commerce power
was an exclusive federal power so as to preclude all state regulation
or taxation affecting interstate commerce and the view that the
commerce clause imposed no restriction at all on the reserved general
regulatory and taxation power of the states. Like many compromise
decisions, the compromise in Cooley may have been the result of a
tacit agreement to avoid explicit discussion of the Court's rationale.
Although the Court held that the commerce power was not an
exclusive federal power so as to preclude all state regulation or
taxation affecting interstate commerce, it also held that the affirmative
grant of the commerce power to Congress of its own force deprived
the states of the power to regulate where the matter in issue
"imperatively demand[ed] a single uniform rule.' 4 M Although the
issue in Cooley, the regulation of pilotage, was not one that imperatively demanded a single uniform rule, 44 Cooley firmly established
the proposition that the affirmative grant of the commerce power to
Congress diminished the reserved general regulatory and taxation
power of the states. Thus, the commerce clause had a negative as
well as an affirmative aspect, and could be relied upon by the Court
as a basis for invalidating state regulation or taxation affecting
interstate commerce.
The Court in Cooley never set forth the rationale for its conclusion
that the affirmative grant of the commerce power to Congress
142. See generally F. FRANKFURTER, supra note 12, at 11-58. See also Sholley,
The Negative Implications of the Commerce Clause, 3 U. Cm. L. REv. 556, 568-77

(1936).
143. Cooley, 53 U.S. at 319.
144. "It is the opinion of ... the Court that the mere grant to Congress
of the power to regulate commerce, did not deprive the states of power to regulate
pilots .... ." Id. at 320.
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deprived the states of the power to regulate where the matter in
issue "imperatively demand[ed] a single uniform rule." Although
the Court held that the commerce power was not an exclusive federal
power, it never explained why the affirmative grant of the commerce
power to Congress should impose any constitutional restraint on the
states' exercise of the reserved general regulatory power. Indeed, in
the case that would have seemed to be most on point on this issue,
Sturges v. Crowninshield,'45 the Court held that the bankruptcy power
was not an exclusive federal power, and thus, in the absence of
congressional action, the Constitution imposed no restriction on the
power of the states to regulate creditor-debtor relations.' 46 In any
event, after the Cooley holding that the affirmative grant of the
commerce power to Congress of its own force limited the power of
the states to regulate interstate commerce, the Court proceeded to
develop fully the allocation of power approach to the permissibility
of state regulation affecting interstate commerce.' 4 7 The essence of
the allocation of power approach was the Court's characterization

145.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
146. The diminution of power justification for a negative basis to the commerce
clause and the failure of the Court in Cooley to deal with this question will be
discussed at greater length in the next part of this Article.
147. Once it is understood that this is the approach that the Court was
taking, it will be apparent that the Court was applying this approach with a fair
degree of consistency. The problem arose in its application to a great variety of
state regulations and schemes of taxation affecting interstate commerce.
The Court's adoption of the allocation of power approach to determine the
permissibility of state regulation of interstate commerce had a collateral effect on
the Court's interpretation of the scope of the affirmative commerce power of
Congress. If the activity being regulated was held not to constitute "commerce"
within the meaning of the commerce clause, the commerce clause, in its negative
aspect, could not be relied on to challenge state regulation of that activity. This
also meant, however, that the activity could not be regulated by Congress in the
affirmative exercise of the commerce power. Thus, when the Court in Paul v.
Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869), upheld state regulation of interstate insurance
transactions on the ground that "issuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction
of commerce" within the meaning of the commerce clause, it was assumed that
Congress lacked the power to regulate the interstate insurance business. This
assumption was not dispelled until United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). Similarly, the Court's decision in Kidd v. Pearson,
128 U.S. 1 (1888), upholding a state ban on liquor manufacture on the ground
that manufacturing was not "commerce," influenced its decision in United States
v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), to the effect that a monopoly of sugar
manufacture was not a "monopoly in interstate commerce" within the meaning
of the Sherman Act. Indeed, the Court has continued to say that manufacturing
is not "commerce," and has upheld federal regulation of manufacturing on "affecting commerce" rather than "regulation of commerce" grounds. See United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941).
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of the nature of the challenged regulation or tax. If it was characterized as a regulation or taxation of interstate commerce itself, it
was deemed to impose a "direct burden" on interstate commerce
and was found to be beyond the power of the states to enact, and
thus was unconstitutional. If it was not characterized as a regulation
or taxation of interstate commerce itself, it was said only to "affect"
interstate commerce or to impose only an "indirect burden" and
thus was a proper exercise of the reserved general regulatory and
148
taxation power of the states.
Under the allocation of power approach, however, there was no
independent "burden analysis"; the Court did not consider how the
particular regulation or tax in actual operation affected interstate
commerce, or whether it "obstructed the free flow of commerce."149
The Court's use of the terms "direct burden" and "indirect burden"
represented merely legal conclusions, resulting from the Court's
characterization of the nature of the regulation or tax.15 0 As the
Court stated:

148. As the Court stated in the Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 400,
402 (1913):
The principle, which determines this classification, underlines the doctrine
that the states cannot under any guise impose direct burdens upon interstate
commerce. For this is but to hold that the states are not permitted directly
to regulate or restrain that which from its nature should be under the
control of the one authority and be free from restriction save as it is
governed in the manner that the national legislature constitutionally ordains ...
But within these limitations there necessarily remains to the States,
until Congress acts, a wide range for the permissible exercise of power
appropriate to their territorial jurisdiction although interstate commerce
may be affected.
Similarly, the Court stated in Missouri ex tel. Barrett v. Kansas Natural Gas Co.,
265 U.S. 298, 307 (1924):
The line of division between cases where, in the absence of congressional
action, the State is authorized to act, and tiose where state action is
precluded by mere force of the commerce clause of the Constitution, is
not always clearly marked. In the absence of congressional legislation, a
State may constitutionally impose taxes, enact inspection laws, quarantine
laws and, generally, laws of internal police, although they may have an
incidental effect on interstate commerce. But the commerce clause of the
Constitution, of its own force, restrains the States from imposing direct
burdens upon interstate commerce.
149. This is the "burden" language of Southern Pacific.
150. "The distinctive feature of this jurisprudence was an effort to carve out
an area of interstate commerce that would be immune from state regulation while
the rest of commerce would be free for unhindered state regulation. The purpose,
reasonableness, or effects of the state legislations were not to count." Kitch, supra
note 4, at 27.
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Whether any statute or action of a State impinges upon
interstate commerce depends upon the statute or action . . . and a tax upon articles in one state that are destined
for use in another State cannot be called a regulation of
interstate commerce .... The action of a state as a regulation
of interstate commerce does not depend on the degree of
51
interference; it is illegal in any degree.
Again, if the regulation or tax was characterized as a regulation or
taxation of interstate commerce itself, it was unconstitutional. If it
was not so characterized, it was constitutional because it was within
52
the reserved powers of the state.1
The key element in the Court's characterization of the nature
of the challenged regulation or tax involved the identification of the
activity that was being regulated or taxed. If it was possible to
identify a local activity upon which the incidence of the regulation
or tax fell, and to separate that local activity from interstate activity,
the regulation or tax would not be characterized as a regulation or

151. Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245, 259 (1922).
152. There does appear to have been one situation where the court employed
an independent "burden analysis" to determine the constitutionality of a challenged
regulation. This was the situation where state or local law required interstate trains
to make what the railroads claimed were unnecessary stops. Where the Court
concluded that the required stops were adequately served, it held the regulation to
be unconstitutional. It first did so in Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 163 U.S. 142
(1896), and later simply followed the holding of that case. See St. Louis & S.F.
Ry. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 261 U.S. 369 (1923); St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 254 U.S. 535 (1921); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v.
Railroad Comm'n, 237 U.S. 220 (1915); Herndon v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry.
218 U.S. 135 (1910); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Wharton, 207 U.S. 328 (1907);
Mississippi R.R. Comm'n v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 203 U.S. 335 (1906); Cleveland,
C.C. & St. L. Ry. v. Illinois, 177 U.S. 514 (1900). In other cases, however, the
Court upheld train stoppage requirements. See Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Texas, 246
U.S. 58 (1918); Wisconsin, M., & P. R.R. v. Jacobson, 179 U.S. 287 (1900);
Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. v. Ohio, 173 U.S. 285 (1899). In Seaboard Air Line Ry.
v. Blackwell, 244 U.S. 310 (1917), the Court invalidated a state law requiring
trains to slacken their speed at every grade crossing, on the ground that the law
would cause unreasonable delays. In Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Texas, 245 U.S.
484 (1918), the Court invalidated a state law requiring that all trains start no more
than 30 minutes after scheduled departure time. In South Covington Ry. v.
Covington, 235 U.S. 537 (1915), the Court invalidated certain provisions of a local
ordinance as applied to an interstate street car company. The invalidated provisions
regulated the number of passengers per car and the number of cars, and required
a uniform temperature in all cars. The provisions that were upheld prohibited
riding on platforms, required a railing on the platforms, and required cleaning and
fumigation of the cars. Only in this line of cases did the Court employ an independent
"burden analysis" and invalidate what otherwise would not be considered a
"regulation of interstate commerce" under the allocation of power approach.
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tax of interstate commerce itself and it would be upheld. In this
circumstance, it did not matter that the entity subject to regulation
or tax was engaged in interstate commerce or that the local activity
was connected with interstate activity in some way. But where the
incidence of the regulation or tax fell on a purely interstate activity,
and it was not possible to identify a local activity distinct from
interstate activity, the regulation or tax was deemed to be on interstate
commerce itself and was unconstitutional.
Let us now consider some examples of permissible and impermissible regulation. The states could not require the licensing of a
foreign corporation doing only interstate business,s 3 or a solicitor
for a foreign corporation doing only interstate business,s 4 or peddlers
of interstate goods.15 5 Nor could they bar suit on an interstate contract
by a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the state,15 6
or deny a certificate of convenience and necessity to an interstate
transportation operator. 5 7 Similarly, they could not license an instrumentality of interstate commerce, such as a vessel or vehicle
used entirely in interstate commerce.'5 s However, as time went on,
the Court became more disposed to identify a local activity so as
to uphold the licensing of entities engaged in interstate commerce,
such as foreign corporations doing some business in the state,5 9
153. See Buck Stove & Range Co. v. Vickers, 226 U.S. 205 (1912); International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91 (1910).
154. See Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. Portland, 268 U.S. 325 (1925); Texas
Transp. & Terminal Co. v. New Orleans, 264 U.S. 150 (1924); Heyman v. Hays,
236 U.S. 178 (1915); Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U.S. 507 (1906); Stockard v.
Morgan, 185 U.S. 27 (1902); Brennan v. City of Titusville, 153 U.S. 289 (1894);
Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47 (1891); McCall v. California, 136 U.S. 104
(1890).
155. See Rosenberger v. Pacific Express Co., 241 U.S. 48 (1916); Davis v.
Virginia, 236 U.S. 697 (1915); Crenshaw v. Arkansas, 227 U.S. 389 (1913); Dozier
v. Alabama, 218 U.S. 124 (1910).
156. See Furst v. Brewster, 282 U.S. 493 (1931); Davis v. Farmer's Coop.
Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312 (1923); Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257
U.S. 282 (1921); Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U.S. 197 (1914); see supra note
76.
157. See Bush & Sons Co. v. Maloy, 267 U.S. 317 (1925); Buck v. Kuykendall,
267 U.S. 307 (1925).
158. See Mayor of Vidalia v. McNeeley, 274 U.S. 676 (1927) (interstate
ferry); Sault Ste. Marie v. International Transit Co., 234 U.S. 333 (1914) (international ferry); Barrett v. New York, 232 U.S. 14 (1914) (wagons and drivers of
express company engaged in interstate commerce); St. Clair County v. Interstate
Sand & Car Transfer Co., 192 U.S. 454 (1904) (ferry carrying trains across
Mississippi River); Harman v. City of Chicago, 147 U.S. 396 (1893) (tugboats
engaged in interstate commerce); Steamship Co. v. Postwardens, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.)
31 (1867) (boats entering a harbor).
159. See Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202 (1944); Railway
Express Agency v. Virginia, 282 U.S. 440 (1931).
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transportation agents selling interstate transportation, 60 and interstate
16
motor carriers using state highways. 1
Price regulation was upheld when it was applied to a transaction
centered in the state, such as intrastate rail transportation, 162 grain
elevator storage, 63 natural gas sales to consumers or wholesalers in
65
the state, 16 4 charges for handling and selling tobacco in the state,
and in-state sales of milk. 66 Price regulation was invalidated when
it was applied to "purely interstate" transactions, such as grain
sales to interstate dealers, 67 interstate sales of electricity or natural
gas to local utilities or distributors, 68 coal destined for interstate
shipment,' 69 and interstate freight shipments. 70 In Milk Control Board
v. Eisenberg Co. , '7' and Parker v. Brown,1 2 however, which in terms
of time are really a part of the Southern Pacific era, the Court upheld
price regulation as applied to products destined primarily for interstate
73
commerce.

160. See California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109 (1941), overruling Di Santo
v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34 (1927); see also Engel v. O'Malley, 219 U.S. 128 (1911)
(state statute regulating receipt of deposits of money is not a burden on foreign or
interstate commerce, even though such deposits are likely to be transmitted out-ofstate or to other countries).
161. See Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U.S. 352 (1932).
162. See Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352 (1913); Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry.
v. Texas, 204 U.S. 403 (1907); Railroad Comm'n Cases, 116 U.S. 307 (1886);
Chicago & N.W.R.R. v. Fuller, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 560 (1873).
163. See Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517 (1892); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S.

113 (1877).
164. See Lone Star Gas Co. v. Texas, 304 U.S 224 (1938); Natural Gas
Pipeline Co. v. Slatterly, 302 U.S. 300 (1937); Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 252 U.S. 23 (1920); Public Serv. Comm'n v. Landon, 249 U.S.
236 (1919).
165. See Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441 (1937).
166. See Higland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608 (1937).
167. See Lemke v. Farmers' Grain Co., 258 U.S. 50 (1922).
168. See State Corp. Comm'n v. Wichita Gas Co., 290 U.S. 561 (1934);
Public Util. Comm'n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927); Missouri
ex rel. Barrett v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298 (1924).
169. See Railroad Comm'n v. Worthington, 225 U.S. 101 (1912).
170. See Wabash, St. Louis & P. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886). In
Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U.S. 204 (1894), the Court
invalidated a state's effort to fix rates over an interstate bridge, but in Port
Richmond & Bergan Point Ferry Co. v. Board, 234 U.S. 317 (1914), it upheld
regulation of ferry rates across the Hudson River.
171. 306 U.S. 346 (1939).
172. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
173. The Court stated in Parker v. Brown that a price-fixing regulation could
be sustained under the "mechanical test sometimes applied by this Court in
determining when interstate commerce begins with respect to a commodity grown
or manufactured within a state and then sold or shipped out of it ....
" Id. at
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General economic regulation was often upheld because it was
possible to identify some local activity on which the incidence of the
regulation fell. Usually the regulation would take effect only after
interstate movement had ended or before it had begun. Among the
kinds of regulations upheld on this basis were regulations requiring
railroads to accept shipments,17 4 provide local service, 17 and settle
claims; 176 securities regulations; 177 anti-trust regulation; 1 78 product
quality regulation, notwithstanding that the products were intended
for export; 79 health, safety, and consumer protection regulations,
notwithstanding that the products had been brought into the state; 180
82
8l
prohibition of liquor manufacture; ' employee protection laws;'
civil liability laws as applied to liability arising out of an interstate
transaction;8 3 and laws imposing liens or attachments on vessels and
other instrumentalities used in interstate commerce. 84 The states
could not, however, ban the sale of products originating in another

360. See infra notes 266-67 and accompanying text. The Court's statement in Parker
is not strictly accurate in light of the above cases. They now have been effectively
overruled. See Arkansas Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461
U.S. 375, 389-95 (1983).
174. See Chicago, M. & St. P.R.R. v. Iowa, 233 U.S. 334 (1914); Grand
Trunk R.R. v. Michigan R.R. Comm'n, 231 U.S. 457 (1913).
175. See Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 262 (1910); Missouri Pac.
Ry. v. Larabee Flour Mills Co., 211 U.S. 612 (1909); Mobile J. & K.C. R.R. v.
Mississippi, 210 U.S. 187 (1908); Wisconsin, M. & Pac. R.R. v. Jacobson, 179 U.S.
287 (1900). In Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U.S. 299 (1896), the Court held that the
state could prohibit trains from running on Sunday.
176. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Mazursky, 216 U.S. 122 (1910).
177. See Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917).
178. See Crescent Cotton Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 257 U.S. 129 (1921); Standard
Oil Co. v. Tennessee, 217 U.S. 413 (1910); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v.
Kentucky, 161 U.S. 677 (1896).
179. See Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935);
Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52 (1915).
180. See Bourjois v. Chapman, 301 U.S. 183 (1937); Bayside Fish Flour Co.
v. Gentry, 297 U.S. 422 (1936); Weigle v. Curtice Bros. Co., 248 U.S. 285 (1919);
Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U.S. 461 (1894); see also Whitfield v. Ohio, 297
U.S. 431 (1936) (upholding a state ban on the sale of convict-made goods).
181. See Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888).
182. See Erie R.R. v. Williams, 233 U.S. 685 (1914).
183. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Illinois, 298 U.S. 155 (1936);
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Crovo, 220 U.S. 364 (1911); Western Union Tel. Co.
v. Commercial Milling Co., 218 U.S. 406 (1910).
184. See Martin v. West, 222 U.S. 191 (1911); Davis v. Cleveland, C.C. &
St. L. Ry., 217 U.S. 157 (1910); Iroquis Transp. Co. v. DeLaney Forge & Iron
Co., 205 U.S. 354 (1907); Johnson v. Chicago & Pac. Elevator Co., 119 U.S.
388 (1886).
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8 6
or an entity
state, 185 or regulate a purely interstate transaction
87
commerce.1
interstate
in
engaged entirely
Safety regulations were upheld almost invariably. Whenever the
challenged law was a safety regulation, the Court would not characterize it as a regulation of interstate commerce, and the law thus
could be applied to what otherwise would be considered a purely
interstate transaction. 18 The most common safety regulations coming
before the Court during this period were those applicable to railroads,
such as the full crew laws, 8 9 and all such regulations were sustained,
even when applied to purely interstate journeys. 90 The Court's 1938
decision in South CarolinaState Highway Department v. Barnwell Brothers,'9'

185. See Rossi v. Pennsylvania, 238 U.S. 62 (1915); Kirmeyer v. Kansas,
236 U.S. 568 (1915); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Cook Brewing Co., 223 U.S.
70 (1912); Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 214 U.S. 218 (1909); American Express
Co. v. Iowa, 196 U.S. 133 (1905); Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1
(1898); Leisy & Co. v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890).
186. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Foster, 247 U.S. 105 (1918); McNeill
v. Southern Ry., 202 U.S. 543 (1906); Houston & T.C.R.R. v. Mayes, 201 U.S.
321 (1906); Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1 (1878).
187. See Michigan Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Duke, 266 U.S. 570 (1925). In
Kansas City S. Ry. v. Kaw Valley Drainage Dist., 233 U.S. 75 (1914), the Court
held that the state could not require a railroad company to remove a bridge that
was a necessary part of its interstate operations despite a finding that such removal
was necessary for the improvement of a drainage district.
188. Thus, although a state ordinarily could not deny a certificate of convenience and necessity to an interstate transportation operator, Buck v. Kuykendall,
267 U.S. 307 (1925), it could do so on the ground that the proposed route was
congested, Bradley v. Public Util. Comm'n, 289 U.S. 92 (1933). Since the purpose
of the denial was to promote safety, rather than to regulate economic competition,
the effect on interstate commerce was deemed to be "incidental." Id.
189. See Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Norwood, 283 U.S. 249 (1931); St. Louis,
I.M. & S. Ry. v. Arkansas, 240 U.S. 518 (1916); Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v.
Arkansas, 219 U.S. 453 (1911).
190. For cases involving safety regulations applicable to railroads, other than
full crew laws, see Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 318
U.S. 1 (1943) (caboose cars for protection of employees); Nashville, C. & St. L.
Ry. v. White, 278 U.S. 456 (1929) (watchman at crossing); Western & A.R.R.
v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 267 U.S. 493 (1925) (switching of cars); Denver
& R.G.R.R. v. Denver, 250 U.S. 241 (1919) (track removal); Vandalia R.R v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 242 U.S. 255 (1916) (headlight candlepower); Atlantic
C.L.R.R. v. Georgia, 234 U.S. 280 (1914) (required use of electric headlights);
Erb v. Morasch, 177 U.S. 584 (1900) (speed limit); New York, N.H. & H.R.R.
v. New York, 165 U.S. 268 (1897) (prohibition against heating passenger cars by
stoves); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Alabama, 128 U.S. 96 (1888) (ban on
employment of train employees aflicted with color blindness); Smith v. Alabama,
124 U.S. 465 (1888) (licensing of railroad engineers).
The only exceptions to the Court's practice of upholding state safety regulations
applicable to railroads are Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Blackwell, 244 U.S. 310
(1917), and South Covington Ry. v. Covington, 235 U.S. 537 (1915).
191. 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
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upholding a truck weight and width regulation as applied to an
interstate motor carrier, merely confirmed the Court's long-standing
practice of holding all safety regulations constitutional because they
placed only an "incidental burden" on interstate commerce.' 92 Inspection and quarantine laws were always upheld for the same
reason. 193
The Court generally found that taxation of interstate activities
w'as permissible if the tax was imposed on a local, as distinct from
an interstate activity, or if the tax was exacted before interstate
movement had begun or after it had come to an end. Taxes were
sustained when they were imposed on in-state production or manufacture of goods, 94 in-state sales and business operations,' 95 and
property that had its situs in the state.' 9 6 The states also could
192. The truck weight regulation was prescribed by four other states, id. at
182; the width limitation was unique to South Carolina, id. at 184. For other cases
upholding state safety regulations affecting interstate commerce, see Sproles v.
Binford, 286 U.S. 374 (1932) (truck size and load limits); Morris v. Duby, 274
U.S. 135 (1927) (truck load limit); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Richmond, 224
U.S. 160 (1912) (telegraph wires).
The Barnwell Court also emphasized deference to legislative judgment in matters
of safety regulation, notwithstanding the fact that the regulation affected interstate
commerce: "[tihe judicial function, under the commerce clause, as well as the
Fourteenth Amendment, stops with the inquiry whether the state legislature in
adopting regulations such as the present has acted within its province, and whether
the means of regulation chosen are reasonably adapted to the end sought." 303
U.S. at 190.
193. See Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937) (inspection of vessels not
subject to inspection under federal law); Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. (1933) (ban
on importation of cattle unless certified to be free from Bang's Disease); Turner
v. Maryland, 107 US. 38 (1883) (tobacco inspection).
194. See Department of Treasury v. Ingram-Richardson Mfg. Co., 313 U.S.
252 (1941); Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 303 U.S. 604 (1938);
Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932); Leonard & Leonard v.
Earle, 279 U.S. 392 (1929); Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S. 284 (1927);
Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172 (1923); American Mfg. Co. v. St.
Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919).
195. See Department of Treasury v. Wood Preserving Co., 313 U.S. 62
(1941); Western Livestock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938); Puget
Sound Stevedoring Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 302 U.S. 90 (1937); Chassaniol v.
City of Greenwood, 291 U.S. 584 (1934); Federal Compress & Warehouse Co. v.
McLean, 291 U.S. 17 (1934); Wagner v. Covington, 251 U.S. 95 (1932); New
York ex rel. Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152 (1907); Woodruff v. Parham, 75
U.S. (8 Wall.) 123 (1868).
196. See Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944); Southern
Pac. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167 (1939); Wiloil Corp. v. Pennsylvania, 294
U.S. 169 (1935); Virginia v. Imperial Coal Sales Co., 293 U.S. 15 (1934)
Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U.S. 86 (1934); Minnesota v. Blasius, 290
U.S. 1 (1933); Edelman v. Boeing Air Transp., Inc., 289 U.S. 249 (1933); Louis
K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace,
288 U.S. 249 (1933); Greeg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U.S. 472 (1932); General
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impose "license taxes" on the local business of foreign corporations, 97
and on brokers and peddlers selling in the state.198 The Court,
however, found invalid taxes on the "privilege of engaging in
interstate commerce," 199 taxes directly imposed on interstate transportation or an instrumentality of interstate transportation, 20 0 and
taxes on interstate transactions, such as a tax on a purely interstate
sale. 20 1 With respect to taxes on the income of foreign corporations,
Amer. Tank Car Corp. v. Day, 270 U.S. 367 (1926); Lacoste v. Department
of Conservation, 263 U.S. 545 (1924); Susquehanna Coal Co. v. Mayor of South
Amboy, 228 U.S. 665 (1913); Bacon v. Illinois, 227 U.S. 504 (1913); American
Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U.S. 500 (1904); St. Louis v. Western Union
Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92 (1893); Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517 (1886).
The states could also apply their motor vehicle taxes and licensing fees to
motor vehicles engaged in interstate transportation. See Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc.,
306 U.S. 583 (1939); Dixie Ohio Express Co. v. State Revenue Comm'n, 306
U.S. 72 (1939); Morf v. Bingaman, 298 U.S. 407 (1936); Aero Mayflower Transit
Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 295 U.S. 285 (1935); Hicklin v. Coney, 290
U.S. 169 (1933); Interstate Buses Corp. v. Blodgett, 276 U.S. 245 (1928).
197. See Atlantic Refining Co. v. Virginia, 302 U.S. 22 (1937); Southern
Natural Gas Corp. v. Alabama, 301 U.S. 148 (1937); International Shoe Co. v.
Shartel, 279 U.S. 429 (1929).
198. See Caskey Baking Co. v. Virginia, 313 U.S. 117 (1941); Singer Sewing
Machine Co. v. Brickell, 233 U.S. 304 (1914); Ficklen v. Shelby County Taxing
Dist., 145 U.S. 1 (1892).
199. See State Tax Comm'n v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 284 U.S. 41
(1931); Sprout v. City of South Bend, 277 U.S. 163 (1928); Alpha Portland Cement
Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203 (1925); Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier,
266 U.S. 255 (1925); Norfolk W. R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 136 U.S. 114 (1890).
200. See McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U.S. 176 (1940); Bingaman
v. Golden Eagle W. Lines, 297 U.S. 626 (1936); Helson & Randolph v. Kentucky,
279 U.S. 245 (1929); Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Kentucky, 202 U.S. 409 (1906);
Pickard v. Pullman S. Car Co., 117 U.S 34 (1886); Moran v. City of New Orleans,
112 U.S. 69 (1884); Morgan v. Parham, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 471 (1873); St. Louis
v. Ferry Co., 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 423 (1870). See also Johnson Oil Ref. Co. v.
Mitchell, 290 U.S. 158 (1933), where a tax on the entire fleet of
Oklahoma ex rel.
tank cars used by a foreign corporation to transport its products from its factory
in the taxing state to other states was held unconstitutional because only a small
percentage of the individual cars were in the taxing state on a daily average. The
Court found that the state was limited to taxing its proper share of the cars, as
measured by the number of cars which on the average were physically present in
the taxing state. Similarly, in Ingels v. Morf, 300 U.S. 290 (1937), a state permit
fee as applied to an interstate motor carrier was held unconstitutional, because the
amount of the fee was found excessive in relation to the carrier's use of the state's
highways.
201. See Fisher's Blend Station, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 297 U.S. 650
(1936); Texas Co. v. Brown, 258 U.S. 466 (1922); Eureka Pipe Line Co. v.
Hallanan, 257 U.S. 265 (1921). In McLeod v. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944),
the Court applied this principle to hold unconstitutional Arkansas' application of
its sales tax to interstate sales by Arkansas buyers from Tennessee sellers. The
Tennessee sellers had solicited orders in Arkansas by sending in traveling salesmen,
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the Court upheld net income taxes on the corporation's intrastate
business, 20 2 and gross income taxes if clearly apportioned to the
corporation's in-state activity, such as a tax on a railroad's gross
income based on a comparison of the railroad's mileage in the state
to its total mileage. 20 3 On the whole, because it frequently was
possible to find a local activity, distinct from interstate activity, on
which the tax was imposed, or to exact the tax before interstate
movement had begun or after it had ended, during this period the
negative commerce clause did not place too great a restriction-on
the power of the states to tax entities engaged in interstate commerce.
The Court applied the allocation of power approach to determine
the validity of the challenged regulation or tax only when the
regulation or tax was nondiscriminatory. Independently of this approach, however, the Court invoked the nondiscrimination principle
to invalidate all regulation or taxation that expressly or in practical
effect discriminated against interstate commerce or out-of-state interests in favor of local commerce or in-state interests because of
the interstate nature of that commerce or the out-of-state nature of
those interests.
The leading case setting forth the nondiscrimination principle
under the negative commerce clause is Welton v. Missouri, decided

and by making mail and telephone solicitations from Tennessee. The sellers had
filled the orders by delivering the goods to carriers in Tennessee for delivery to
the Arkansas buyers. McLeod, and some of the other cases in the late 1930's and
early 1940's invalidating state taxes, reflect the Court's approach to the permissibility
of state taxation affecting interstate commerce during what, for purposes of our
historical analysis, is the period after Southern Pacific. See supra note 141.
202. See Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Beeler, 315 U.S. 649 (1942); Matson
Navigation Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 297 U.S. 441 (1936); Atlantic Coast
Line R.R. v. Daughton, 262 U.S. 413 (1923); United States Glue Co. v. Oak
Creek, 247 U.S. 321 (1918).
203. See Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1940); Great
Northern Ry. v. Minnesota, 278 U.S. 503 (1929); Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Adams,
155 U.S. 688 (1895); Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Backus, 154 U.S. 439
(1894); Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Hayward, 141 U.S. 36 (1891). Gross income
taxes were also upheld when they were levied on the corporation's purely intrastate
activity, see Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Minnesota, 309 U.S. 157 (1940), and Pacific
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Tax Comm'n of Wash., 297 U.S. 403 (1936), or where they
were found to be proportioned precisely to the corporation's intrastate activity in
relation to its interstate activity, see Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U.S. 331
(1939). See also Great N. Ry. v. Washington, 300 U.S. 154 (1937), where a tax
based on a public utility's gross operating revenues was sustained as representing
the reasonable cost of supervision and regulation.
The Court's decisions beginning in the late 1930's, invalidating unapportioned
gross receipts taxes, will be discussed in the next section of this Article.
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in 1875.204 Missouri required the payment of a license tax by peddlers
who "deal in the selling of patent or other medicines, goods, wares,
or merchandise . . . which are not the growth, produce, or manufacture of this State . . . ." No similar tax was required of peddlers
selling goods grown, produced, or manufactured in Missouri. The
Court characterized the tax as a tax on interstate commerce, since
it applied only to goods brought into the state. Finding that the tax
was beyond state power under the allocation of power approach, the
Court held the tax unconstitutional. 0 5 However, the Court also
focused on the discrimination against interstate commerce that was
effected by the tax, and held that such discrimination was unconstitutional. 20 6 The Court specifically found the nondiscrimination
principle to be a major historic purpose of the commerce clause,
stating that, "[t]he very object of investing this power in the General
Government was to insure this uniformity against discriminating
State legislation. "207 The Court also noted that the grant of the
commerce power to Congress was deemed to protect property that
entered the state "from any burdens imposed by reason of its foreign
origin. ',208
Following Welton, the Court developed the nondiscrimination
principle more precisely as an independent ground for invalidating
state regulation and taxation.2 0 9 The nondiscrimination principle as
204. 91 U.S. 275 (1875). The nondiscrimination principle had been articulated
earlier by the Court in Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123 (1868). In
upholding a license tax on the sale of goods at auction, the Court emphasized that
the tax did not discriminate against out-of-state goods, and stated: "But a law
having such operation, would, in our opinion, be an infringement of the provisions
of the Constitution which relate to those subjects and, therefore, void." Id. at 140.
This language was cited by the Court in Welton. 91 U.S. at 283. In Ward v.
Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1871), the Court held invalid, under the
privileges and immunities clause, a state law requiring an annual license for
nonresidents selling goods manufactured out-of-state.
205. The Court recognized the difficulty in defining the point at which "the
commercial power of the Federal Government over a commodity has ceased and
the power of the state has commenced," and stated that federal power continued
"until the commodity has ceased to be the subject of discriminating legislation by
reason of its foreign character." 91 U.S. at 282.
206. Id. at 279.
207. Id. at 280.
208. Id. at 282.
209. However, in Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489
(1887), the Court held that a state could not require a solicitor of orders for an
interstate sale to secure a license or pay a license tax. Robbins subsequently was
relied on to hold that the states could not regulate or tax a purely interstate
transaction. See supra notes 186 & 191 and accompanying text. The license and tax
required in Robbins, however, applied only to persons "not having a regularly
licensed house of business in the Taxing District," and thus should have been
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an independent basis for invalidation is illustrated by Guy v. Baltimore, 210 where the Court held unconstitutional a city's wharfage fee
that applied only to vessels transporting out-of-state goods. The
Court noted that it had upheld nondiscriminatory taxes applied to
goods imported from other states. In those cases the Court emphasized
that the tax fell equally on interstate and local commerce.2 1' The
Court stated:
In view of these and other decisions of this court, it must
be regarded as settled that no State can, consistently with
the Federal Constitution, impose upon the products of other
States, brought therein for sale or use, or upon citizens
because engaged in the sale therein, or the transportation
thereto, of the products of other States, more onerous public
burdens or taxes than it imposes upon the like products of
21 2
its own territory.
As in Welton, the Court specifically related the nondiscrimination
principle to the historical context of the affirmative grant of the
commerce power to Congress. It noted that Congress had been
granted the commerce power because of the "oppressed and degraded
state" of commerce existing under the Articles of Confederation, 21 3
and concluded that if discriminatory state legislation were not held
unconstitutional, "it is easy to perceive how . . . the equality of
commercial privileges secured by the Federal Constitution to citizens
of the several states [could] be materially abridged and impaired.' '214
In retrospect, the Court was relating the affirmative grant of the
commerce power to Congress to a right on the part of those engaged
in interstate commerce and residents of other states to be free from
state legislation discriminating against interstate commerce or outof-state interests in favor of local commerce or in-state interests.
In Minnesota v. Barber,21 5 the Court extended the nondiscrimination
principle to reach facially neutral laws that in practical operation
discriminated against interstate commerce in favor of local commerce.

invalidated on the ground that it discriminated against interstate commerce in favor
of local commerce. The Court subsequently explained Robbins on this basis. See
Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 423-26 (1946); McGoldrick v. Benvind-White
Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 55-57 (1940).
210. 100 U.S. 434 (1880).
211. Id. at 438-39.
212. Id. at 439.
213. Id. at 439-40.
214. Id. at 441.
215. 136 U.S. 313 (1890).
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In that case the Court invalidated a Minnesota law requiring fresh
meat sold in Minnesota to have been inspected by a Minnesota
inspector within twenty-four hours of slaughter. The practical effect
of the law was to prevent the sale in Minnesota of meat slaughtered
in other states, and it was this effect that rendered the law unconstitutional.21 6 The Court made it clear that where the practical effect
of a state regulation was to discriminate against interstate commerce
in favor of local commerce, the regulation necessarily was violative
of the negative commerce clause. As the Court stated:
The presumption that this statute was enacted, in good faith,
for the purpose expressed in the title, namely, to protect the
health of the people of Minnesota, cannot control the final
determination of the question whether it is not repugnant to
the Constitution of the United States. There may be no
purpose upon the part of a Legislature to violate the provisions
of that instrument, and yet a statute enacted by it, under
the forms of law, may, by its necessary operation, be destructive of rights granted or secured by the Constitution.
In such cases, the courts must sustain the supreme law of
21 7
the land by declaring the statute unconstitutional and void.
The Court also emphasized that Minnesota could prohibit the sale
of all meat that it considered to be unfit for human consumption.
It could not, however, establish an inspection scheme that in practical
operation excluded from the Minnesota market meat slaughtered in
other states.
In Brimmer v. Rebman, 218 decided in 1891, the Court further
explicated the nondiscrimination principle and focused on the discrimination between groups similarly situated except for their instate and out-of-state location. There the Court invalidated a Virginia
law requiring the postslaughter inspection in each county of meat
that had been transported over one hundred miles from the place
of slaughter. The practical effect of the law was to disadvantage
sellers of meat that had been slaughtered more than one hundred
miles from the place of sale, including meat slaughtered in other
states. These sellers would have to pay a substantial inspection fee,
while the sellers of meat slaughtered locally would not have to pay

216. The Court noted that Minnesota could rely on inspections in the state
of origin to insure that the meat had been slaughtered properly. Id. at 322-23.
217. Id. at 319.
218. 138 U.S. 78 (1891).
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such a fee. 219 As applied to sellers of meat slaughtered in other states,
therefore, the resulting competitive disadvantage rendered the regulatory scheme violative of the negative commerce clause. 220 The
state tried to defend against the discrimination claim by arguing
that the law also applied to Virginia sellers of meat slaughtered more
than one hundred miles from the place of sale. The Court rejected
this argument: Discrimination for negative commerce clause purposes
consisted of putting out-of-state sellers of meat at a disadvantage in
comparison with Virginia sellers, and it was irrelevant that some Virginia
221
sellers were similarly disadvantaged.
The nondiscrimination principle was followed by the Court with
complete consistency throughout this period and thereafter. Whenever
the regulation or tax expressly or in practical effect discriminated
against or disadvantaged interstate commerce in favor of local com222
merce, such as by expressly applying only to interstate commerce,
223
embargoing the sale of local products outside of the state,
prohibiting the entry of out-of-state products into the state, 224 taxing
enterprises engaged in interstate commerce differently from enterprises engaged in local commerce, 225 or giving any kind of preference
to local commerce or in-state interests over interstate commerce or
219. The state, of course, could require that all meat be certified as pure
meat when sold regardless of where it had been slaughtered.
220. As the Court stated:
The owners of the meats here in question, although they were from animals
slaughtered in Illinois, had the right, under the Constitution, to compete
in the markets of Virginia upon terms of equality with the owners of like
meats, from animals slaughtered in Virginia or elsewhere within one
hundred miles from the place of sale. Any local regulation which, in terms
of its necessary operation, denies this equality in the markets of a State
is, when applied to the people and products or industries of other States,
a direct burden upon commerce among the States, and, therefore, void.
138 U.S. at 82.
221. Id. at 83. In Dean Milk, the Court relied on this part of the Brimmer
holding to support its conclusion that it was constitutionally irrelevant that Wisconsin
7nilk producers outside of Madison were also disadvantaged by the discriminatory
inspection requirement. See supra note 55.
222. See Hale v. Bimco Trading Co., 306 U.S. 375 (1939); Foote & Co. v.
Stanley, 232 U.S. 494 (1914); Voight v. Wright, 141 U.S. 62 (1891); Carson v.
Maryland, 120 U.S. 502 (1887); Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344 (1881); Tiernan
v. Rinker, 102 U.S. 123 (1880); Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U.S. 566 (1878).
223. See Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); West v. Kansas
Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
224. See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935); iThe Hannibal
& St. Joseph Ry. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465 (1878).
225. See Best Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454 (1940); Bethlehem Motors Corp.
v. Flynt, 256 U.S. 421 (1921); Darnell & Son Co. v. City of Memphis, 208 U.S.
113 (1908).
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out-of-state interests, 226 it was held unconstitutional without further
27
inquiry.

The nondiscrimination principle was expounded in Best & Co.
v. Maxwell, 228 where the Court invalidated a state tax applicable to
sellers of retail goods by sample who were not "regular retail
merchants in the state."
The commerce clause forbids discrimination, whether forthright or ingenuous. In each case it is our duty to determine
whether the statute under attack, whatever its name may be,
will in its practical operation work discrimination against
interstate commerce. .

allows merchants
for their goods is
effect of which is
nesses, whatever
guage.

229

.

. The freedom of commerce which

of each state a regional or national market
not to be fettered by legislation, the actual
to discriminate in favor of intrastate busimay be the ostensible reach of the lan-

The Court also made it clear that the nondiscrimination principle
operated independently of the general allocation of power approach
to the permissibility of state regulation or taxation affecting interstate
commerce. Even though the regulation or tax otherwise would be
constitutionally permissible as not constituting a regulation or taxation
of interstate commerce itself, it was unconstitutional if it expressly
or in practical operation discriminated against or disadvantaged
interstate commerce in comparison with local commerce.23 0 As the
Court stated in Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc. ,231 where it invalidated
a New York law prohibiting the sale of milk bought outside the
state at a price lower than the minimum price for purchases of
similar milk in New York:
Nice distinctions have been made at times between direct
and indirect burdens. They are irrelevant when the avowed

226. See Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928).
227. In Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58 (1897), South Carolina took over the
purchase and sale of intoxicating liquors and discriminated in favor of local products.
The Court held such discrimination to be unconstitutional. It would be upheld
today, however, since the state when acting as purchaser can discriminate in favor
of local products. See supra text accompanying notes 78-81.
228. 311 U.S. 454 (1940).
229. Id. at 455-57.
230. Id. at 456-57.
231. 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
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purpose of the obstruction, as well as its necessary tendency,
is to suppress or mitigate the consequences of competition
between the states. Such an obstruction is direct by the very
232
terms of the hypothesis.
The Court thus has consistently held, throughout this period and
thereafter, that all discrimination against interstate commerce or outof-state interests because of the interstate nature of that commerce
or the out-of-state nature of those interests was violative of the
negative commerce clause.
During this period, the Court also considered the power of
Congress to authorize the states to enact what otherwise would be
a constitutionally impermissible regulation or taxation of interstate
commerce. After the Court held that the states could not prohibit
the in-state sales of intoxicating liquors that had been shipped from
out-of-state, 233 Congress enacted the Wilson Act. 2 4 This Act subjected
intoxicating liquors, once transported into a state, to the operation
of state prohibition laws. In In re Rahrer,235 the Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Wilson Act, rejecting the contention that
Congress had delegated its power to regulate interstate commerce
to the states or that it had granted to the states a power denied to
them under the Constitution. Rather, the Court reasoned, Congress
had merely "removed an impediment to the enforcement of state
laws" by allowing the regulation of liquor shipped into the state to
be treated as a "local activity" as soon as the liquor arrived in the
236
state.
The Wilson Act was not completely effective in enabling the
states to enforce their prohibition laws, since it did not apply to
sales of liquor that were purely interstate. The regulation of interstate
liquor sales was held by the Court to be a regulatidn of interstate
commerce itself and therefore beyond the states' power. 2 7 Congress
subsequently enacted the Webb-Kenyon Act, 238 which absolutely
prohibited the shipment of liquor into any state.

232.

Id. at 522.

233.
234.

See Leisy & Co. v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890).
Ch. 728, 26 Stat. 313 (1890).

235.
236.

140 U.S. 545 (1891).
Id. at 564.

237. See Rosenberger v. Pacific Express Co., 241 U.S. 48 (1916); Rossi v.
Pennsylvania, 238 U.S. 62 (1915); Kirmeyer v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 568 (1915);
Heyman v. Hayn, 236 U.S. 178 (1915); Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co. v. Cook
Brewing Co., 223 U.S. 70 (1912); Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 214 U.S. 218

(1909).
238.

Ch. 90, 37 Stat. 699 (1913).
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In Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Railway Co.,239 the
Court sustained the constitutionality of the Webb-Kenyon Act on
the ground that Congress had "conformed its regulation as to produce
2 40
cooperation between the local and national forces of government."
Although the Court's recognition of Congress' power to authorize
what otherwise would be unconstitutional state regulation of interstate
commerce was quite troubling to academic commentators of the
period, 241 it was not troubling to the Court. Thus, when the challenged state regulation or tax specifically was authorized by Congress,
242
the negative commerce clause was completely inapplicable.
In summary, the "state of the law" from Cooley to Southern Pacific
reflects the Court's general approach to the negative commerce clause
as a restriction on state regulation and taxation in terms of allocation
of power. The permissibility of a particular exercise of state regulatory
or tax power depended on the Court's characterization of the nature
of the regulation or tax. If it was characterized as a regulation or
taxation of interstate commerce itself, it was deemed to constitute a
"direct burden" on interstate commerce and was beyond the power
of the states. If the regulation or tax was not characterized as a
regulation or taxation of interstate commerce itself, it was deemed
only to "affect" interstate commerce or to impose an "indirect
burden" on interstate commerce and so was within the reserved
general regulatory and taxation power of the states. But all regulation
and taxation discriminating against or disadvantaging interstate commerce or out-of-state interests in favor of local commerce or in-state
interests because of the interstate nature of that commerce or the
out-of-state nature of those interests was violative of the negative
commerce clause. Congress, however, could expressly authorize what
otherwise would be an impermissible regulation or taxation of interstate commerce.

239. 242 U.S. 311 (1917).
240. Id. at 331. With the passage of the twenty-first amendment, the negative
commerce clause no longer operated to impose any limitation on the power of the
states to regulate the sale or distribution of liquor within the state. See Hostetter
v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 330 (1964). However, the
twenty-first amendment does not authorize discriminatory state regulation or taxation, notwithstanding that liquor is involved. See Bacchus Imports v. Diaz, 104
S. Ct. 3049 (1984).
241.
The Court's recognition of Congress' power to authorize state regulation
of interstate commerce gave rise to the "implied intention of Congress," as a
conceptual justification for a negative aspect to the commerce clause. See infra notes
408-14 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.

1985]
2.

THE NEGATIVE COMMERCE CLAUSE

From Southern Pacific to the Advent of the Current Approach
a.

The Development of the Balancing of Interests
Approach

As the foregoing analysis indicates, in the years between Cooley
and Southern Pacificthe Court had developed a clearly defined approach
to the constitutional permissibility of state regulation and taxation
affecting interstate commerce. 243 Its general approach was in terms
of allocation of power, with the result depending on whether the
challenged regulation or tax was characterized as a regulation or tax
on interstate commerce itself. The difficulty in the application of
that approach, which required the Court to characterize the nature
of a great variety of regulatory and tax laws, made the negative
commerce clause appear to be an uncertain area of constitutional
law. 244 There was no difficulty in the application of the nondiscrimination principle, which operated in tandem with the Court's
general approach, since either the discrimination was express or the
discriminatory effect of the regulation or tax was clear.
The allocation of power approach came under attack by Justice
(later Chief Justice) Stone because of what he considered to be its
"mechanical nature" and its failure to focus on the "inherent
conflict" between state and national interests whenever state regulation affected interstate commerce. 245 Justice Stone's views first
243. This conclusion is contrary to the general view of the academic commentators of an earlier period. See Dowling I, supra note 6, at 5-8; Shenton, supra
note 6, at 160-62; Sholley, supra note 6, at 558-59; Stem, The Problems of YesteryearCommerce and Due Process, 4 VAND. L. REv. 446, 451-52 (1951). The difference may
be due to the fact that these commentators tended to focus on the doctrine and
language of the Court's opinions, rather than on the actual approach that the Court
was following and the results that were reached in the application of that approach.
244. See Milk Control Bd. v. Eisenberg Farm Prod., 306 U.S. 346, 352
(1939), where the Court stated: "These principles have guided judicial decision for
more than a century ....
The difficulty arises not in their statement or in a ready
assent to their propriety, but in their application in connection with the myriad
variations in the methods and incidents of commercial intercourse." The Court's
use of the terms "direct burden," and "indirect burden" also may have caused
confusion, if it was not realized that the Court was using these terms in a tautological
rather than analytical sense. See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
245. Justice Stone did not question the nondiscrimination principle as an
independent ground for invalidating state regulation and taxation affecting interstate
commerce. Academic commentators similarly took the nondiscrimination principle
for granted or ignored it. Their concern was with the use of the negative commerce
clause as a general limitation on state regulatory and taxation power and they
contended that it should be employed to invalidate nondiscriminatory regulation
and taxation as well. See Dowling I, supra note 6, at 16-17.
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246
surfaced in a short dissent in the 1927 case of Di Santo v. Pennsylvania,
where the Court held unconstitutional, as a regulation of interstate
commerce, Pennsylvania's attempt to license travel agents selling
interstate transportation. 247 He stated:

[T]he traditional test of the limit of state action by inquiring
whether the interference with commerce is direct or indirect
seems to me too mechanical, too uncertain in its application,
and too remote from actualities, to be of value. In thus
making use of the expressions, "direct" and "indirect interference" with commerce, we are doing little more than
using labels to describe a result rather than any trustworthy
formula by which it is reached.2 18 . . . [I]t seems clear that
those interferences not deemed forbidden are to be sustained,
not because the effect on commerce is nominally indirect,
but because a consideration of all the facts and circumstances,
such as the nature of the regulation, its function, the character
of the business involved and the actual effect on the flow of
commerce, lead to the conclusion that the regulation concerns
interests peculiarly local and does not infringe the national
interest in maintaining the freedom of commerce across state
lines 249
Justice Stone's opinions in negative commerce clause cases following his Di Santo dissent increasingly referred to the matter of
"national and state interests" and "burden" on interstate commerce. 25 0 The Justice thereby proposed a balancing of interests
approach instead of an allocation of power approach. Under the
balancing approach, no regulation would be held to be unconstitutional solely on the ground that it was characterized as a regulation
of interstate commerce itself. It only would be unconstitutional if the
Court, "upon consideration of all the facts and circumstances," con-

246. 273 U.S. 34 (1927).
247. Di Santo was overruled in California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109 (1941).
248. 273 U.S. at 44 (Stone, J., dissenting). As we have pointed out previously,
however, the Court was using these terms in a conclusive rather than analytical
sense. The result described by the labels depended on the Court's characterization
of the nature of the regulation or tax. See supra notes 147-52 and accompanying
text. What Justice Stone really objected to was the allocation of power approach
and the characterization test that it employed.
249. 273 U.S. at 44.
250. See Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390 (1941); California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109 (1941).
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cluded that the regulation "infringe[d] the national interest in maintaining the freedom of commerce" across state lines. 25 1 Conversely, no
regulation would be held constitutional solely on the ground that its
incidence fell on local activity, distinct from interstate activity. For example, as previously discussed, safety regulations almost invariably had
been upheld. They were considered to involve indentifiable local activity,
such as the use of the state's highways, and thus were not characterized
as a "direct" regulation of interstate commerce. Under Justice Stone's
proposed approach, a safety regulation could be held to be unconstitutional because of its "actual effect on the flow of commerce.' '252
Academic support for a balancing approach to replace the allocation of power approach came from Professor Dowling, 25' and
looked to a conceptual justification for a negative aspect to the
commerce power. Insofar as the Court had attempted to state a
conceptual justification for a negative aspect to the commerce clause
which would support the allocation of power approach, it was the
affirmative grant of the commerce power to Congress that by its
own force operated to diminish the states' exercise of the reserved
general regulatory and taxation power. 21 4 To the academic commentators, this justification seemed to be inconsistent with the Court's
position that Congress could expressly authorize the states to undertake what otherwise would be an impermissible regulation or
taxation of interstate commerce. 25 5 Dowling and others resolved this
seeming inconsistency by concluding that the conceptual justification
for a negative aspect to the commerce clause was not based on any
notion of a diminution of state power by the affirmative grant of
the commerce power to Congress, but on the "implied intention of
Congress.' '256 According to Dowling, the Court had imposed restrictions on the power of the state to regulate and tax interstate commerce
because Congress had "impliedly intended" that such restrictions
be imposed. In his view, this conclusion followed from the Court's
holdings in In re Raher 5 7 and Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland
Railway Co. ,258 that Congress could expressly authorize the states to enact
what otherwise would be an impermissible regulation or taxation of

251. Thompson, 313 U.S. at 116.
252. Di Santo, 273 U.S. at 44.
253. See Dowling II, supra note 6.
254. See supra notes 143-52 and accompanying text.
255. See BikIe, supra note 6, at 209-13; Dowling II, supra note 6, at 25-26;
Powell, supra note 6, at 115-18.
256. See supra note 255.
257. 140 U.S. 545 (1891).
258. 242 U.S. 311 (1917).
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interstate commerce, and from the fact that Congress, in the affirmative exercise of the commerce power, could prohibit or preempt
regulation otherwise within the states' power. Congress, therefore,
could supersede state action in matters that had been characterized
as "local" under the allocation of power approach and permit it in
matters that had been characterized as "interstate" under that
approach.2 5 9 According to Dowling, since it would be unthinkable
that Congress could authorize the states to do something that had
been held by the Court to be unconstitutional, whenever the Court
invalidated a state regulation or tax on the basis of the commerce
clause, the Court was "effectuating the will of Congress and not
the commerce clause per se.

'

"260

Once having established that the conceptual justification for a
negative aspect to the commerce clause was the "implied intention"
of Congress, Dowling proceeded to set forth an operational test by
which this "implied intention" could be ascertained by the Court:
"[I]n the absence of affirmative consent a Congressional negative
will be presumed in the courts against state action which in its effect
upon interstate commerce constitutes an unreasonable interference
with national interests, the presumption being rebuttable at the
pleasure of Congress. '261 In order to determine whether the state
action "constitutes an unreasonable interference with national interests," the Court would have to engage in a "deliberate balancing
of national and local interests. ' 262 Such an approach, said Dowling,
"would provide flexibility in the adjustment and accomodation of
national and state interests, at the same time preserving the judicial
and amplifying the legislative function. "263 While the Court would

259. Dowling II, supra note 6, at 6.
260. Id. at 18-19. In support of the "theory of the implied will of Congress,"
Dowling cited a footnote in Justice Stone's opinion in Graves v. New York ex rel.
O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 479 n.1 (1939). In the course of discussing the significance
of congressional silence with respect to whether the states should be able to tax
the salaries of employees of a federal agency, Justice Stone stated:
The failure of Congress to regulate interstate commerce has generally been
taken to signify a Congressional purpose to leave undisturbed the authority
of the states to make regulations affecting the commerce in matters of
peculiarly local concern, but to withhold from them the authority to make
regulations affecting those phases of it which, because of the need of a
national uniformity, demand that their regulation, if any, be prescribed
by a single authority.
According to Dowling, "[n]o clearer statement of the implied will of Congress
appears in the Reports." Dowling II, supra note 6, at 18.
261. Dowling II, supra note 6, at 20.
262. Id. at 21.
263. Id. at 23.
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be making the determination as to the permissibility of state regulation
or taxation in the first instance, Congress would have the final say.
At all times, Congress would be exercising the commerce power,
expressly or impliedly, to determine the permissibility of state reg264
ulation or taxation affecting interstate commerce.
Thus, Chief Justice Stone and Professor Dowling were advocating
the substitution of a balancing of interests approach for the allocation
of power approach that the Court had been following since the time
of Cooley. 265 In the 1943 case of Parker v. Brown, 266 Justice Stone
succeeded in putting the balancing approach on a par with the
allocation of power approach. At issue in that case was a California
price-fixing scheme for the marketing of raisins, the major part of
which were destined for interstate commerce. Price regulation imposed by the state of production before the products left the state
had long been considered to be the regulation of local activity rather than
the regulation of interstate commerce for negative commerce clause
purposes. Justice Stone began by upholding the regulation under
what he referred to as "the mechanical test sometimes applied by
this Court in determining when interstate commerce begins with
respect to a commodity grown or manufactured within a state and
' '267
then sold or shipped out of it.
He then went on to set forth the balancing test that he had been
advocating ever since his Di Santo268 dissent:
But courts are not confined to so mechanical a test. When
Congress has not exerted its power under the Commerce
Clause, and state regulation of matters of local concern is
so related to interstate commerce that it also operates as a
regulation of that commerce, 269 the reconciliation of the power
thus granted with that reserved to the state is to be attained

264. Id.
265. As pointed out previously, Stone did not question the nondiscrimination
principle as an independent ground for invalidating state regulation and taxation.
See supra note 245. While Dowling vehemently maintained that the prohibitions of
the negative commerce clause should not be limited to discrimination against
interstate commerce, he did not deal specifically with discrimination in his development of the balancing approach. Dowling II, supra note 6, at 16-17.
266. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
267. Id. at 360.
268. Di Santo, 273 U.S. at 43.
269. Under the allocation of power approach of Di Santo, if a state regulation
also operated as a regulation of interstate commerce it would be held unconstitutional.
Id. at 44.
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by the accomodation of the competing
demands of the state
270
and national interests involved.

At this point Justice Stone undertook a considerable amount of
"revisionism" of the Court's prior negative commerce clause decisions. Citing cases where state regulations had been upheld, Stone
stated:
Such regulations by the state are to be sustained, not because
they are "indirect" rather than "direct, ''271 . . . not because
they control interstate activities in such a manner as only 272
to
affect the commerce rather than to command its operations.
But they are to be upheld because upon a consideration of
all the relevant facts and circumstances it appears that the
matter is one which may appropriately be regulated in the
interest of the safety, health and well-being of local communities, and which, because of its local character and the
practical difficulties involved, may never be adequately dealt
with by Congress. Because of its local character also there
may be wide scope for local regulation without substantially
impairing the national interest in the regulation of commerce
by a single authority and without materially obstructing the
free flow of commerce, which were the principle objects
273
sought to be secured by the Commerce Clause.

If this was the basis for the Court's decisions in those cases, no
indication to that effect will be found in the Court's opinions,
including the Barnwell opinion which was authored by Stone himself

24
just a few years before.

b.

The Balancing of Interests Approach in the Regulation Area:
Southern Paific and Thereafter

It was the decision in Southern Pacifid7 5 which saw the Court
unqualifiedly adopt the balancing of interests approach in the reg270. 317 U.S. at 362.
271. As we have emphasized repeatedly, the Court was using the terms,
"indirect," and "direct," only in a tautological sense.
272. Again, this represented a conclusion.
273. 317 U.S. at 362-63.
274. South Cardina v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938). In Barnwell,
Stone emphasized deference to legislative judgment in matters of safety regulation,
see supra note 192, and did not speak at all about any need to accommodate
conflicting state and national interests. 303 U.S. at 190.
275. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
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ulation area and, unlike its decision in Parker v. Brown, invalidate
the challenged state regulation as constituting an "undue burden"
on interstate commerce. Southern Pacific is also remarkable in that
the Court invalidated a state safety regulation dealing with the length
of freight trains in the face of a virtually unbroken line of precedents
sustaining such state safety regulations against negative commerce
clause challenges .276
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Stone began by downplaying
the significance of the conceptual justification for a negative aspect
to the commerce clause that had so concerned Dowling and other
academic commentators. Justice Stone stated simply: "Whether or
not this long recognized distribution of power between the national
and state governments is predicated upon the implications of the
commerce clause itself ... or upon the presumed intention of Con' 277
gress, where Congress has not spoken . . .the result is the same.

Stone then continued the "revisionism" he had begun in Parker v.
Brown, by implying that the balancing of interests approach was
merely a refinement of the approach that the Court had been following
since Cooley. Referring to the "infinite variety of cases in which
regulation of local matters may also operate as a regulation of
commerce," he maintained that in those cases, "reconciliation of
the conflicting claims of state and national power [was] to be attained
only by some appraisal and accommodation of the competing demands of state and national interests involved. "278 Thus, Stone
concluded, "[f]or a hundred years it has been accepted constitutional
doctrine . .. that in such cases, where Congress has not acted, this

Court, and not the state legislature, is under the commerce clause
the final arbiter of the competing demands of state and national
interests. ' '279
Justice Stone then considered the constitutionality of the Arizona
train limit regulation under the balancing of interests approach. In
deciding whether that regulation was permissible, Stone found:
matters for ultimate determination are the nature and extent
of the burden which the state regulation of interstate trains,
adopted as a safety measure, imposes on interstate commerce,
and whether the relative weights of the state and national
interests involved are such as to make inapplicable the rule,
generally observed, that the free flow of interstate commerce

276.
277.
278.

See supra notes 188-92 and accompanying text.
325 U.S. at 768 (citations omitted).
Id. at 768-69.

279.

Id. at 769.
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and its freedom from local restraints in matters requiring
by the
uniformity of regulation are interests safeguarded
280
commerce clause from state interference.
After extensively reviewing the facts and the findings of the state
trial court, Justice Stone concluded, "[h]ere examination of all the
relevant factors makes it plain that the state interest is outweighed
by the interest of the nation in an adequate, economical and efficient
railway transportation service, which must prevail.' '281
In a strong dissent, Justice Black stated:
There have been many sharp divisions of this Court concerning its authority, in the absence of congressional enactment, to invalidate state laws as violating the Commerce
Clause. 282 That discussion need not be renewed here, because
even the broadest exponents of judicial power in this field
have not heretofore expressed doubt as to a state's power,
absent a paramount congressional declaration, to regulate
28 3
interstate trains in the interest of safety.

If there was a need for uniform regulation of train length, the
constitutional remedy, according to Justice Black, was in the affirmative exercise of the commerce power of Congress, not in the
invalidation of state regulation by the Court on the ground that it
"unduly burdened" interstate commerce. 284
280.
281.

Id. at 770-71.
Id. at 783-84.

282. It appears that Justice Black, too, was engaging in a bit of "revisionism"
here. The disagreement among the members of the Court was not over the Court's
authority to invalidate state laws as violative of the negative commerce clause, but
over the application of the Court's allocation of power approach to the cases coming
before it for decision. Chief Justice Stone was correct in his statement that, ever
since the time of Cooley, the authority of the Court to invalidate state laws under
the negative commerce clause had not been questioned. See 325 U.S. at 769.
283. Id. at 790 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black discussed the Court's
opinion in Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Georgia, 234 U.S. 280 (1914), where
Justice Hughes, speaking for the Court, referred to "the settled principle that, in
the absence of legislation by Congress, the States are not denied the exercise of
their power to secure safety in the physical operation of railroad trains within their
territory, even though such trains are used in interstate commerce." Id. at 291.
284. Justice Black also dealt with Justice Stone's concern for "uniformity"
in regulation, with reference to Atlantic Coast Line,, where Justice Hughes stated
that, if there was a need for unformity, "That remedy does not rest in a denial
to the State, in the absence of conflicting Federal action, of its power to protect
life and property within its borders, but it does lie in the exercise of the paramount
authority of Congress in its control of interstate commerce to establish such
regulations as in its judgment may be deemed appropriate and sufficient." 325
U.S. at 791.
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Thus, in Southern Pacific, despite Chief Justice Stone's effort at
"judicial revisionism," the Court abandoned the allocation of power
approach in the regulation area and adopted in its stead an approach
based on a balancing of competing state and federal interests. Under
this balancing of interests approach, the analysis in determining the
permissibility of state regulation affecting interstate commerce would
not be based on a characterization of the nature of the regulation,
but on an appraisal of the "competing demands of state and national
interests. "25 When, as in Southern Pacific, the Court concluded that
the regulation did little to advance the asserted state interest, and
operated to "obstruct the free flow of commerce," the regulation
would be found to impose an "undue burden" on interstate com286
merce and would be held to be unconstitutional.
Under the balancing of interests approach, the emphasis was on
the Court's role as the "final arbiter of the competing demands of
state and national interests," and the implication was that state
regulation would be invalidated when the Court concluded that such
regulation imposed an "undue burden" on interstate commerce.
However, the years after Southern Pacific saw the Court in its application- of this approach generally sustaining nondiscriminatory regulation while continuing to invalidate all regulation that expressly
or in practical effect discriminated against interstate commerce or
out-of-state interests in favor of local commerce or in-state interests.
Except for the racial segregation case of Morgan v. Virginia,287 and
the transportation case of Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines,2 8 from the
time of Southern Pacific to the advent of the current approach, all
nondiscriminatory state regulation was sustained against negative
commerce clause challenges. Among the state regulations sustained
despite the claim that they imposed an "undue burden" on interstate

285. Id. at 769.
286. As Professor Tushnet has noted, the balancing approach of Southern
Pacific is similar to a due process analysis of the validity of economic regulation.
Tushnet, supra note 4, at 141-47.
287. 328 U.S. 373 (1946). See supra note 85. In Edwards v. California, 314
U.S. 160 (1941), the Court relied on the negative commerce clause to strike down
a California law that prohibited bringing an indigent person into the state. Four
Justices found that this prohibition violated the privileges and immunities clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 177-86 (separate concurrences). Today, however,
such a prohibition would be held unconstitutional on the ground that it directly
interfered with the constitutional right of interstate travel. See, e.g., Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (statute denying welfare benefits to indigents residing
within the jurisdiction for less than one year subject to strict scrutiny because it interferes with the indigent's right of interstate movement, and violates the equal protection clause).
288. 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
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commerce, were regulations prohibiting racial discrimination by
entities engaged in interstate commerce; 289 regulations prohibiting
advertising on vehicles, many of which were used in interstate
commerce, and by a radio station broadcasting in interstate commerce; 2 0 an ordinance prohibiting door-to-door solicitation as applied
to solicitors for national magazines; 291 state licensing and price
regulation of pipeline companies selling natural gas in interstate
commerce; 292 state licensing of vehicles engaged in interstate transportation; 293 application of a smoke abatement ordinance to a vessel
engaged in interstate commerce;2 94 and state regulation of liquor
pricing based on prices at which liquor was sold to wholesalers and
295
retailers in other states.
In Bibb, the Court held that an Illinois law requiring the use of
contour mudflaps instead of straight mudflaps was unconstitutional
as applied to trucks engaged in interstate commerce. 296 Noting that
all other states permitted the use of straight mudflaps, and the
neighboring state of Arkansas required their use, and finding that
the safety advantage of countour mudflaps over straight mudflaps
was "dubious at best," the Court concluded that, "[t]he heavy
burden which the Illinois mudguard law places on the interstate
movement of trucks and trailers seems to us to pass the permissible
limits even for safety regulations.' '297 The Court's 1968 decision in
298
Brotherhoodof Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R.,
however, appeared to limit sharply the use of the "undue burden"
analysis to invalidate nondiscriminatory state safety regulation. The Court
upheld the constitutionality of an Arkansas "full crew" law despite
the lower court's conclusion that the safety benefits of such laws
were "negligible" and that compliance by the railroads substantially
increased the cost of interstate railroad operations. 299 Justice Black,
who had dissented in Southern Pacific, authored the Court's opinion,

289. See Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines,
372 U.S. 714 (1963); Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948).
290. See Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 372 U.S. 424 (1963);
Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
291. See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
292. See Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179
(1950); Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 332 U.S. 507 (1947).
293. See Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. Wood, 344 U.S. 157 (1953); Buck v.
California, 343 U.S. 99 (1952).
294. See Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
295. See Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, (1966).
296. 359 U.S. at 529.
297. Id. at 530.
298. 393 U.S. 129 (1968).
299. Id. at 143-44.
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and in response to the finding of the lower court, stated: "[w]e
think it plain that in striking down the full-crew laws on this basis,
the District Court indulged in a legislative judgment wholly beyond
its limited authority to review state legislation under the Commerce
Clause. ' 30 0 While Justice Black distinguished the facts of Southern
Pacific from those of Bibb, 30 1 his analysis in Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen leaves little room for invalidation of state safety regulations
on "undue burden" grounds.3 0 2 The results in the later transportation
cases of Raymond and Kassell can be explained under the nondiscrimination principle. 303
During this period, the Court continued to invalidate all discriminatory state regulation. In addition to Dean Milk and Hood,
discussed earlier, 30 4 the Court applied the nondiscrimination principle
in PolarIce Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews,3 0 to invalidate a Florida
scheme of milk regulation that had the effect of requiring Florida
milk distributors to purchase a substantial portion of their milk from
Florida producers.30 6 The Court noted that part of the Florida
regulatory scheme was invalid as a "burden on interstate commerce"
because it reserved a substantial share of the Florida milk-market to
local producers. 30 7 The Court thus applied the nondiscrimination
principle within the framework of its articulated balancing of interests
approach. When the challenged regulation was found to be discriminatory, however, no balancing was performed and the regulation
308
was held to be unconstitutional.

300. Id. at 136. For older cases upholding the constitutionality of the Arkansas
"full crew" law see supra note 189. In an earlier version of Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen, 382 U.S. 423 (1966), the Court rejected the claim tha'tthe "flifl crew" law,

which exempted railroads with less than 100 miles of tracks, improperly discriminated

against interstate commerce. The effect of the exemption was that none of the intrastate

railroads were subject to the law, while most interstate railroads were. However, since
the classification was based on miles traveled, it did not have the effect of discriminating

against interstate commerce because of its out-of-state origin, and the law was thus
not violative of the negative commerce clause.

301.

393 U.S. at 139-40.

302. See Tushnet, supra note 6, at 144. Professor Tushnet maintains, however,
that the Court has not accepted Justice Black's analysis fully.
303. See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 43 & 55-57 and accompanying text.
305. 375 U.S. 361 (1964).

306. The Court held that Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc. and Dean Milk controlled.
Id. at 373.

307. Id. at 375. The discrimination effected by the scheme of regulation was
against milk producers in other states.
308. In Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415 (1952), a state law requiring
a $5 license fee for resident commercial fishermen, and a $50 license fee for
nonresident commercial fishermen, was held to be violative of the privileges and
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In practice, therefore, in the period after Southern Pacific, the
balancing of interests approach did not operate to interfere significantly with the power of the states to impose nondiscriminatory
regulations on interstate commerce. The "pure burden" analysis
employed by the Court in Southern Pacific and Bibb did not result in
the invalidation of nondiscriminatory regulations in any other cases 3 °9
and it seems clear that, in practice, the Court was not engaging in
"an appraisal of the competing demands of state and national
interests." In the application of its new approach to the permissibility
of state regulation affecting interstate commerce, the Court had in
effect expanded the power of the states to regulate interstate commerce, so long as the regulation was nondiscriminatory.3 1 0 Where
the regulation was discriminatory, expressly or in its essential effect,
the Court continued to hold it unconstitutional.
c.

The Approach in the Taxation Area

A different development took place in the taxation area. The
Court did not adopt the balancing of interests approach of Southern
Pacific when dealing with the permissibility of state taxation affecting
interstate commerce. Doctrinally, it continued to follow the allocation
of power approach, with the result often depending on the Court's
characterization of the nature of the tax in question and on the
ability to identify a local activity, distinct from interstate activity,
on which the incidence of the tax fell. But the Court's application
of the allocation of power approach in the taxation area during this
time was influenced by its view that the commerce clause embodied
a free trade principle, so as to require the invalidation of all state
taxation schemes that "had the effect of impeding the free flow of
trade between states." 3 1' The allocation of power approach in the
taxation area, as applied by the Court with reference to the free
trade principle, meant that nondiscriminatory taxation, like nondiscriminatory regulation under the balancing of interests approach,
immunities clause of art. IV, § 2. It also could have been held to be violative of
the negative commerce clause, since it had the practical effect of discriminating
against interstate commerce in favor of local commerce. See infra notes 527-29 and
accomanying text.
309. But see Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946), discussed supra note
85.
310. This is probably not what Chief Justice Stone had intended when he
asserted that the role of the Court was that of a "final arbiter of the competing
demands of state and national interests." Southern Pacific, 325 U.S. at 769. Since
Stone died in 1946, he had no opportunity to influence the Court's application of
the balancing of interests approach that had been adopted in Southern Pacific.
311. Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946).
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could be invalidated if it had the effect of imposing an "undue
burden" on interstate commerce. Invocation of the free trade principle in the taxation area also gave rise to a strong concern about
the possibility of "multiple taxation" of interstate commerce,3 12which
was deemed to be inconsistent with the free trade principle.
As discussed earlier, under the allocation of power approach, as
applied by the Court prior to this time, the negative commerce
clause did not place too great a restriction on the power of the state
to impose nondiscriminatory taxes on entities engaged in interstate
commerce. 313 This was because it frequently was possible to find a
local activity, distinct from interstate activity, on which the tax was
imposed, and to exact the tax before interstate movement had begun
or after it had come to an end. 31 4 Beginning in the late 1930's,
however, the Court, influenced by the newly found free trade
principle, became more disposed to invalidate state taxation schemes
as applied to entities engaged in interstate commerce. These state
taxation schemes tended to be more complex and often were based
on the gross receipts of the entity subject to the tax. Entities engaged
in interstate commerce challenged the application of state taxation
schemes to their activity on both negative commerce clause and due
process grounds, and these grounds of challenge tended to merge. 1 5
The emphasis, however, was on the negative commerce clause and
on the free trade principle that it was seen as embodying.
One consequence of the Court's invocation of the free trade
principle was that all gross receipts taxes imposed on an entity
engaged in interstate commerce were held to be unconstitutional
unless they were shown to be apportioned clearly to the entity's
identified local activity.31 6 It did not matter that the effect of the tax

312. It was also contended that "multiple taxation" was discriminatory
because local commerce was not exposed to "multiple taxation." See Gwin, White
& Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 439-40 (1939) (Stone, C.J.). However,
entities engaged in interstate commerce were exposed to "multiple taxation" only
because they were doing business in more than one state. Within each taxing state,
local commerce and interstate commerce were treated exactly the same, so there
was no "discrimination" for negative commerce clause purposes. It also may be
noted that "multiple taxation" is not violative of due process so long as each of
the taxing states has conferred a benefit on the subject of the tax. See State Tax
Comm'n v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 177-82 (1941).
313. See supra notes 194-203 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 194-98 and accompanying text.

315. The Court took the position that the tests of validity under the negative
commerce clause and under the due process clause were similar. See National Bellas
Hess, Inc. v. Illinois Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967).
316. See Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948);
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was nondiscriminatory in the sense that its incidence fell equally on
entities engaged in purely local commerce.3 17 The possibility that the
entity engaged in interstate commerce would be subject to "multiple
taxation" on gross receipts arising out of interstate activity was
sufficient to render the tax unconstitutional. Chief Justice Stone and
Justice Frankfurter were in the forefront of the articulation of the
free trade principle; this was apparent in their opinions holding
unconstitutional unapportioned gross receipts taxes.
In Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford,3 18 Chief Justice Stone,
writing for the Court, stated that an unapportioned gross receipts
tax was unconstitutional because it:
burdens commerce in the same manner and to the same
extent as if the exaction were for the privilege of engaging
in interstate commerce and would, if sustained, expose it to
multiple tax burdens, each measured by the entire amount
31 9
of the commerce, to which local commerce is not subject.
Justice Stone related the unconstitutionality of the potential double
taxation to the free trade principle that he saw as being embodied
in the negative commerce clause:
Such a multiplication of state taxes, each measured by the
volume of the commerce, would reestablish the barriers to
interstate trade which it was the object of the commerce
clause to remove. Unlawfulness of the burden depends upon
its nature, measured in terms of its capacity to obstruct
interstate commerce, and not in the contingency that some

Joseph v. Carter & Weckes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1947); Freeman v.
Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249 (1946); Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S.
434 (1939); J.D. Adams Mfg. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938); Fisher's Blend
Station, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 297 U.S. 650 (1936). For cases upholding
taxes based on a foreign corporation's gross receipts, on the ground that the tax
formula properly apportioned the gross receipts to the corporation's local activity,
see General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964); Norton Co. v.
Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1951); Canton R.R. v. Rogan, 340 U.S.
511 (1981); Western Livestock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938); see
also Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959)
(state's application of its net income tax to a foreign corporation doing substantial
business in that state where the amount of the tax fairly apportioned to the corporation's activities in the taxing state).
317. See Justice Black's discussion of this point in Gwin, White & Prince,
Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 455 (1939) (Black, J., dissenting).
318. 305 U.S. 434 (1939).
319. Id. at 439.
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other state may first have subjected the commerce to a like
320
burden.
Under this view, an unapportioned gross receipts tax was unconstitutional per se, notwithstanding that the entity subject to the tax
was engaged in substantial activities in the taxing state, and that
the amount of the tax was reasonable in relation to the extent of
the entity's activity in the taxing state. A tax imposed on the gross
receipts of an entity engaged in interstate commerce, subjecting the
entity to the possibility of multiple taxation on its interstate activities,
was deemed to be inconsistent with the free trade principle and thus
rendered the tax unconstitutional.
In Freeman v. Hewitt,3 2 1 the Court invalidated a gross receipts tax
on the interstate sale of securities. Justice Frankfurter, writing for
the Court, emphasized that a tax on an interstate transaction could
be unconstitutional, notwithstanding that a similar tax was imposed
on local transactions, thereby sharply distinguishing the free trade
principle from the nondiscrimination principle. He stated:
In two recent cases [Southern Pacific and Morgan] we applied
the principle that the Commerce Clause was not merely an
authorization to Congress to enact laws for the protection
and encouragement of commerce among the States, but by
its own force created an area of trade free from interference
among the States. . . . This limitation on State power, as
the Morgan case so well illustrates, does not merely forbid a
State to single out interstate commerce for hostile action. A
State is also precluded from taking any action which may
fairly be deemed to have the effect of impeding the free flow
of trade between States. It is immaterial that local commerce
is subjected to a similar encumbrance. . . . But to compare
a State's treatment of its local trade with the exertion of its
authority against commerce in the national domain is to
compare incomparables.
...
Of course a State is not required to give active
advantage to interstate trade. But it cannot aim to control
that trade even though it desires to control its own ....
It
is true that the existence of a tax on its local commerce
detracts from the deterrent effect of a tax on interstate

320.
321.

Id. at 440.
329 U.S. 249 (1946).

WAYNE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:885

commerce to the extent that it removes the temptation to
sell the goods locally. But the fact of such a tax, in any
event, puts impediments upon the currents of commerce
across the State line, while the aim of the Commerce Clause
was precisely to prevent States from exacting toll from those
3 22

engaged in interstate commerce.

According to Frankfurter, the tax on the interstate sale of securities
was unconstitutional because it was "a direct imposition on that
very freedom of commercial flow which for more than a hundred
and fifty years has been the ward of the Commerce Clause.' '323
The concern with the possibility of multiple taxation of entities
engaged in interstate commerce was extended to ad valorem property
taxes. In Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 324 the Court invalidated, as violative
of due process, Ohio's imposition of an ad valorem property tax on
vessels owned by an Ohio corporation. Since the vessels were used
outside of the state most of the time, the Court held that the tax
had to be apportioned strictly according to the vessels' use in Ohio. 325
In Central Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania,326 the Court held that Pennsylvania's unapportioned tax on the value of freight cars used in
runs between Pennsylvania and New Jersey was unconstitutional
because New Jersey also could impose a tax on such cars, leading
3 27
to multiple taxation of interstate operations.
The Court's invocation of the free trade principle in the taxation
area may explain its continued adherence to the allocation of power
approach in that area, although it had converted to a balancing of
interests approach in the regulation area. A tax on interstate commerce itself would be inconsistent with the free trade principle, which
was deemed to confer immunity from such taxation on interstate
commerce. The Court continued to follow the allocation of power
322. Id. at 252-54.
323. Id. at 256.
324. 342 U.S. 382 (1952).
325. Id. at 384.
326. 370 U.S. 607 (1962).
327. Id. at 613. The tax was sustained as applied to freight cars used on
runs to other states, because there was no showing that any other state had acquired
taxing jurisdiction over those cars. Id. at 614. In Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge
Line Co., 336 U.S. 169 (1949), the Court upheld an ad valorem property tax on
vessels, based on the ratio between the total number of miles of the carrier's lines
in the state and the total number of miles of the entire line. See also Norfolk &
Western Ry. v. Missouri State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317 (1968), where the
Court found unconstitutional a state's use of a mileage formula, to impose an ad
valorem property tax on a railroad's rolling stock, which produced a distorted result
in terms of a difference between assessed value and real value.
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approach in the taxation area and, totally apart from the matter of
proper apportionment, a tax could be invalidated depending on the
form that the tax took and the activity on which it fell. If the tax
was characterized as a tax on interstate commerce or on an interstate
transaction it would be invalidated.3 28 The tax would be sustained
where it was possible to identify a local activity on which the incidence
of the tax fell, such as taxes on manufacturing, production or sales
30
in the state, 3 9 or taxes on property having a situs in the state. 1
The formalism of the Court's approach to the permissibility of
state taxation affecting interstate commerce in the period after Southern
3 31
Pacific is best illustrated by Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor.
In that case the Court struck down a Connecticut franchise tax as
applied to an interstate motor freight carrier characterizing the tax
as a tax "on the privilege of carrying on exclusively interstate
transportation in the State,' '332 notwithstanding that the tax applied
equally to entities engaged in intrastate commerce. The Court noted:
"[e]ven though the financial burden on interstate commerce might
be the same, the question whether a state may validly make interstate
commerce pay its way depends first of all upon the constitutional
channel through which it attempts to do so.' ' 3 33 Nor was it relevant
that the tax was fairly apportioned to the carrier's local activity,
and thus would have been sustained had it taken the form of a tax
on the carrier's gross receipts, apportioned to the carrier's local

328. See Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 (1954); MichiganWisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157 (1954); Spector Motor Serv.
v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951); McLeod v. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
For cases invalidating taxes effecting foreign commerce on import-export grounds,
see Department of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 377 U.S. 341 (1964);
Joy Oil Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 337 U.S. 286 (1949); Empresa Siderurgica v.
County of Merced, 337 U.S. 154 (1949).
329. See Dunbar-Stanley Studios, Inc. v. Alabama, 393 U.S. 537 (1969)
(taking pictures); State Tax Comm'n v. Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe Co., 372
U.S. 605 (1963) (manufacturing cast iron pipes); Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v.
Stone, 337 U.S. 662 (1949) (operating pipe lines); International Harvester Co. v.
Evatt, 329 U.S. 416 (1947) (operating factories, warehouses, and retail stores).
330. See Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska Bd. of Equalization & Assessment,
347 U.S. 590 (1954); Bode v. Barrett, 344 U.S. 583 (1953); City of Chicago v.
Willett Co., 344 U.S. 574 (1953); Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S.
542 (1950); Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of R.R. Comm'rs, 332 U.S.
495 (1947); Independent Warehouses, Inc. v. Scheele, 331 U.S. 70 (1947). If the
property was used in other states, the tax had to be properly apportioned according
to the use of the property in the taxing state. See supra notes 324-27 and accompanying
text.
331. 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
332. Id. at 608.
333. Id.
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activity. 3 4 The Court found: "[t]he constitutional infirmity of such
a tax persists no matter how fairly it is apportioned to business done
within the state. 335
Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert,33 6 is another extreme
example of how the Court's characterization of the nature of the
particular tax was result-dispositive. A state tax on natural gas,
measured by the volume of gas taken, was held unconstitutional as
applied to the taking of gas from the outlet of an independent
gasoline plant in the state for immediate shipment into interstate
commerce. Although the tax applied equally to gas moving in
intrastate and interstate commerce, it was found to be unconstitutional because its incidence did not fall on the production of the
gas, but rather on its shipment into interstate commerce after
338
37
The Railway Express Agency cases
production was complete.
epitomize the result-dispositive effect of the Court's characterization
of the nature of a particular tax. There Virginia tried to obtain
taxes from Railway Express Agency, which was doing substantial
business in the state. In Virginia's first effort, the tax was characterized by the Court as a tax on "the privilege of engaging 3 in39
interstate commerce," and thus was held to be unconstitutional.
After Virginia revised the wording of the tax, labeling it a tax on
intangible property in the form of "going concern" value as measured
by the corporation's gross receipts from business in Virginia, the
tax was sustained.3 40 As the Court subsequently recognized, there
both
was not a real economic difference between the two taxes, and
34
manner.
same
the
exactly
in
Express
Railway
on
impacted
The Court also had some difficulty in determining the circumstances under which the states could require an interstate seller to
collect a use tax.3 42 It upheld the state's power to require collection
of the use tax where orders for the product were solicited in-state
by brokers and wholesalers, 343 and where aviation fuel purchased
334. Id. at 609-10.
335. Id. at 609.
336. 347 U.S. 157 (1954).
337. Id. at 169. The Court again noted the possibility of "multiple taxation."
Id. at 170.
338. Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434 (1959); Railway
Express Agency v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 (1954).

339.

347 U.S. 359 (1954).

340.

358 U.S. 434 (1959).

341. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 284-85 (1977).
342. The Court had no difficulty in concluding that an in-state seller could
be required to collect the sales tax notwithstanding that the product was going to
be shipped out-of-state. See McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309
U.S. 33 (1940).
343. See Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
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out-of-state was stored and loaded aboard aircraft in-state for use
in interstate flights.3s However, it held that the use tax collection
requirement was unconstitutional as applied to an out-of-state seller
who made the sales in its out-of-state stores, although it advertised
extensively in the taxing state,3 45 and an out-of-state mail order
house that had made upwards of one million dollars in annual sales
3
in the taxing state.

46

Throughout this period, the Court continued to invalidate all
state taxation schemes that expressly or in practical effect discriminated against interstate commerce in favor of local commerce. In
Nippert v. City of Richmond,3 47 the Court held unconstitutional the
application of a municipal flat sum license tax as applied to a solicitor
of orders for interstate sales. The license tax was unconstitutional
344. See United Air Lines v. Makin, 410 U.S. 623 (1973).
345. See Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954).
346. See National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753
(1967). The Court used a combined commerce clause-due process analysis, noting
that the commerce clause and due process claims were closely related and that the
tests for determining a commerce clause and a due process violation in the area
of state taxation affecting interstate commerce were similar. Id. at 756. In invalidating
the use tax collection requirement, the Court stated that, "the Court has never
held that a State may impose the duty of use tax collection and payment upon a
seller whose only connection with customers in the State is by common carrier or
the United States Mail." Id. at 758. In his dissent, Justice Fortas pointed out that
National Bellas Hess had made over $2 million in Illinois sales for the 15 months
for which taxes were levied. He contended that,
[t]here should be no doubt that this large-scale, systematic, continuous
solicitation and exploitation of the Illinois consumer market is a sufficient
"nexus" to require Bellas Hess to collect from Illinois customers and to
remit the use tax, especially when coupled with the use of the credit
resources of residents of Illinois, dependent as that mechanism is upon
the State's banking and credit institutions.
Id. at 761-62 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
In National Geographic Soc'y v. California Equalization Bd., 430 U.S. 551
(1977), the Court upheld a requirement that the Society collect California's use
tax on mail order sales to California residents, mailed from the Society's Washington,
D.C. office, in response to orders they mailed on forms the Society had distributed
by mail announcements or in its magazine. In discussing National Bellas Hess and
Miller Bros., the Court emphasized the lack of "contacts" between the out-of-state
seller and the taxing state in those cases. In National Geographic by contrast, the
Court noted that the Society maintained offices in California, and thus received a
"benefit" from the taxing state. Id. at 558-62. If Miller Bros. and National Bellas
Hess were to be followed today, it would be because of the lack of "nexus" between
the out-of-state seller's activity and the taxing state, under the first element of the
Complete Auto Transit test. The "nexus" requirement, as previously discussed, involves
due process rather than negative commerce clause concerns. The negative commerce
clause should not be seen as imposing any limits on the power of a state to require
an out-of-state seller to collect the use tax on goods sold to residents of the taxing
state.
347. 327 U.S. 416 (1946).
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because the amount of the tax bore no relationship to the amount
of the solicitor's sales in the city; the tax had to be paid by anyone
who engaged in even a single act of solicitation.3 48 The Court focused
on the practical effect of the tax and concluded that the effect was
to disadvantage interstate commerce in comparison with local commerce. The Court stated:
the small operator particularly and more especially the casual
or occasional one from out of the State will find the tax not
only burdensome but prohibitive, with the result that the
commerce is stopped before it is begun. And this effect will
be extended to more substantial and regular operators, particularly those whose product is of highly limited or special
character and whose market in any single locality for that
reason or others cannot be mined more than once in every
3 49

so often.

The discriminatory effect of the tax on interstate commerce was
aggravated by the fact that it was a municipal tax which, if sustained,
could thereafter be imposed by all municipalities in the state, so
that, "the cumulative burden will be felt more strongly by the outof-state itinerant than by the one who confines his movement within
the state or the salesman who operates within a single community
or only a few.' '350 While it was true that such a tax also could affect
local solicitors adversely, the Court found it more likely to adversely
affect out-of-state solicitors. The Court concluded that, "[t]he tax
here in question inherently involves too many probabilities, and we
think actualities, for exclusion of or discrimination against interstate
commerce, in favor of local competing business, to be sustained in
any application substantially similar to the present one. '351
348. The terms of the ordinance are set out in a footnote to the opinion. See
327 U.S. at 418-19 n.2.
349. Id. at 429.
350. Id. at 430.
351. Id. at 434. Nippert may be compared with Breard v. Alexandria, 341
U.S. 622 (1951). In Nippert, the Court noted the fact that out-of-state solicitors
would be competing with local retail merchants, which was also true in Breard. In
Nippert, however, the tax placed out-of-state solicitors at a competitive disadvantage
in comparison to local retail merchants as a general proposition. In Breard, by contrast,
all solicitors, local and interstate, were placed at a competitive disadvantage in
comparison to local retail merchants. The discrimination thus effected by the tax
in Nippert was against interstate commerce generally in comparison to local commerce, while the discrimination effected in Breard was against solicitors generally
in comparison to retail merchants. Thus, there was unconstitutional discrimination
against interstate commerce for negative commerce clause purposes in Nippert, while
such discrimination was absent in Breard.
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In Memphis Steam Laundy Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone,35 2 a tax was applied
to the solicitation of business for laundries not licensed in the state.
Local laundries were subject to other taxes, but the effective per
truck tax for local laundries was only eight dollars, in comparison
to an effective per truck tax of fifty dollars for out-of-state laundries.
The Court found that the effect of the tax was to discriminate against

interstate commerce. In West Point Wholesale Grocery Co. v. City of

Opelkia,353 the city imposed a flat-sum privilege tax on wholesale
firms delivering groceries to the city from points outside the city or
state, while no comparable tax was imposed on local grocery firms.
Since the practical effect of the tax was to discriminate against
interstate commerce in favor of local commerce, as in Dean Milk,
the tax was held unconstitutional, notwithstanding that it also disadvantaged some in-state grocery firms. In Halliburton Oil Well
Cementing Co. v. Reily, 35 4 the Court invalidated a Louisiana tax scheme
which applied to certain transactions of an out-of-state user-manufacturer, but did not apply to the same transactions when carried
on by an in-state user-manufacturer. The in-state user-manufacturer
would not have to pay a sales tax on the transaction while the outof-state user-manufacturer would have to pay a use tax on the
transaction. The Court found: "equal treatment for in-state and
out-of-state taxpayers similarly situated is the condition precedent
for a valid use tax on goods imported from out-of-state. 3' 55
During this period, the Court's treatment of discriminatory taxes
thus differed considerably from its treatment of nondiscriminatory
taxes. Where the tax was nondiscriminatory, the court invoked the
free trade principle and looked only to the form of the tax or the
possibility of multiple taxation of interstate commerce. Where the
claim was that the tax discriminated against interstate commerce in
favor of local commerce, however, the Court focused on the effect
of the tax in operation and, emphasizing the nondiscrimination
principle rather than the free trade principle, continued to invalidate
all taxation schemes that had the effect of discriminating against
interstate commerce in favor of local Commerce.
The number of cases involving challenges to state taxation affecting entities engaged in interstate commerce began to decline in
the 1960's,356 and the early 1970's saw a perceptible change in the
Court's view toward the permissibility of state taxation affecting

352.

342 U.S. 389 (1952).

353.

354 U.S. 390 (1957).

354.
355.
356.

373 U.S. 64 (1963).
Id. at 70.
This was particularly so during the latter part of the decade.
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interstate commerce.3 5 7 Whereas, in 1972 the Court in Evco v. Jones""
invalidated per curiam an unapportioned gross receipts tax as applied
to interstate sales of goods delivered to out-of-state buyers, in 1975
the Court in Standard Pressed Steel v. Washington Revenue Department5 9
upheld a Washington tax imposed upon a foreign corporation's gross
6
receipts from interstate shipments .to a buyer in the taxing state.3
Standard Pressed Steel is particularly significant in two respects. First,
while the Court previously had invalidated unapportioned gross
receipts taxes on the ground that they gave rise to a possibility of
multiple taxation, in Standard Pressed Steel the Court found that the
taxpayer had the burden of demonstrating that it was subject to the
61
risk of multiple taxation, and that no such showing had been made.
Second, the Court focused on the "fair relation" between the entity's
activities in the taxing state and the imposition of the tax, concluding
that the tax in question, in light of the extent of the entity's activities
in Washington, bore a "reasonable relation to the protection and
benefits conferred by the taxing State. "362
In Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle,3 63 also decided in 1975, the
Court upheld the application of Louisiana's franchise tax to an
interstate carrier of liquified petroleum products. Although the carrier
did no interstate business through Louisiana, it had employees there
to inspect and maintain its pipeline, pumping stations, and related
activities. The Court emphasized that the validity of the tax depended
on whether the tax was "related to a corporation's local activities
and [on whether] the State has provided benefits and protections for
those activities for which it is justified in asking a fair and reasonable
return.' '364 Since the tax applied to "operating incidences of activities

357. See, e.g., Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines,
405 U.S. 707 (1972), where the Court upheld a municipal airport's $1 charge for
each deplaning passenger. The Court emphasized that both intrastate and interstate
flights were subject to the same charges and that the charges reflected a fair, if
imperfect, approximation for the use of the facilities by those for whose benefit
they were imposed.
358. 409 U.S. 91 (1972) (per curiam).

359.

419 U.S. 560 (1975).

360. Standard sold aerospace fasteners to Boeing Company in Seattle, based
on orders that Boeing sent to Standard's headquarters in Pennsylvania. These
orders were filled by interstate shipments to Boeing in Seattle. Standard had one
full-time employee in Washington whose job was to keep Standard aware of products
that Boeing might use and to "keep track" of Boeing's use of Standard's products.
Cf. General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964).
361. 419 U.S. at 563.
362. Id. at 562. The Court essentially employed a due process analysis.
363. 421 U.S. 100 (1975).
364. Id. at 108.
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within Louisiana for which the State affords privileges and protections
that constitutionally entitle Louisiana to exact a fairly apportioned
and nondiscriminatory tax, "365 the tax was upheld.
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,3 66 decided in 1977, was the
culmination of the trend reflected in StandardPressed Steel and Colonial
Pipeline. The significance of Complete Auto Transit for this discussion,
however, lies in the Court's articulation of a completely new approach
toward permissible state taxation of interstate commerce. The Complete
Auto Transit Court abandoned the allocation of power approach, with
its emphasis on the characterization of the nature of the particular
tax.3 67 As evidenced by the Court's decisions since Complete Auto
Transit, it has abandoned reliance on the free trade principle to shield
entities engaged in interstate commerce from the operation of nondiscriminatory state taxation. The current focus of the Court is on
nondiscrimination and "fair relation, "36 and all nondiscriminatory
state taxation of interstate commerce will be sustained.
d.

Congressional Authorization

In the period following Southern Pacific, the Court again affirmed
the power of Congress to authorize the states to impose what otherwise
would be a constitutionally impermissible regulation or taxation of
interstate commerce. The leading case on this point is Prudential
Insurance Co. v. Benjamin,369 which involved South Carolina's taxation
of premiums received by foreign insurance companies in the state.
No similar tax was required of South Carolina insurance companies.
By the McCarran-Ferguson Act,3 7 0 Congress specifically provided:
"the continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the
business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on
the part of the Congress shall not be construed 'to impose any barrier
to the regulation or taxation of such business by the several States."37,
365. Id. at 113. The Court distinguished Spector and the earlier Railway Express
case on the ground that here the Louisiana legislature amended the law "purposefully
to remove any basis of a levy upon the privilege of carrying on an interstate
business and narrowly to confine the impost to one related to appellant's activities
within the State in the corporate form." Id. at 113-14. Justice Stewart found
this distinction to be "specious." Id. at 116. See generally Hellerstein, State Taxation
of Interstate Business and the Supreme Court, 1974 Term: Standard Pressed Steel and Colonial
Pipeline, 61 VA. L. REv. 149 (1976).

366. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
367. Spector was specifically overruled. The Court stated, "[s]imply put, the
Spector rule does not address the problems with which the Commerce Clause is
concerned." Id. at 288-89.
368. "Fair relation" is a due process concern, as noted previously.
369. 328 U.S. 440 (1951).
370. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1982).
371.

Id. § 1011.
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The insurance companies argued that Congress could not constitutionally authorize the states to impose a discriminatory tax on foreign
insurance companies. In response to this argument, the Court stated:
The power of Congress over commerce exercised entirely
without reference to coordinated action of the states is not
restricted, except as the Constitution expressly provides, by
any limitation which forbids it to discriminate against interstate commerce and in favor of local trade. Its plenary scope
enables Congress not only to promote but also to prohibit
interstate commerce, as it has done frequently and for a
great variety of reasons....
This broad authority Congress may exercise alone, subject
to those limitations, or in conjunction with coordinated action
by the states, in which case limitations imposed for the
preservation of their powers become inoperative and only
those designed to forbid action altogether by any power or
.combination of powers in our governmental system remain
effective. Here both Congress and South Carolina have acted,
and in complete coordination, to sustain the tax ...
In this light the argument that the degree of discrimination
which South Carolina's tax has involved, if any, puts it
beyond the power of government to continue must fall of its
own weight. No conceivable violation of the commerce clause,
372
in letter or spirit, is presented.
Thus, even when the regulation or tax otherwise would amount to
constitutionally impermissible discrimination against interstate commerce, it could be specifically authorized by Congress and, on that
basis, would be immune to negative commerce clause challenge.
3.

The Court's Current Approach and Its Approach from an
HistoricalPrespective: A Retrospective View

A retrospective view of the Court's approach to the negative
commerce clause as a restriction on state regulatory and taxation
power reveals two distinct patterns of institutional behavior, one of
which has fluctuated dramatically, and one of which has demonstrated
complete consistency from Cooley to the present time. The Court has
had great institutional difficulty in dealing with the negative commerce clause as a general limitation on state regulatory and taxation
power. In Cooley, the Court took the position that the affirmative

372.

328 U.S.

at

434-36.
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grant of the commerce power to Congress operated to diminish the
reserved regulatory and taxation power of the states whenever the
exercise of state power affected entities engaged in interstate commerce. The Court's approach to the permissibility of state regulation
and taxation affecting interstate commerce thus was in terms of
allocation of power, and the constitutional result depended upon the
Court's characterization of the nature of the challenged regulation
or tax. If it was characterized as a regulation or tax on interstate
commerce itself, it was deemed to impose a "direct burden" on
interstate commerce and was unconstitutional. If it was not so
characterized, it was sustained as being within the reserved regulatory
and taxation power of the states.3 73 In Southern Pacific, the Court
adopted a markedly different approach to the constitutionality of
state regulation affecting interstate commerce. Under this approach,
the constitutional permissibility of the regulation depended upon a
balancing of competing state and national interests, rather than upon
a characterization of the nature of the regulation. The Court would
balance the state interest advanced by the challenged regulation
against the national interest in the free flow of commerce across
state lines, and the regulation would be invalidated if it was found
to impose an "undue burden" on interstate commerce.3 74 The Court
did not appear to be concerned with a conceptual justification for
a negative aspect to the commerce clause, stating almost casually
that the justification could be found either in the diminution of state
regulatory power as a result of the affirmative grant of the commerce
power to Congress, or in the "implied intention" of Congress that
state regulatory power be restricted in matters where the exercise of
state power would impose an "undue burden" on interstate com3 75
merce.
While the balancing of interests approach is the Court's current
articulated approach to the permissibility of state regulation affecting
interstate commerce, the results reached in the application of that
approach in the years following Southern Pacific, up through the
present time, would indicate that a very different kind of approach
is being followed. With the exception of the transportation cases,
the more recent of which can be brought within the nondiscrimination
principle 3 76 and Edgar v. Mite Corp.,377 which can be explained on
full faith and credit grounds 3 78 the Court never has invalidated a
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.

See supra notes 153-203 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 276-86 and accompanying text.
See Southern Pacific, 325 U.S. at 768.
See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
457 U.S. 624 (1982).
See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
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state regulation on "undue burden" grounds, despite the adverse
impact of the regulation on the "free flow of commerce." Conversely,
where the Court has concluded that the essential effect of the
regulation in practical operation was to discriminate against or
disadvantage interstate commerce or out-of-state interests because of
the interstate nature of that commerce or the out-of-state nature of
those interests, the Court has always invalidated the regulation. In
terms of results, it thus would appear that the Court is not following
the articulated balancing of interests approach, but instead is following
an approach under which all nondiscriminatory state regulation is
sustained and all discriminatory state regulation is invalidated. As
far as results are concerned, the absence of balancing stands out
sharply and thus there is a clear inconsistency between the Court's
articulated approach and the results that the Court reaches. Again,
in terms of results, the Court has come full circle from the allocation
of power approach adopted in Cooley, to the point at which it will
uphold virtually all nondiscriminatory state regulation against a
negative commerce clause challenge.
In the taxation area, the Court's institutional behavior has
379
fluctuated even more dramatically than in the regulation area.
Here too, in terms of results, the Court now has reached the point
where all nondiscriminatory state taxation affecting interstate commerce is likely to be upheld against a negative commerce clause
challenge. While continuing to follow the allocation of power approach
until its abandonment in Complete Auto Transit, the Court's application
of that approach in the Southern Pacific era was influenced by the
free trade principle, which the Court viewed as embodied in the
negative commerce clause. The Court invalidated all unapportioned
gross receipts taxes because of the possibility of multiple taxation of
interstate commerce, and invalidated all taxes that, because of their
form or the activity on which they fell, were characterized as a tax
on interstate commerce itself. During the early 1970's, a perceptible
change was apparent in the Court's view toward the permissibility
of state taxation of entities engaged in interstate commerce, culminating in the Court's adoption of a completely new approach in
Complete Auto Transit. The four element test of Complete Auto Transit
focuses on the issue of nondiscrimination and the issue of "fair
relation," which is a due process rather than a negative commerce
clause concern.3 80 The Court's decisions after Complete Auto Transit
make it clear that all nondiscriminatory state taxation of entities
engaged in interstate commerce will likely be sustained.
379. See supra notes 312-68 and accompanying text.
380. See supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
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Thus, the Court's institutional behavior, and its articulated
approach with respect to the negative commerce clause as a general
limitation on state regulatory and taxation power, have fluctuated
dramatically over the years. The Court never has adequately set
forth a structurally-based conceptual justification for the negative
commerce clause as a general restriction on state regulatory and
taxation power. In terms of results, however, the Court's institutional
behavior has evolved to the point where, coming full circle from
Cooley, it is now sustaining virtually all nondiscriminatory regulation
and taxation against negative commerce clause challenge. On the
other hand, whenever the essential effect of the regulation or tax
has been to discriminate against interstate commerce or out-of-state
interests in favor of local commerce or in-state interests because of
the interstate nature of that commerce or the out-of-state nature of
those interests, the Court has followed a completely consistent pattern
of institutional behavior. From Cooley to the present time, all such
regulation or taxation has been held to violate the negative commerce
clause, except where the state was acting as market participant or
where the particular state regulation or tax had been authorized
specifically by Congress. The Court also has found and articulated
a structurally-based conceptual justification for invalidating discriminatory state regulation and taxation, related to a major historical
purpose of the commerce clause. Since a major purpose for the
affirmative grant of the commerce clause power to Congress was to
prevent the states from discriminating against interstate commerce
or out-of-state interests in favor of local commerce or in-state interests,
the Court has relied on the negative aspect of the commerce clause
to invalidate all discriminatory regulation and taxation, even in the
absence of congressional action. 31 Thus, there has been a consistent
pattern of institutional behavior, supported by a structurally-based
conceptual justification, invalidating all discriminatory state regulation and taxation affecting interstate commerce.
Much can be learned from the Court's institutional behavior
with respect to the negative commerce clause as a restriction on
state regulatory and taxation power. The Court has followed a
consistent pattern of invalidating all discriminatory regulation and
taxation, while its institutional behavior has fluctuated dramatically
in regard to nondiscriminatory regulation and taxation. This dichotomy in behavior may be a strong indication that the negative
commerce clause as a ban on discriminatory regulation and taxation
is firmly rooted in constitutional structure, while it is lacking such
structural support as a restriction on nondiscriminatory regulation
381.

See supra notes 204-14 and accompanying text.
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and taxation. In addition, great weight must be attached to the
results that the Court reaches in practice; they are a much better
indicator of the Court's view of the proper meaning of the
Constitution 38 2 than is the constitutional doctrine that the Court
articulates, or the approach to the resolution of constitutional questions that the Court purportedly follows. Thus, the fact that the
Court's institutional behavior with respect to the negative commerce
clause as a restriction on state regulatory and taxation power has
evolved to the point where the Court is invalidating all discriminatory
regulation and taxation, while sustaining all nondiscriminatory regulation and taxation, is a further indication that a structurally-based
conceptual justification for a negative aspect to the the commerce
clause can be found in the nondiscrimination principle, and that it
cannot be found on any other basis.
It is, therefore, appropriate at this point to consider structurallybased conceptual justifications that have been advanced for a negative
aspect to the commerce clause.
II.

STRUCTURALLY-BASED CONCEPTUAL JUSTIFICATION FOR
A NEGATIVE ASPECT TO THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

This part of the Article addresses the four conceptual justifications
that have been advanced in support of a negative aspect to the
commerce clause. These justification theories may be described as
follows: (1) Diminution of power: The affirmative grant of the
commerce power to Congress operates to diminish the reserved
general regulatory and taxation powers of the state where the regulation or tax affects interstate commerce; (2) Implied intention of
Congress: The failure of Congress to authorize specifically state
regulation or taxation affecting interstate commerce in certain circumstances indicates that Congress intended that state regulation or
taxation be precluded in those circumstances; (3) The free trade
principle: A major historical purpose for the grant of the commerce
power to Congress was to establish a national free trade area; state
regulation or taxation that unreasonably burdens interstate commerce
38 3
or interferes with interstate trade or movement is unconstitutional;
382. The Court's function in defining the meaning of the Constitution is
discussed in Sedler, supra note 7, at 113-20.
383. Proponents of the free trade principle justification have relied on the
historic context of the commerce clause for support. The term "historical context"
refers to the "principles and ideas which most importantly influenced the development of our constitutional texts." Saphire, Judicial Review in the Name of the
Constitution, 8 U. DAYTON L. REv. 745, 780 (1983). Professor Saphire uses the

term "historic context" to avoid the problems associated with use of the term
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(4) The nondiscrimination principle: A major historical purpose for
the grant of the commerce power to Congress was to prevent economic
protectionism and discrimination against interstate commerce or outof-state interests in favor of local commerce or in-state interests;
state regulation or taxation that discriminates against interstate commerce or out-of-state interests in favor of local commerce or in-state
interests because of the interstate nature of that commerce or the
out-of-state nature of those interests is unconstitutional. 38
As stated previously, the validity of these conceptual justifications
will be analyzed in terms of constitutional structure. Constitutional
structure may restrict the exercise of state power in one of three
ways. First, certain specific powers are denied to the states, either
expressly or implicitly, by the grant of an exclusive power to
"framers' intent." He states:
Given my view of the intractable dilemma inherent in the search for the
individual and collective intentions of those individuals who were centrally
involved in the promulgation of our constitutional texts, and given the
fact that the term "framers' intent" has become so closely associated with
the personal, subjective views of those individuals, I believe that continued
reference to "the framers' intent" in the discourse of constitutional theory
should generally be avoided. [Thus, the reference to the historic context
of a constitutional provision is a reference to] foundational principles and
ideas [that] transcend the views expressed by particular persons. Those
principles and ideas are epochal; they must be extrapolated, however
imperfectly, from the events of an entire political era.
Id.
The term "historical context" is particularly appropriate in understanding the
circumstances surrounding the promulgation of the commerce clause. The focus of
the inquiry is on the major historical purposes for the affirmative grant of the
commerce power to Congress. Those purposes can be ascertained clearly from the
events of the political era during which the nation first operated under the Articles
of Confederation and later under the Constitution.
384. The nondiscrimination principle, as a conceptual justification for a
negative aspect to the commerce clause, can be sustained with reference to the
historical context of that clause, and the Court has relied on the historical context of
the commerce clause in support of the nondiscrimination principle. See supra notes
204-14 and accompanying text. With reference to the matter of a structurally-based
conceptual justification for a negative aspect to the commerce clause, then, it is
necessary only to engage in an "interpretive review" or, as my colleague, Professor
Grano, would put it, "to constitutionalize values not inferable from the Constitution
itself." Grano, Judicial Review and a Written Constitution in a Democratic Society, 28
WAYNE L, REV. 1, 64 (1981). I maintain that "noninterpretive review" is necessary
for constitutional adjudication involving the "majestic generalities" of the Constitution, such as the equal protection clause or the due process clause. Sedler, supra
note 7, at 132-36. However, finding limitations on the exercise of state power on
the basis of an affirmative grant of power to Congress obviously does not involve
the Court's role in defining the "majestic generalities" of the Constitution. Therefore, in dealing with the matter of a negative aspect to the commerce clause, the
Court's focus is properly on the historical context of that clause.
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Congress. Second, a particular exercise of state power may be
proscribed because it conflicts with, or is preempted by, Congress'
affirmative exercise of its delegated powers. Third, an exercise of
state power may be limited by constitutional provisions designed to
protect individual rights. It must be determined, therefore, whether
any of the conceptual justifications that have been advanced for a
negative aspect to the commerce clause properly can be brought
within one of these structurally-based methods of restricting state
power.
The diminution of power justification obviously relates to the
first structural method of restriction. The question is whether it is
consistent with the allocation of federal and state power under the
Constitution to conclude that the affirmative grant of the nonexclusive
commerce power to Congress operates to diminish the reserved
general regulatory and taxation powers of the state where the regulation or tax affects interstate commerce. The implied intention of
Congress justification relates to the second structural method of
restriction, since it involves preclusion of state regulation as a matter
of federal supremacy. The question under this theory of justification
is whether it is consistent with the allocation of federal legislative
power under the Constitution to conclude that Congress may exercise
that power negatively as well as affirmatively. Has Congress by its
failure to authorize specifically state regulation or taxation affecting
interstate commerce in certain circumstances effectively acted to
preclude state regulation or taxation in those circumstances?
The free trade principle and the nondiscrimination principle
3 85
justifications both relate to the third structural method of restriction.
Limitations on the exercise of governmental power may be found
38 6
in the internal inferences of the Constitution, as well as in its text.
The question here is whether the commerce clause may be relied
upon as the source of a right accruing to entities engaged in interstate
commerce, to be free from state regulation or taxation that unreasonably burdens interstate commerce or interferes with interstate
trade or movement (the free trade principle), or discriminates against
interstate commerce or out-of-state interests in favor of local commerce or in-state interests because of the interstate nature of that
commerce or the out-of-state nature of those interests .(the nondiscrimination principle).

385.

The structurally-based conceptual justification for a negative aspect to

the commerce clause that will be advanced also leads to certain conclusions in
determining the validity of state regulation and taxation affecting interstate commerce. See infra notes 496-500 and accompanying text.
386.

See infra notes 477-83 and accompanying text.
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A. The Diminution of Power Justification
The diminution of power justification was the basis of the Court's
holding in Cooley that the affirmative grant of the commerce power
to Congress by its own force deprived the states of the power to
regulate where the matter in issue "imperatively demand[ed] a single
uniform rule. ' 38 7 As previously discussed, the Court's holding in
Cooley clearly was a compromise between the view that the commerce
power was an exclusively federal power, so as to preclude all state
regulation or taxation affecting interstate commerce, and the view
that the commerce clause imposed no limitation at all on the reserved
general regulatory and taxation power of the states.3 88 The Court
avoided any discussion of the rationale for its conclusion that the
federal commerce power was, in effect, a "partly exclusive" power.
The Court did not give a structural explanation of how a federal
power could be partly exclusive, such that the affirmative grant of
that power of Congress could operate to diminish the exercise of
the reserved powers of the states. In other words, the Court never
related the diminution of power justification to the constitutional
allocation of power.
The Court's failure to deal with the structural questin in Cooley
is very troubling because the diminution of power justification seems
inconsistent with the underlying theory of allocation of power under
the Constitution. The theory behind the allocation of federal and
state power under the Constitution is that the federal government
possesses only those powers that have been delegated to it by the
Constitution. The states retain general regulatory power and all
other sovereign powers that they possessed prior to the adoption of
the Constitution, except where the exercise of such power was denied
to the states or otherwise restricted by the Constitution.3 8 9 The Cooley
Court's holding that the commerce power was not an exclusive
federal power, should have meant that the Constitution did not by
necessary implication deny the states the power to regulate matters

387. See Cooley, 53 U.S. at 318.
388. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
389. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 404-07 (1819).
The tenth amendment provides that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the People." U.S. CONST. amend. X. The tenth amendment
merely states a truism; it is "declaratory of the relationship between the national
and state governments as it had been established by the Constitution before the
amendment." United States v. Darby, 313 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). Furthermore,
this underlying structure is reflected in the text of the Constitution, which assigns

particular powers to the federal government, but does not assign specific powers
to the states.
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that were within the ambit of the federal commerce power. Inasmuch as
the states retain general regulatory power, except where the exercise
of that power is restricted by the Constitution, it is difficult to find any
structural basis upon which the commerce clause could operate negatively
to limit state regulatory power over matters requiring a uniform rule.
The Court's conclusion in Cooley that the affirmative grant of a
nonexclusive power to Congress could, by its own force, operate to
limit the exercise of the states' reserved general regulatory power
also appears inconsistent with the Court's earlier holding in Sturges
v. Crowinshield. 3 90 Sturges looked at the effect of the federal bankruptcy
power on state power to regulate insolvency. The Sturges Court held
that the bankruptcy power was not an exclusive federal power and,
thus, in the absence of congressional action there was no constitutional
3 9
restriction on the power of the states to regulate insolvency. ,
Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, began by discussing
the theory of allocation of power under the Constitution, and the
test for determining the exclusivity of federal power:
When the American people created a national legislature,
with certain enumerated powers, it was neither necessary nor
proper to define the powers retained by the states. These
powers proceed, not from the people of America, but from
the people of the several states; and remain, after the adoption
of the constitution, what they were before, except so far as
they may be abridged by the instrument. In some instances,
as in making treaties, we find an express prohibition; and
this shows the sense of the convention to have been, that
the mere grant of a power to Congress did not imply a
prohibition on the states to exercise the same power. But it
has never been supposed that this concurrent power of legislation extended to every possible case in which its exercise
by the state has not been expressly prohibited ....
Whenever
the terms in which a power is granted to Congress, or the
nature of the power, required that it should be exercised
exclusively by Congress, the subject is as completely taken
from the state legislatures as if they had been expressly
392
forbidden to act on it.

390. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
391. Id. at 196-97. The
was invalidated as constituting
violation of art. I, § 10 of the
392. Id. at 193.

122 (1819).
particular state regulation of insolvency, however,
an impairment of the obligations of a contract, in
Constitution. Id. at 197-99.
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Thus, when the Constitution does not expressly prohibit the exercise
of state power, an affirmative grant of a power to Congress does
not preclude the exercise of state power unless the nature of the
power is such that it should be exercised exclusively by Congress.
Finding that the bankruptcy power was not of this nature, Marshall
concluded that, in the absence of congressional action,
the states
3 93
remained free to regulate insolvency in all respects.
The point to be emphasized is that in Sturges, once the Court
held that the bankruptcy power was not an exclusive federal power,
the constitutional inquiry concerning the power of the states to
regulate insolvency was at an end; the affirmative grant of the
bankruptcy power to Congress did not interfere with the states'
ability to exercise their general regulatory power over insolvency.
The Cooley Court was not consistent with respect to the effect of the
grant of a nonexclusive federal power on the exercise of the general
regulatory power of the states. Once it held that the commerce
power was not an exclusive federal power, the constitutional inquiry
concerning the power of the states to apply their general regulatory
power to matters coming within the ambit of the federal commerce
power should have ended. The state regulation over pilotage involved
in Cooley should not have been subject to challenge as being beyond
the reserved powers of the state.
However, in analyzing whether the commerce power was an
exclusive federal power, the Court in Cooley stated: "[w]hatever
subjects of this [commerce] power are in their nature national, or
admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation, may justly
be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by
Congress. 39' The Court thereby held that the commerce power was
a "partly exclusive" federal power; the affirmative grant of the
commerce power to Congress operated to diminish the exercise of
the general regulatory power of the states over subjects requiring
one uniform rule.
The Court failed, however, to demonstrate that the concept of
a partly exclusive federal power was consistent with the structural
allocation of federal and state power under the Constitution. The
Court also failed to explain how the commerce power, unlike the
bankruptcy power involved in Sturges, could, by its own force, limit
the exercise of the reserved powers of the states.
Following Cooley, the Court continued to follow the allocation of
power approach to the permissibility of state regulation and taxation
affecting interstate commerce, but has made no further attempt to
393.
394.

Id. at 193-96.
Cooley, 53 U.S. at 319.
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deal with the crucial structural questions left unanswered in Cooley.
The Court simply repeated the assertion that, "[w]here the subject
matter requires a uniform system as between the States, the power
controlling it is vested exclusively in Congress, and cannot be
enroached upon by the State ....
,395 At a later time, the Court reaffirmed this view, stating that the commerce clause "remains in the Constitution as a grant of power to Congress . . . and as a diminution
pro tanto of absolute state sovereignty over the same subject matter.' '396
However, the Court has never subjected this diminution of power
justification to a structural analysis or explained how the affirmative
grant of the commerce power to Congres can operate as a "diminution pro tanto" of the reserved general regulatory and taxation
powers of the states consistent with the allocation of power under
the Constitution.
The Court's holding in Cooley, that the affirmative grant of the
commerce power to Congress operates to diminish the reserved
general regulatory and taxation powers of the states where interstate
commerce is involved, not only conflicts with its holding in Sturges,
but also with its more recent holding in Goldstein v. California.3 97 The
Goldstein Court held that the copyright power was not an exclusive
federal power; the affirmative grant of the copyright power to
Congress did not, by its own force, restrict the power of the states
to protect copyrights within the state. The Goldstein opinion is
particularly noteworthy because the Court discussed Cooley at length,
citing it for the proposition that, "Congress alone may legislate over
matters which are necessarily national in import. ' 398 Relating that
proposition solely to the question of whether the copyright power
was an exclusive federal power, the Court concluded that it was
not, and held that there was no constitutional restriction on the
power of the states to protect copyrights.3 99 Only with respect to the
395. Leisy & Co. v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1890). See also, Coverdale
v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 303 U.S. 604, 610 (1938); Helson v. Kentucky,
279 U.S. 245, 248-49 (1929); Texas Co. v. Brown, 258 U.S. 466, 475 (1922); DahnkeWalker Mill Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 290 (1921); Covington & Cincinnati
Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U.S. 204, 209-12 (1894). As the Court stated in DahnkeWalker, "[t]he Commerce Clause of the Constitution .. . expressly commits to Congress and impliedly withholds from the several states the power to regulate commerce
among the latter." 257 U.S. at 290. The Coverdale Court found, "[t]axation by the
states of the business of interstate commerce is forbidden only because it is deemed
an interference with that commerce, the uniform regulation of which is necessarily
reserved to the Congress." 303 U.S. at 610.
396. Carter v. Virginia, 321 U.S. 131, 137 (1944).
397. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
398. Id. at 554 (citing Cooley, 53 U.S. at 299).
399. 412 U.S. at 554-58. The Goldstein Court emphasized that the concurrent
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commerce power has the Court invoked the notion of "partly
exclusive" federal powers and held that the affirmative grant of the
commerce power to Congress somehow diminishes the reserved
general regulatory and taxation powers of the states.
It is this author's submission that diminution of power cannot
be sustained as a conceptual justification for a negative aspect to
the commerce clause because it is completely inconsistent with the
allocation of federal and state power under the constitutional structure.40 The constitutional structure does not assign particular powers
to the federal government and to the states. Rather, the underlying
theory of allocation of power is that the states possess all the sovereign
power that they possessed prior to the adoption of the Constitution,
while certain specific powers are affirmatively granted to the federal
government by the Constitution. 4° 1 The Constitution does deny
certain specific powers to the states, either expressly or by necessary
implication, because such state powers would be incompatible with
the existence of the same powers on the part of the federal government. 402
exercise of the power to protect copyrights on the part of Congress and the states
would not necessarily lead to difficulty. The Court concluded, "[n]o reason exists
why Congress must take affirmative action either to authorize protection of all
categories of writings or to free them from all restraint." Id. at 560.
The federal admiralty power also has been held not to be an exclusive federal
power, and the affirmative grant of the admiralty power to the federal government
does not preclude state regulation of maritime matters. See Askew v. American
Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 339-41 (1973). The only exception occurs
where there is direct conflict with, or preemption by, a federal statute. Id. at 337.
400. This view is not completely original. Professor Shenton observed many
years ago:
It must be realized at the outset, then, that in defining the power of the
states to regulate interstate commerce while Congress is silent the Supreme
Court has diserted all constitutional basis and guidance for the principles
which rule its decisions, and that it is acting solely and entirely upon its
own discretion. The rules which it applies are founded on its own notions
of expediency, and not upon the mandates of Congress, or the expressed
intentions of the framers of the Constitution. No amount of scrutiny of
that instrument will reveal the principles according to which some subjects
of interstate commerce are reserved exclusively for regulation by Congress,
while others may be regulated by states pending action by Congress.
During the silence of Congress the Supreme Court itself clearly regulates
interstate commerce,-"prescribes the rules by which it is to be governed,"-though Congress is the only federal agency to which the Constitution ascribes that function.
Shenton, Interstate Commerce During the Silence of Congress, 23 DICK. L. REv. 78, 8081 (1919).
401. See supra note 389.
402. For a discussion of the powers that are denied to the states, either
expressly or by necessary implication, see supra note 8.
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The delegation of specific powers to the federal government,
however, does not, under the constitutional structure, affect as such
3
the exercise of the reserved powers of the states.41 The fact that a

particular power has been delegated to the federal government is
relevant, with regards to the existence of state power, only on the
issue of denial of state power by necessary implication from the
affirmative grant of federal power. Where the nature of the federal
power is such that it can be exercised only by one sovereign, it is
an exclusive power and it is denied to the states by necessary
implication. Where the power is not an exclusive federal power,
however, the affirmative grant of that power to the federal govern40 4
ment can have no effect on the reserved powers of the states.
Thus, with regard to the allocation of federal and state power
under the Constitution the concept of a "partly exclusive" federal
power is analytically unsound. The Constitution recognizes only
exclusive and nonexclusive federal powers. If a federal power is
exclusive, it is denied to the states by the Constitution; if it is not
exclusive, the affirmative grant of that power to the federal government has no effect on the exercise of the reserved powers of the
states. Diminution of power, therefore, must be rejected as a conceptual justification for a negative aspect to the commerce clause,
because it is completely inconsistent with the allocation of federal
and state power under the constitutional structure. Since the commerce power has been held not to be an exclusive federal power,
the affirmative grant of the commerce power to Congress cannot be
relied on to diminish the exercise of the states' reserved general
regulatory and taxation powers. 40 5 The Constitution thus does not restrict
in any way the power of the states to regulate or tax entities engaged
in interstate commerce; such regulation and taxation is fully within the
reserved powers of the states.

403. As pointed out previously, the principle of reserved state sovereignty is
embodied textually in the tenth amendment, but also would follow from the allocation
of federal and state power under the constitutional structure. See supra note 389.
404. See supra notes 392-93 and accompanying text.
405. It also is not strictly accurate to say that under the Constitution the
states and the federal government possess "concurrent power" to regulate interstate
commerce. The Constitution gives the federal government the power to regulate
interstate commerce, as one of its enumerated powers. The Constitution does not
give any powers to the states, since under our constitutional scheme the states are
deemed to possess all of the sovereign power they had prior to the adoption of the
Constitution. Thus, strictly speaking, the Constitution gives Congress the power
to regulate interstate commerce, whereas the states may apply their reserved general
regulatory and taxation power to entities engaged in interstate commerce, in the
absence of conflicting or preemptive federal regulation.
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THE NEGATIVE COMMERCE CLA USE

The Implied Intention of Congress Justification

The theory underlying the implied intention of Congress justification for a negative aspect to the commerce clause is that the
states lack the power to regulate or tax interstate commerce in certain
circumstances because Congress, by its failure to authorize affirmatively state regulation or taxation in those circumstances, has man40 6
ifested its intention to preclude all state, regulation or taxation.
This justification is premised on preclusion by silence: Congress has
exercised the commerce power by its silence, and by failing to
authorize affirmatively state regulation or taxation in certain circumstances, it has prohibited the exercise of state power. The effect
is the same as if there had been express prohibition or preemption,
and as a matter of federal supremacy, the implicit action by Congress
prevails over inconsistent state action. 407
The implied intention of Congress justification was developed
by academic commentators to deal with what they saw as a theoretical
inconsistency in the diminution of power justification. The Court
had held that Congress could expressly authorize the states to
undertake what otherwise would be an impermissible regulation or
taxation of interstate commerce4 8 However, if the Constitution
restricted the power of the states to regulate or tax interstate commerce, then how could Congress, by legislation, authorize the states
to do what the Constitution prohibited? 409 The commentators sought
406. The implied intention of Congress justification accomodates both an
allocation of power approach and a balancing of interests approach. Under this
justification, it could be said that Congress, by its silence, intended to preclude
"state regulation or taxation of interstate commerce itself," or state regulation or
taxation where, "on balance, the national interest in the free flow of commerce
predominates over the asserted state interest."
407. With respect to preemption by affirmative action of Congress, the Court
has stated that "[p]re-emption of state law by federal statute or regulation is not
favored 'in the absence of persuasive reasons-either that the nature of the regulated
subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably
so ordained."' Chicago & North Western Trans. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co.,
450 U.S. 311, 317 (1981) (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,
373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963)). But, as in Kalo Brick, the Court does sometimes find
preemption. Compare e.g., Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654 (1982),
with Fidelity Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 455 U.S. 917 (1982).
408. See Bikle, supra note 6, at 209-13; Dowling II, supra note 6, at 25-26;
Powell, supra note 6, at 115-18.
409. The Court recognized this theoretical inconsistency in California v.
Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949), but found it to be inconsequential: "There is no longer
any question that Congress can redefine the areas of local and national predominance
... despite theoretical inconsistency with the rationale of the Commerce Clause
as a limitation in its own right. The words of the Clause-a grant of poweradmit of no other result." Id. at 728 (citation omitted).
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a constitutional explanation for a negative aspect to the commerce
clause that would explain why, in the absence of congressional
authorization, certain state regulation or taxation affecting interstate
commerce was impermissible, although the same regulation or taxation was permissible when congressional authorization was present.
They found this explanation in the implied intention of Congress.
Thus, whenever the Court held state regulation or taxation affecting
interstate commerce to be impermissible, it should not be on the
ground that the Constitution imposed restrictions on the power of
the states to regulate interstate commerce but rather, on the ground
that Congress impliedly intended to preclude the states from imposing
the particular regulation or tax on interstate commerce. According
to Professor Thomas Reed Powell:
[The Supreme Court] could declare that the states have
concurrent power with Congress over all interstate commerce.
The congressional power is superior to the state power.
Congress may exercise its power by silence as well as by
speech. The silence of Congress requires interpretation. To
interpret this silence the court must have regard to the nature
of the particular commerce in issue. If it appears to be of a
kind to render diverse regulations in different states undesirable, the silence of Congress will be deemed equivalent to
a declaration that the particular commerce be free from legal
restraint. But Congress may at any time by speaking rebut
41 0
the inference previously drawn from its silence.
Similar views were expressed by other commentators in the 1920's
and the 1930's.411

It was left to Professor Dowling to develop fully the implied
intention of Congress justification. 412 In Dowling's view, the implied
intention of Congress justification for a negative aspect to the
410. Powell, supra note 6, at 137. The Court had stated at various times that
where the matter was within the "exclusive jurisdiction" of Congress, the failure
of Congress to regulate that matter indicated the intention of Congress that the
matter not be regulated. See, e.g., Leisy & Co. v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 109-10
(1890). For a later tongue-in-cheek discussion about the "silence of Congress," see
Powell, The Still Small Voice of the Commerce Clause, in THREE SELECTED ESSAYS ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 931-32 (1938).
411. See, e.g., Bikle, The Silence of Congress, 41 HARV. L. REV. 200, 220-24
(1928).
412. We have previously detailed Professor Dowling's development of this
conceptual justification and his relating it to a balancing of interests approach to
the permissibility of state regulation affecting interstate commerce. See supra notes
454-64 and accompanying text.
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commerce clause followed from the fact that Congress could, in the
affirmative exercise of its commerce power, both prohibit or preempt
state regulation of matters that the Court had found to be within
the states' constitutional power, and authorize state regulation of
matters that the Court had found to be beyond the states' constitutional power. Since it would be unthinkable for Congress to
authorize the states to do something that the Court had held to be
beyond their constitutional power, whenever the Court invalidated
a state regulation or tax under the commerce clause, the Court was
"effectuating the will of Congress and not the commerce clause per
se." ' 413 Dowling went on to state that, "except for explicitness and
generalizations," the implied intention justification was "the position
to which the Court itself had come by a process of trial and error
over nearly a hundred years.' '414
Writing for the Court in Southern PaCific,4 15 Chief Justice Stone
expressly recognized the implied intention of Congress justification
as a basis for a negative aspect to the commerce clause, but accepted
the diminution of power justification as well, indicating that the
41 6
particular justification relied upon by the Court was not important.
He thus downplayed the significance of the issue of a conceptual
justification, which had so concerned Professor Dowling and the
other academic commentators. 41 7 To the Chief Justice, it was the
substitution of the balancing of interests approach for the allocation
of power approach in the regulation area, and the assertion of the
Court's role as the "final arbiter of the competing demands of state
and national interests," that was significant.4 1 8 In fact, there was
no need for the Court to find in favor of either justification.
Regardless of which justification was relied on, the negative aspect
to the commerce clause would remain, and the commerce clause,
in the absence of congressional action, would restrict the power of
the states to regulate or tax interstate commerce. Moreover, the
process by which the Court would determine what restrictions were

413. Dowling II, supra note 6, at 19; see also supranote 260 and accompanying text.
414. Dowling II, supra note 6, at 20.
415. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
416. Id. at 768.
417. In a subsequent writing, Professor Dowling complained that Stone
"pointedly left open the question as to the source or nature of the impediment to
state action." Dowling I, supra note 6, at 554. Thus, despite recognition of the
implied intention justification in Southern Pacific, Dowling lamanted that, "no
satisfactory exposition of the underlying theory has ever come from the Court."
Id.
418. 325 U.S. at 769-71.
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imposed by the negative commerce clause on state regulatory and
taxation power would be the same under either conceptual justification. If the affirmative grant of the commerce power to Congress
operated to diminish the exercise of state regulatory or taxation
power affecting interstate commerce, the Court, in the performance
of its function of defining the meaning of the Constitution, would
state what limitations the Constitution imposed. If it was the implied
intention of Congress that interstate commerce be immune from
state regulation or taxation in certain circumstances, it is the Court
that would have to decide what restrictions on state regulatory and
taxation power Congress impliedly intended to impose.41 9 It is easy
to see why Chief Justice Stone, whose concern was with the role of
the Court as the "final arbiter of the competing demands of state
and national interests," felt no need to decide in favor of one
justification over another.
Neither the implied intention of Congress justification, nor the
diminution of power justification, can withstand any degree of
structural analysis. It is perhaps revealing that Professor Dowling
and the other proponents of the implied intention of Congress
justification did not attempt to undertake such an analysis, and
never addressed the question of the source of Congress' authority
under the Constitution to "legislate by silence."420 No such authority
can be found, because the concept of "legislation by silence" would
be completely inconsistent with the provisions of article I, setting
forth the method by which the federal legislative power is to be
exercised; article I, section 7 is very specific in its requirements of
affirmative action on the part of both houses of Congress and the
President. In order to become law, a bill must be introduced, it
must be passed by both the House of Representatives and the Senate,
and it must be signed by the President or passed by a two-thirds
vote of both houses over the President's veto. The Constitution
makes no provision for Congress to "legislate by silence." As
Professor Monaghan has pointed out:
419. The commentators long had recognized that, regardless of the theoretical
basis for a negative aspect to the commerce clause, the Court was effectively
determining the circumstances in which state regulation or taxation would be
permitted. See Shenton, supra note 6, at 160-62; Sholley, supra note 6, at 558-59.
420. Professor Dowling tried to demonstrate the theoretical inconsistency of
the diminution of power justification, and advanced policy-type arguments in favor
of the implied intention of Congress justification: it would not entail a sharp break
with past judicial practice, it would amplify the judicial and legislative functions,
it would be agreeable to Congress, and it would afford a common ground on which
the divergent views of the then members of the Court could be brought together.
Dowling II, supra note 6, at 20-27. Powell simply stated that, "Congress may
exercise its power by silence as well as by speech." Powell, supra note 6, at 137.
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The Constitution, after all, expressly prescribes the process
by which legislation is to be enacted, and it is one which
requires both affirmative congressional action and a role for
the President. It is difficult to see how legislation by silence
can be squared with this constitutionally prescribed process.4 21
Thus, the structural fallacy of the implied intention of Congress
justification is that Congress cannot exercise the federal legislative
power implicitly under the Constitution; Congress cannot manifest
any "implied intention." It can exercise the federal legislative power
only in accordance with the process set forth in the Constitution,
and that process makes no provision for legislation by silence.
Congress cannot, therefore, by its failure to enact legislation specifically authorizing state regulation or taxation of interstate commerce in certain circumstances, be deemed to have precluded implicitly
state regulation or taxation in those circumstances. It can preclude
state regulation or taxation only by taking affirmative action, since
421. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, Foreward: Constitutional Common
Law, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1, 16-17 (1975) (footnotes omitted). Professor Monaghan's
own explanation of the negative aspect of the commerce clause is in terms of
"constitutional common law." He maintains that the commerce clause "embodies
a national free-trade philosophy which can be read as requiring the Court, in
limited circumstances, to displace state-created trade barriers." Id. at 17. Monaghan
states that, while the source of the Court's authority in this respect is the text of
the Constitution, its decisions are subject to congressional revision. Thus, in effect,
the Court is "making constitutionally inspired common law." Id. Professor Monaghan's discussion of the negative commerce clause does not go beyond this
tautological analysis, and his main concern in the article is with constitutional
common law in the area of constitutional criminal procedure. Professors Schrock
and Welsh, whose concern is to rebut Monaghan's constitutional common law
explanation of the constitutional criminal procedure cases, also do not adequately
address the negative commerce clause. They explair the cases as involving the
proper allocation of power between Congress and the states: "Judicial invalidation
of state law as an impermissible burden on interstate commerce constitutes a
judgment that the transaction to which the state law applied was one which, in
the constitutional scheme of things, was to be governed by Congress." Schrock &
Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Common Law, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1117, 1139
(1978).
Whether or not the federal courts have the power to establish constitutional
common law, is beyond the scope of this Article. It must be emphasized, however,
that Professor Monaghan does not subject the matter to any structural analysis;
he does not show that it is within the judicial function of the federal courts under
article III to establish constitutional common law. For present purposes, he is doing
no more than attempting to provide an explanation for the fact that Congress can
authorize state regulation or taxation of interstate commerce that otherwise would
be constitutionally impermissible. Since we can provide a structurally-based explanation for that phenomenon, it is not necessary to turn to the constitutional common
law analysis.
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it is only by affirmative action that Congress can exercise the federal
legislative power. 422 The proposition that Congress cannot, consistent
with the constitutional structure, legislate by silence, seems so obvious
as not to require extended discussion. As one commentator observed
some time back:
It is carrying things a bit too far to say that Congress is
"making laws" by its very refusal to make laws, and that
its unexpressed intentions and desires are the "supreme law
of the land." It follows that there can be no warrant in the
Constitution for the proposition that the silence of Congress
can in any way limit or restrain the exercise of a state
423
power.
Thus, it is astonishing that such distinguished constitutional scholars
as Professors Dowling and Powell completely ignored the limitations
imposed by constitutional structure in finding a conceptual justification for a negative aspect to the commerce clause in the implied
intention of Congress.
Thus, like the diminution of power justification, the implied
intention of Congress justification is completely inconsistent with the
structure of governance established by the Constitution. The fact
that both of these conceptual justifications have been accepted by
the Court for a long time cannot alter their structural unsoundness.
Neither justification can be relied on to support a negative aspect
to the commerce clause.
C.

The Free Trade PrincipleJustification

The free trade principle justification analytically relates to the
third structural method of restriction: limitations on the exercise of
state power designed to protect individual rights. 424 The question is

422. Congress can, of course, enact laws that express its intention in very
generalized terms. It could enact a law providing that: "No state shall enact any
law that imposes an undue burden on interstate commerce," or "No state regulation
or tax affecting interstate commerce shall be valid in circumstances where the
national interest in the free flow of commerce outweighs the state interest advanced
by the regulation or tax." Were Congress to enact such a law, the Court would
have to interpret and apply it despite its very generalized terms. But in so doing,
the Court would be performing the judicial function of interpreting and applying
legislation. In that case, the state regulation or tax affecting interstate commerce
would be invalidated on the ground that it was prohibited by federal law, as the
Court had interpreted that law.
423. Sholley, supra note 6, at 587.
424. These limitations can be found in the internal inferences of the Con-
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whether the commerce clause properly may be relied on as the
source of a right, on the part of entities engaged in interstate
commerce, to be free from state regulation or taxation that violates
the free trade principle, such as by "unreasonably burdening"
interstate commerce or interfering with interstate trade or movement.
It is important at the outset of this analysis to distinguish the free
trade principle from the nondiscrimination principle as a structurallybased conceptual justification for a negative aspect to the commerce
clause. Not infrequently, the Court has talked about "free trade"
and "free access" in the context of invalidating discriminatory state
regulation or taxation, thereby confusing the free trade principle
with the nondiscrimination principle.42 5 For example, Justice Jackson's opinion for the Court in H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond,426 is
said to represent the Court's recognition of the free trade principle
as the basis for a negative aspect to the commerce clause.4 27 Justice
Jackson referred to a "federal free trade unit, ' 428 and stated:
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every
farmer and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce
by the certainty that he will have free access to every market
in the Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his
exports, and no foreign state will by customs duties or
regulations exclude them. Likewise, every consumer may
look to the free competition from every producing area in
the Nation to protect him from exploitation by any. Such
was the vision of the Founders; such has been the doctrine
429
of this Court which has given it reality.
Justice Jackson, however, was relating the matter of free access to
the nondiscrimination principle, as indicated by his examples of
discrimination and retaliation, 43 and his reference to embargoes and
customs duties. Hood involved a state regulation that was found to
discriminate expressly against interstate commerce and out-of-state

stitution, as well as in the text. For discussion of the Constitution as the source
of limitations on the exercise of governmental power designed to protect individual
rights, see SedIler, supra note 7, at 117-18.
425. See, e.g., Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 32829, 335-37 (1977); Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co.v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 380-81 (1976).
426. 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
427. Maltz, supra note 4, at 64-65.
428. H.P. Hood, 336 U.S. at 538.
429. Id. at 539.
430. Id. at 535-38.
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interests; it was on this basis that the Court held the regulation to
be unconstitutional. 431 The discussion of a "federal free trade unit,"
in Hood, therefore, must be evaluated in the context of discrimination.4 3 2 Thus viewed, Hood does not stand for the proposition that
the negative commerce clause embodies a free trade principle that
may be relied on to invalidate nondiscriminatory state regulation
and taxation.
As we previously discussed, 43 3 the free trade principle, as distinct
from the nondiscrimination principle, came to the fore in the taxation
cases of the late 1930's and the 1940's, and was deemed to require
the invalidation of state taxation schemes that had "the effect of
impeding the free flow of trade between States. ' 43 4 Chief Justice
Stone and Justice Frankfurter were leaders in articulating the free
trade principle, which they sharply distinguished from the nondiscrimination principle. Chief Justice Stone referred to "the barriers
to interstate trade which it was the object of the commerce clause
to remove,"' 411 taking the position that, in light of the free trade
principle, an unapportioned gross receipts tax, as applied to an
entity engaged in interstate commerce, was unconstitutional per se
because of the possibility that the entity would be subject to multiple
taxation.4 3 6 The clearest distinction between the free trade principle
and the nondiscrimination principle is found in Justice Frankfurter's
437
opinion for the Court in Freeman v. Hewitt:
[T]he Commerce Clause . . . by its own force created an
area of trade free from interference by the states. . . . This
limitation on State power . . . does not merely forbid a State

to single out interstate commerce for hostile action. A State
is also precluded from taking any action which may fairly
be deemed to have the effect of impeding the free flow of
trade between States. It is immaterial that local commerce
43 8
is subjected to a similar encumbrance.

431. Id. at 530. See supra note 43.
432. For other references to a "federal free trade unit" or a "common
national market" created by the commerce clause, see United Air Lines v. Mahin,
410 U.S. 623, 632 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); General Motors Corp. v.
Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 462 (1964) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
433. See supra notes 316-20 and accompanying text.
434. Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946).
435. Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 440 (1939);
Western Livestock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 256 (1938).
436. See supra notes 316-20 and accompanying text.
437. 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
438. Id. at 252.
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Justice Frankfurter also referred to the "very freedom of commercial
flow which for more than a hundred and fifty years has been the
ward of the Commerce Clause." 439
More recently, Professor Maltz, on the assumption that the
commerce clause embodies the free trade principle, has developed
the "free location principle" as an approach to the permissibility of
state regulation affecting interstate commerce. 440 The underlying
theory of this approach is that "entrepreneurs should be free to
choose the state where various conditions give them a competitive
advantage in the national marketplace." ' 44' Maltz sets forth criteria
to determine when a state regulation is violative of the free location
principle. These criteria are similar to those that form the basis of
the nondiscrimination principle: facial discrimination against out-ofstate consumers, or facially neutral actions that are intended to
protect local industry from outside competition. 44 2 His concern,
however, is with commercial competition and market advantage,
rather than with discrimination against interstate commerce or outof-state interests. Thus, his application of the free location principle
leads to some results that differ from those reached by the Court's
application of the nondiscrimination principle. Maltz would, for
example, uphold discriminatory regulation that was not designed to
give in-state industry a commercial advantage over out-of-state industry, such as the challenged regulations in Philadelphia v. New

439. Id. at 256. See also McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 33031 (1944) (Frankfurter, J.) ("The very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to
create an area of free trade among the several States. That clause vested the power
of taxing a transaction forming an unbroken process of interstate commerce in the
Congress, not in the States.").
Although the free trade principle was not invoked in the regulation area, that
principle could support the balancing approach to the constitutionality of state
regulation affecting interstate commerce set forth in Southern Pacific, particularly as
regards "undue burden." Where a nondiscriminatory state regulation, on balance,
was found to unduly burden interstate commerce, it could be said that such
regulation was inconsistent with the free trade principle.
440. Maltz, supra note 4, at 64-65. Professor Maltz does not discuss the
matter of a structurally-based conceptual justification for a negative aspect to the
commerce clause. He simply assumes that the free trade principle furnishes such
a justification, and that the commerce clause embodies that principle, relying on
Jackson's "free access" language in Hood. However, Maltz never explains precisely
why the commerce clause is said to embody the free trade principle. In addition,
he confuses, both in his citation of Jackson's language in Hood, and in his criteria
for the application of the free trade principle, the nondiscriminatory principle and
the free trade principle. Id.
441. Id. at 66.
442. Id. at 67.
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Jersey,443 Rice,"4 4 and Kassell.445 Maltz also concludes that Hood,4 6 Dean
Milk,447 and Hunt,448 were wrongly decided, reasoning that in the
absence of a specific finding that the challenged regulations were
adopted with "protectionist intent," their application does not violate
the free location principle.4 4 9 The essential effect of each of the
challenged regulations was to discriminate against or disadvantage
interstate commerce or out-of-state interests in favor of local commerce
or in-state interests because of the interstate nature of that commerce
or the out-of-state nature of those interests; the regulations were
held to be unconstitutional in all of these cases. Maltz's approach
to the permissibility of state regulation affecting interstate commerce
is thus a further illustration of the difference between the free trade
principle and the nondiscrimination principle.
The next question to be considered is whether there is any
reasonable basis for concluding that the commerce clause embodies
the free trade principle, so that it may be relied upon, in its negative
aspect, as the source of a right to be free from state regulation or
taxation that violates the free trade principle. To the exent that
proponents of the free trade principle, such as Justice Frankfurter, 4 0
have addressed this question, it has been in terms of the historic
context of the commerce clause. 451 Their assumption has been that
a major historic purpose of the affirmative grant of the commerce
power to Congress was to create a free trade area, that is, a
constitutional common market.4 5 2 If this were so, the commerce
clause could be relied upon as a source of a right on the part of
entities engaged in interstate commerce to be free from state regulation or taxation that unreasonably burdens interstate commerce or
453
interferes with interstate trade or movement.
443. 437 U.S. 617 (1978). See Maltz, supra note 4, at 73-74.
444. 434 U.S. 429 (1978). See Maltz, supra note 4, at 83.
445. 450 U.S. 662 (1981). Maltz concludes that Southern Pacific and Bibb also
were wrongly decided. See Maltz, supra note 4, at 81-85.
446. 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
447. 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
448. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
449. Maltz, supra note 4, at 74-81.
450. Other proponents of the free trade principle include Chief Justice Stone
and Professor Maltz.
451. As to the meaning of "historic context of the commerce clause," see
Saphire, supra note 383.
452. See, e.g., Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946) (Frankfurter,
J.) (very purpose of the commerce clause was to create an area of free trade among
the several states).

453. Justice Frankfurter himself, however, approached the matter in terms of
the lack of state power rather than in terms of a violation of individual rights. See McLeod
v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1944).
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Since the free trade principle as a structurally-based conceptual
justification for a negative aspect to the commerce clause purportedly
is found in the historic context of the commerce clause, and since
no other structurally-based conceptual justification for the free trade
principle has been advanced, its justification must be sustained by
reference to that historic context. It is doubtful that there is any
evidence to indicate that a major historic purpose for the commerce
clause was to create a free trade area among the states, to protect
interstate commerce from burdensome state regulation or taxation
that interfered with the free flow of trade. The proponents of the
free trade principle have never engaged in any kind of historical
analysis. They have not tried to show, by analyzing the circumstances
leading to the affirmative grant of the commerce power to Congress,
that a major concern of the framers was the unrestricted commercial
intercourse across state lines. They merely assumed that a primary
historical purpose of the commerce clause was to "create an area
of free trade among the several states."
It has been demonstrated persuasively that the affirmative grant
of the commerce power to Congress was not intended to create a
free trade area or a national common market. In a comprehensive
analysis of the historic context of the commerce clause and related
provisions granting power to the federal government and restricting
state power in the commercial area, Professor Kitch has analyzed
the argument for a "consitutional common market.' '4 4 He contends
that the argument that a constitutional common market exists must
be constructed from a number of provisions that (1) grant powers
to Congress, (2) restrict federal power, and (3) restrict state power.
The Constitution grants Congress not only the commerce power,
but also a number of other powers involving commercial matters,
including the powers to lay uniform duties and excises, 4*5 to establish
uniform rules for naturalization and bankruptcy, 4 6 to coin money
and fix standards of weights and measures, 457 to establish post
offices, 458 and to grant patents and copyrights.4 59 The Constitution
also imposes certain restrictions on federal power in the commercial
area, such as the prohibition on taxes on exports from a particular
state 4 0 and the ban on preferences for the ports of one state over

454. Kitch, supra note 4, at 9-22.
455. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 1.
456. Id. § 8, c. 4.
457. Id. § 8, c. 5.
458. Id. § 8, c. 7.

459.
460.

Id. § 8, c. 8.
Id. § 9, c. 5.
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another.461 Similarly, the Constitution expressly imposes certain restrictions on the exercise of state power in the commercial area,
such as the ban on a tax on imports or exports, 462 the ban on duties
of tonnage, 463 and the prohibition against laws impairing the obligations of contracts. 464 Looking to the apparent purpose behind the
inclusion of these benefits in the Constitution, Kitch concludes that
"[t]hese clauses in the Constitution did not result from a program
to create a customs union, a free trade area, or a common market,"
but rather they, "responded to a series of more limited and practical
problems.

465

1

These problems all related to the authority of the federal government to deal with commercial matters. A primary concern was
to enable the federal government to bargain effectively with European
466
governments about American rights of commerce and navigation.
Another concern was the need to provide the federal government
with a reliable revenue base. This concern was reflected, both in
the grant of power to impose duties to the federal government and
the denial of the corresponding power to the states, assuring that
the states could not erode federal income from duties through
overlapping taxes. 467 Kitch concludes, however, that the Constitution
was not designed to implement a common market, but rather to
establish the authority of the federal government to deal with commercial matters. The series of constitutional provisions involving
federal and state power in the commercial area, including the
commerce clause, were designed to respond to particular problems
that were the concern of the framers at that time. 468 There is no
historical evidence to indicate that the framers were concerned with
maintaining an "area of free trade among the several states." The
existence of a "free trade" area of a "national common market,"
would depend upon Congress establishing one in the affirmative
exercise of its commerce power or other powers in the commecial
area.469
Professor Eule, also has examined the historical question, and
notes that our Constitution, unlike, for example, the Australian
461. Id.§ 9, cl.6.
462. Id.§ 10, cl.2.
463. Id. 10, cl.3.
464. Id.§ 10, cl.1.
465. Kitch, supra note 4, at 20.
466. Id.
467. Id.at 21.
468. Id.
469. Id. Actually, the federal government has used its commercial powers
rather sparingly. According to Kitch: "A review of the Constitution and the debates
that surround commercial issues lead one to conclude that the federal commercial
laws and policies that emerged after the signing of the Constitution varied greatly
from what the Federalists had envisaged." Id. Kitch suggests that Marshall was
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constitution does not articulate explicitly the free trade ideal.4 10 He
points out that there were few references to free trade during the
debates preceding the adoption of the Constitution. Eule contends
that while "economic parochialism" was a motivating force behind
the calling of the constitutional convention, "[o]ur Constitution . .
. did not attempt to solve economic parochialism by an express
prohibition against interference with free trade, [but] [i]nstead it
shifted legislative power over economic matters that affect more than
one state to a single national body." ' 471 He concludes that "[t]he
commerce clause thus cannot be said to establish and protect free
trade or a national marketplace as a fundainental constitutional
value.' '472 Professor Eule questions "the persistent judicial articulation
of a free trade model in the Court's dormant commerce clause
cases," and states that,
[t]he answer is clear, and has been ably documented by others:
the Constitutional Convention was prompted by commercial
protectionism. A uniform system of commercial regulations was
seen as necessary for the preservation of national unity and tranquility. Congress, accordingly, was provided a tool for encouraging this free trade ideal as a means of protecting the nation from
self-destruction. There was no intent, however, to inject
a
473
philosophy of laissez-faire into the constitutional fabric.
Professor Eule's observations may shed some light on why Justice
Frankfurter, and other proponents of the free trade principle as a
conceptual justification for a negative aspect to the commerce clause,
have simply assumed that this principle is embodied in the commerce
clause. The court has recognized that a major motivating force
behind the calling of the constitutional convention, and a major
historical purpose for the affirmative grant of the commerce power
to Congress, was to bring an end to the "commercial protectionism"
that had existed under the Articles of Confederation. 474 This historical
concern with commercial protectionism may have led proponents of
the free trade principle to assume that the commerce clause was
designed to embody the "free trade ideal" and to create a "constitutional common market." To relate the free trade principle to

trying to preserve the Federalist vision when he urged that the commerce clause
itself operated negatively to limit state power to regulate and tax interstate commerce.
Id. at 22.
470. Eule, supra note 4, at 429. Eule uses the term, "free market ideal."
471. Id. at 430.
472. Id. at 434.
473. Id. at 434-35.
474. See infra notes 484-89 and accompanying text.
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the historical concern with commercial protectionism, however, is to
confuse the free trade principle with the nondiscrimination princi475
ple.
The free trade principle that Justice Frankfurter and others saw
as being embodied in the commerce clause is, as this Article has
noted, and as Justice Frankfurter himself has emphasized, quite
different from the nondiscrimination principle. According to Justice
Frankfurter, the commerce clause by its own force, "created an area
of trade free from interference among the states," and rendered
unconstitutional "any action which may fairly be deemed to have
the effect of impeding the free flow of trade between states. ' 476 The
free trade principle, as embodied in the commerce clause, would
protect interstate commerce from "burdensome" state action even
if completely nondiscriminatory, and thus "nonprotectionist" in
nature.
The assumption that the commerce clause embodies the free
trade principle, therefore, is inconsistent with the premise upon
which that assumption is based: that a major motivating force behind
the calling of the constitutional convention, and the affirmative grant
of the commerce power to Congress, was a concern with the commercial protectionism that had existed under the Articles of Confederation. This concern with commercial protectionism, however,
resulted from discriminatory state action favoring local commerce
and in-state interests at the expense of interstate commerce and outof-state interests, not from nondiscriminatory state action allegedly
burdening interstate commerce. The free trade principle that Justice
Frankfurter apparently derived from an historical concern with commercial protectionism, on the other hand, would invalidate nondiscriminatory, and thus nonprotectionist state action.
Thus, as a structurally-based conceptual justification for a negative aspect to the commerce clause, the free trade principle cannot
be sustained on the basis on which it has been proposed. That
principle cannot be found in the historical context of the commerce
clause. There is no historical evidence indicating that a major purpose
for the affirmative grant of the commerce power to Congress was
to create a "constitutional common market" or "an area of trade
free from interference among the states." The historical evidence
indicates a concern with the commercial protectionism that had

475. Thus, like Professor Maltz, Professor Eule fails to distinguish between
the free trade principle and the nondiscrimination principle. See infra notes 546-47
and accompanying text.

476.

Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249, 252, 255 (1946).
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existed under the Articles of Confederation, not with a "free trade
ideal" that would immunize interstate commerce from nondiscriminatory state regulation and taxation. Thus, there is no structural
basis for finding a free trade principle embodied in the commerce
clause, and for relying on the commerce clause, in its negative
aspect, as the source of a right to be free from nondiscriminatory
state regulation and taxation that purportedly burdens interstate
commerce or impedes the free flow of trade between the states.
D.

The Nondiscrimination PrincipleJustification

We submit that a structurally-based conceptual justification
for a negative aspect to the commerce clause, and for reliance on
the commerce clause to invalidate state regulation and taxation,
properly may be found in the nondiscrimination principle. A major
historical purpose for the affirmative grant of the commerce power
to Congress was to prevent discrimination against interstate commerce or out-of-state interests in favor of local commerce or in-state
interests. Thus, the commerce clause may be said to embody the
nondiscrimination principle, and it may be relied upon, in its negative
aspect, as the source of a right on the part of entities engaged in
interstate commerce and out-of-state interests not to be subject to
discrimination or disadvantage because of the interstate nature of
that commerce or the out-of-state nature of those interests.
Limitations on the exercise of governmental power, designed to
protect individual rights, must be found either in the text of the
Constitution or in its internal inferences.4 7 7 While most of these
constitutionally protected rights have a textual source, others, such
as the right to interstate travel, are not expressly guaranteed by the
Constitution. The Court has found the source of these rights in the
internal inferences of the Constitution, that is, in the inferences that
follow from the Constitution as a whole and from the relationship
among the different constitutional provisions. Professor Charles Black
has described this process as involving "the method of inference
from the structures and relationships created by the constitution in
all its parts or in some principal part. ' 478 The right to interstate
travel was first recognized by the Court in Crandall v. Nevada,479 on
a theory of membership in the national polity: the requirements of
the national government that its citizens travel to the places at which

477.

See supra note 424.

478.

C. BLACK,

STRUCTURE AND

(1969).

479.

73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
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the national government maintains its offices and the correlative
right of citizens to travel to those places. 48 0 Professor Black expands
on this rationale and maintains that the fact that the United States
is a single nation warrants an inference as to mobility of population.
The right to travel within the country is an inference from the
national unity that the Constitution was designed to establish.4 8' The
Court later stated in United States v. Guest:482 "The constitutional
right to travel from one State to another . . . occupies a position
483
fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.
The right of entities engaged in interstate commerce and outof-state interests to be free from discriminatory state regulation or
taxation because of the interstate nature of that commerce or the
out-of-state nature of those interests also may be found in the internal
inferences of the Constitution. The source of this right is the
nondiscrimination principle embodied in the commerce clause. Since
a major historical purpose for the affirmative grant of the commerce
power to Congress was to prevent commercial protectionism and
discrimination in favor of local commerce and in-state interests at
the expense of interstate commerce and out-of-state interests, the
nondiscrimination principle may be considered to be embodied in
the commerce clause. That principle may then be relied on to create
a right on the part of entities engaged in interstate commerce and
out-of-state interests to be free from state regulation or taxation that
discriminates against or disadvantages interstate commerce or outof-state interests because of the interstate nature of the commerce
or the out-of-state nature of those interests.
The Court consistently has recognized that the commerce clause
embodies the nondiscrimination principle, and has found the non480. Id. at 43-45. The Court held unconstitutional Nevada's imposition of a
head tax on the exit of all persons from the state.
481.
BLACK, supra note 478, at 27-28. In Edwards v. California, 314 U.S.
160 (1941), the Court invalidated a California law that prohibited bringing an
indigent person into the state. According to Black, Edwards should have been decided
on right to travel grounds, rather than on negative commerce clause grounds:
I should prefer to think of Edwards' right to travel, and of his brotherin-law's right to bring him into the state, as a consequence of his being
one of the people in a unitary nation, to which, because of its nationhood,
internal barriers to travel are unthinkable, rather than pretending that I
have performed a warranted inference from a clause empowering Congress
to regulate commerce among the several states. I am pretty sure that it
was the first of these thoughts, rather than the second, that really moved
the Court in the Edwards case.
BLACK, supra note 478, at 28-29.

482.
483.

383 U.S. 745 (1966).
Id. at 757.
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discrimination principle in the historical context of the commerce
clause.4 84 An analysis of the historical context shows incontrovertibly
that the prevention of commercial protectionism on the part of the
states was one of the main reasons for the affirmative grant of the
commerce power to the Congress. It was a widely-held belief at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution, that the Articles of Confederation had failed, in large part, because the states had waged
destructive trade wars against one another. State governments had
been too responsive to local economic interests, with the result that
interstate economic competition was conducted more through political
processes than through the marketplace.4 85 As the Court observed
in Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig Inc., "a chief occasion of the commerce
clause was 'the mutual jealousies and aggressions of the States, taking
form in customs barriers and other economic retaliation.' ",486 The
Court had observed earlier, in Guy v. Baltimore, that Congress had
been granted the commerce power because of the "oppressed and
degraded state" of commerce existing under the Articles of Confederation.4 87 The nondiscrimination principle, as a major historical
purpose for the affirmative grant of the commerce power to Congress,
488
was most recently recognized by the Court in Maryland v. Louisiana:
One of the fundamental principles of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence is that no State, consistent with the Commerce
Clause, may "impose a tax which discriminates against
interstate commerce . . . by providing a direct commercial
advantage to local business." This antidiscrimination principle "follows inexorably from the basic purpose of the
Clause" to prohibit the multiplication of preferential trade
areas destructive of the free commerce anticipated by the
4 9
Constitution.
Since discrimination against interstate commerce and out-of-state
interests in favor of local commerce and in-state interests violates

484. See supra notes 204-14 and accompanying text.
485.

See IL.TRIBE,

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

321-22 (1978) and the

sources cited therein. Professor Kitch questions the premises upon which this widelyheld belief was based: "The idea that the thirteen years of experience under the
Articles of Confederation proved that decentralized authority over commerce would

degenerate into restrictions on freedom of trade has played a central role in the
American tradition." Kitch, supra note 4, at 15.

486.
487.
488.
489.

294 U.S. 550, 552 (1935).
100 U.S. 434, 440 (1879).
451 U.S. 725 (1981).
Id. at 754 (citations omitted.)
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the nondiscrimination principle embodied in the commerce clause,
the commerce clause may serve as the structural basis for finding a
right on the part of entities engaged in interstate commerce and
out-of-state interests to be free from such discrimination.
The nondiscrimination principle is also embodied in the full faith
and credit clause and the privileges and immunities clause of article
IV. The full faith and credit clause, while evincing a constitutional
concern for national uniformity, 490 and the uniform recognition of
sister state judgments, 49' also prohibits the discriminatory refusal to
enforce claims existing under the law of a sister state. 492 The privileges
and immunities clause expressly embodies the nondiscrimination
principle, and states in unqualified language: "The Citizens of each
state shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens
of the several states." The Supreme Court has noted that there is
a "mutually reinforcing relationship between the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, section 2 and the Commerce
Clause-a relationship that stems from their common origin in the
Fourth Article of the Articles of Confederation and their shared
vision of federalism. ' 493 The nondiscrimination principle, as embodied in the commerce clause, the full faith and credit clause, and
the privileges and immunities clause, thus demonstrates a general
constitutional concern with interstate discrimination. In this federal
union, interstate commerce shall be treated equally with local commerce, nonresidents shall be treated equally with residents, 494 and
claims under a sister state's law shall stand on equal footing with
claims under a state's own law.
490.

See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.

491.

See supra note 106.

492. For example, if a state allows a wrongful death action under its own
law it cannot, consistent with full faith and credit, refuse to enforce a wrongful
death claim existing under the law of a sister state. First Nat'l Bank v. United
Air Lines, 342 U.S. 396 (1952); Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951). As long
as the state is not discriminating against claims existing under the law of a sister
state, it may refuse to enforce such claims on the same basis as it would refuse to
enforce claims existing under its own law. See, e.g., Wells v. Simonds Abrasive
Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953) (claim barred by statute of limitations).
493. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 531-32 (1978). For discussions of the
relationship between the privileges and immunities clause and the negative commerce
clause see Varat, supra note 4, at 488-91 and TRIBE, supra note 485, at 404-05.
The precise relationship between the privileges and immunities clause and the
negative commerce clause will be discussed infra notes 512-33 and accompanying
text. The point to be emphasized is that the privileges and immunities clause also
embodies the nondiscrimination principle, and textually expresses a concern that
out-of-staters shall not be subject to discrimination simply because they are out-ofstaters.
494. This principle is subject to the "nonfundamental rights" qualification.
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It is with this background that the nondiscrimination principle
can be recognized as the structurally-based conceptual justification
for a negative aspect to the commerce clause. Finding its source in
the historical purpose for the affirmative grant of the commerce
power to Congress, and in related provisions of the original Constitution such as the full faith and credit clause and the privileges
and immunities clause, the nondiscrimination principle has become
firmly established in our constitutional system. The Court properly
can rely on the nondiscrimination principle to find, in the internal
inferences of the Constitution, a right on the part of entities engaged
in interstate commerce and out-of-state interests to be free from
4 95
discriminatory state regulation and taxation.
The focus of the nondiscrimination principle, as embodied in
the negative commerce clause, is on commercial protectionism and
on the competitive disadvantage suffered by interstate commerce or
out-of-state interests in comparison with local commerce or in-state
interests. Two conclusions follow therefrom with respect to the
meaning of that principle in determining the validity of state regulation and taxation affecting interstate commerce. First, whether
the challenged state regulation or taxation is discriminatory for
negative commerce clause purposes depends upon the essential effect
of the regulation or tax on interstate commerce or out-of-state interests
in comparison with local commerce or in-state interests. Where the
essential effect of the state regulation or tax is to advance local

Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978). See infra note
516 and accompanying text.
495. The right of entities engaged in interstate commerce and the right of
out-of-state interests are necessarily intertwined. In effect, the entity engaged in
interstate commerce asserts its right on behalf of unidentified out-of-state interests
as well as on its own behalf. For example, in Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294
U.S. 511 (1935), the New York milk distributor who was subject to the challenged
regulation was asserting its own right to purchase milk from out-of-state farmers
instead of in-state farmers for sale in New York. This right was intertwined with
the right of unidentified Vermont milk producers to have equal access with New
York milk producers to the New York milk market. Similarly, in Pike v. Bruce
Church, 397 U.S. 137 (1970), Bruce Church was asserting its own right to locate
its shed in California instead of in Arizona. This right was intertwined with the
rights of unidentified California workers and suppliers not to be subject to discrimination in favor of Arizona workers and suppliers with respect to the Arizona grown
cantaloupes. For a discussion of intertwined rights, see generally Sedler, The Assertion
of ConstitutionalJus Tertii: A Substantive Approach, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1308, 1328-29
n.64 (1982). In some cases, the out-of-state victims of the discrimination are
identified and, therefore, could sue as plaintiffs to challenge the discrimination.
Thus, in Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978), the City of Philadelphia,
which had entered into disposal contracts with New Jersey landfill owners, brought
suit along with the landfill owners to challenge the validity of the regulation.
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economic interests at the expense of interstate or out-of-state economic
interests, there is commercial protectionism, which is necessarily
inconsistent with the nondiscrimination principle. Under such circumstances, the Court has held that there is a constitutional violation,
and it was not necessary to show that the discrimination was
intended.4 96 Second, a state regulation or tax is discriminatory for
negative commerce clause purposes only where its essential effect is
to discriminate against interstate commerce or out-of-state interests
because of the interstate nature of that commerce or the out-of-state
nature of those interests. There is no constitutional violation unless
the favored and disfavored interests are similarly situated except for
the interstate or out-of-state nature of the disfavored interests. In
Exxon v. Maryland,497 where the effect of the regulation was to favor
retail service stations over producer-marketeers, there was no violation of the nondiscrimination principle, notwithstanding the fact
that the producer-marketeers were all interstate. The effect of the
regulation was to favor one kind of economic interest over a different
kind of economic interest, not a local economic interest over an
interstate or out-of-state economic interest; it is only the latter kind
of favoritism that is inconsistent with the nondiscrimination principle.
Once a scheme of state regulation or taxation has been found
to discriminate against interstate commerce or out-of-state interest
in favor of local commerce or in-state interests because of the interstate
nature of that commerce or the out-of-state nature of those interests,
it is unconstitutional.49 8 The Court does not consider the governmental interest purportedly advanced by the discriminatory regulation
or tax, or the availability of alternative means to advance that
interest. It is the discrimination itself that violates the values reflected
in the nondiscrimination principle; any interest the state may seek
496. See supra notes 215-32 and accompanying text.
497. 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
498. Under this structurally-based conceptual justification, the unconstitutionality of discrimination against interstate commerce or out-of-state interests is
value-based; it has nothing to do with process-type concerns, such as the lack of
representation of interstate or out-of-state economic interests in the state's political
process. Some commentators have advocated a process-type anaylsis of discrimination. Professor Tushnet maintains that the Court should take a differentiated
approach to discrimination, depending on how the distribution of benefits and
burdens is allocated between local and out-of-state interests. The premise of this
approach is that where local interests also will suffer from the challenged regulation,
it may be assumed that "the potential burden-bearers can adequately represent the
national interest in free trade." Tushnet, supra note 4, at 148-49. Tushnet proposes
a spectrum of standards by which to determine the constitutionality of a state
regulation which has been challenged as discriminating against interstate commerce.
The standard of review would depend upon the local and out-of-state distribution
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to advance must be achieved by nondiscriminatory means. 49 9 Finally,
under the nondiscrimination principle, it is clear that the negative
commerce clause imposes identical limitations on state regulation
and state taxation affecting interstate commerce. 00

of burdens and benefits. Automatic invalidation would follow from a finding of
intentional discrimination, and invalidation also would result where the burdens of
the regulation fell exclusively on out-of-state interests. Tushnet puts Hunt into this
category. Id. at 131-35. Where the burdens fell on both in-state and out-of-state
interests, but the benefits were solely local, there would be a lower level of scrutiny
and a "reasonable alternatives" inquiry. Tushnet puts Dean Milk into this category.
Id. at 136-37, 141. Where the burdens fell on a large number of out-of-staters and
only a small number of local residents, but the benefits accrued to many local
residents and only a few out-of-staters, the Court would require a showing of a
"fair and substantial relation" between the state's nondiscriminatory purpose and
the regulation adopted. Tushnet put Breard into this category; Exxon, which came
down subsequent to the publication of his article, would also fall into this category.
Id. at 137-39, 141. Where the benefits and burdens were so distributed that
substantial numbers of local residents both felt the burden and gained the benefits,
Tushnet says that it would be "unlikely that the political process will be distorted
by protectionist impulses, and judicial intervention on grounds of discrimination
would be unjustified." In such cases, the Court would use a "simple rationality"
test. Tushnet puts Raymond into this category. Id. at 139-41.
Professor Eule also advocates a spectrum of standards approach to determine
the constitutionality of commercial protectionism. The standard to be used would
depend on the comparative impact of the challenged regulation on local interests
and on out-of-state interests. This approach, which is based on the premise that
the privileges and immunities clause, rather than the negative commerce clause, is
the "more appropriate vehicle" to deal with "commercial discrimination." This
approach will be discussed infra notes 535-47 and accompanying text. Professor
O'Fallon also has contended that, "[i]n the context of commerce clause adjudication,
the central question is whether a legislature representative of the people whose
significant interests are affected, made the decision. If the question can be answered
affirmatively, the legislative decision may be presumed to be legitimate." O'Fallon,
supra note 4, at 400.
This author's disagreement with such process-type approaches to the validity
of discrimination against interstate commerce or out-of-state interests relates to the
structurally-based conceptual justification that has been advanced for a negative
aspect to the commerce clause. Since this nondiscrimination principle justification
finds its source in the values embodied in the commerce clause, the focus is on
whether the challenged regulation is inconsistent with those values. If so, the
regulation cannot be permitted to stand, regardless of the theoretical effectiveness
of the political process in preventing such discrimination. In this particular instance,
the political process was not effective in preventing economic protectionism, and
the result is inconsistent with the nondiscrimination principle.
499. This approach accords with the results that have been reached in practice,
because nondiscriminatory alternatives always will be available. See supra notes 3637 and accompanying text.
500. As to due process limitations on state taxation affecting interstate and
foreign commerce, see supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text and supra note
130.
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E. A Concluding Note
Analysis of the structurally-based conceptual justifications proposed for a negative aspect to the commerce clause leads to the
following conclusions: (1) The diminution of power justification
cannot be sustained because it is completely inconsistent with the
allocation of federal and state power under the constitutional structure. As long as a federal power, like the commerce power, is
nonexclusive, the affirmative grant of that power to Congress can
have no effect on the exercise of the reserved powers of the states.
(2) The implied intention of Congress justification cannot be sustained
because, under the constitutional structure, Congress cannot legislate
by silence, but must exercise the federal legislative power by affirmative action in accordance with the process set forth in article I,
section 7. The "silence of Congress" cannot be relied upon to restrict
the exercise of the reserved powers of the states. (3) The free trade
principle justification cannot be sustained because the commerce
clause does not embody that principle. Proponents of the free trade
principle have contended that a major historical purpose for the
affirmative grant of the commerce power to Congress was to create
an area of free trade among the states. This contention, however,
is not supported by analysis of the historical context of the commerce
clause; there is no basis on which to conclude that the commerce
clause embodies the free trade principle. This being so, the negative
commerce clause cannot be relied upon as the source of a right to
be free from nondiscriminatory state regulation or taxation that
purportedly burdens interstate commerce or impedes the free flow
of trade between the states. (4) The only conceptual justification for
a negative aspect to the commerce clause that can be sustained with
reference to the constitutional structure is one that is based on the
nondiscrimination principle. Since a major historical purpose for the
affirmative grant of the commerce power to Congress was to prevent
discrimination against interstate commerce or out-of-state interests
in favor of local commerce or in-state interests, the commerce clause
may be said to embody the nondiscrimination principle. It may,
therefore, be relied upon, in its negative aspect, as the source of a
right on the part of entities engaged in interstate commerce and
out-of-state interests to be free from discriminatory state regulation
or taxation. Under this conceptual justification, the right of entities
engaged in interstate commerce and out-of-state interests to be free
from discriminatory state regulation or taxation is found in the
internal inferences of the Constitution. The sole, but absolute prohibition, of the negative commerce clause is directed toward discrimination against interstate commerce or out-of-state interests
because of the interstate nature of that commerce or the out-of-state
nature of those interests.
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The results reached by the Court, under its current approach to
the negative commerce clause as a limitation on state regulatory and
taxation power, find support in the nondiscrimination principle
justification. The Court's acceptance of this structurally-based conceptual justification for a negative aspect to the commerce clause,
and its promulgation of doctrine reflecting the nondiscrimination
principle, 0' would establish the negative commerce clause as an
important, although narrow, restriction on state regulation and
taxation affecting interstate commerce. Although the Court would
have to alter its articulated approach to the negative commerce clause
in the regulation area, it would have to disapprove the results only
in Southern Pacific and Bibb.50 2 State regulation affecting interstate
commerce would no longer be subject to constitutional challenge on
the ground that it imposed an undue burden. However, whenever
the essential effect of a state regulation or tax was to discriminate
against or disadvantage interstate commerce or out-of-state interests
in comparison to local commerce or in-state interests because of the
interstate nature of that commerce or the out-of-state nature of those
interests, the regulation or tax would be unconstitutional. The Court,
in practice, has consistently reached this result. One effect of the
Court's acceptance of the nondiscrimination principle, therefore,
would be to bring theory into accord with results. Another effect
would be to eliminate undue burden challenges, which generally
have proved unavailing in practice. Above all, the Court would
finally bring order to negative commerce clause theory; the negative
commerce clause as a restriction on state regulatory and taxation
power would be rooted firmly in the structure of the Constitution.
III.

FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS

RELATING TO THE

NONDISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLE

The nondiscrimination principle also raises questions concerning:
(1) the power of Congress to authorize discriminatory regulation and

501. There would be no "balancing" where discrimination is involved. Under
the Court's current articulated approach, theoretically there may be balancing in
those circumstances. In practice, however, the balance has always been struck
against the challenged discriminatory regulation.
502. The Court would not have to alter its approach in the taxation area.
As we have demonstrated previously, under the four-element Complete Auto Transit
test only the third element-the absence of discrimination against interstate commerce-implicates commerce clause, as opposed to due process concerns. See supra
notes 117-18 and accompanying text. The Court also would have to explain Edgar
v. Mite Corp. on full faith and credit grounds. See supra notes 97-108 and accompanying
text.

1000
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taxation by the states; (2) the relationship between the nondiscrimination principle of the negative commerce clause and the nondiscrimination principle of the privileges and immunities clause; and
(3) the constitutionality of discrimination in favor of local commerce
and in-state interests where the state is acting as market participant
or dispenser of benefits. Analysis of these questions in terms of
constitutional structure leads to the following conclusions: First,
Congress may authorize state regulation or taxation that discriminates
against interstate commerce or out-of-state interests in favor of local
commerce or in-state interests, because the commerce clause by its
own force imposes no limitations on the exercise of federal power
over interstate commerce. The nondiscrimination principle embodied
in the commerce clause is applicable only to the exercise of state
power. Second, the negative commerce clause and the privileges and
immunities clause serve separate, though related, functions in our
constitutional scheme. Particular kinds of discrimination against outof-state interests will invoke the application of one or the other
provision. Third, in terms of constitutional structure, neither the
negative commerce clause, nor the privileges and immunities clause,
should operate as a limitation on the power of the states to utilize
state-owned resources for the benefit of their residents. There can
be no constitutional restriction on the power of a state to favor its
own residents when acting as a purchaser or a seller of products
produced by state-owned enterprises. Similarly, the power of the
state to give residents preference in the use of or access to stateowned resources should not be limited.
A.

The Power of Congress To Authorize Discriminatory Regulation and
Taxation by the States

As previously discussed, the Court has emphasized repeatedly
that Congress may authorize state regulation or taxation affecting
interstate commerce which otherwise would be constitutionally impermissible. 03 The Court specifically has upheld congressional authorization of state regulation or taxation that would discriminate
against interstate commerce in favor of local commerce, 0 4 finding
that: "The Commerce Clause is a grant of authority to Congress,
and not a restriciton on the authority of that body. Congress, unlike
a state legislature authorizing similar expenditures, is not limited by
any negative implications of the Commerce Clause in the exercise
503. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
504. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 440 (1951); Western &
S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648 (1981).
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of its spending power. 5 05 The Court's position is correct from a
structural standpoint. It follows from recognition of the nondiscrimination principle as the structurally-based conceptual justification
for a negative aspect to the commerce clause.
Since the commerce clause embodies the nondiscrimination principle, it may properly be relied upon as the source of a right of
entities engaged in interstate commerce and out-of-state interests to
be free from discriminatory actions on the part of the states in the
506
exercise of their reserved general regulatory and taxation powers.
However, the commerce clause structurally is an affirmative grant
of power to Congress, and it cannot b~y its own force limit the
exercise of congressional power. The nondiscrimination principle
does not relate to action on the part of the federal government,
because it has its source in an historical concern with discrimination
by the states, not by the federal government.
The Constitution does impose certain limitations on the exercise
of federal power. These limitations are contained in article I, section
9,507 and include, for example, the requirement that in the exercise
of the commerce power granted in article I, section 8, Congress can
give no preference to the ports of one state over another.5 0 8 Section
9, however, contains no "nondiscrimination" limitation on the
exercise of powers granted in section 8. Since section 9 is designed
to impose limitations on the exercise of those powers, it would be
improper, from a structural standpoint, to infer any other limitations.
Thus, except as limited by section 9 and by other provisions of the
Constitution, such as the Bill of Rights, Congress may exercise the
powers granted in section 8, without constitutional restraint. It may
exercise the commerce power in such a way as to require, or to
permit, discrimination against interstate commerce in favor of local
commerce. The Court was indisputably correct, from a structural
standpoint, when it stated in Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin:50 9

505.

White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204,

213 (1983).
506. As noted previously, a major historical purpose for the affirmative grant
of the commerce power to Congress was to prevent commercial protectionism by
the states.
507. In McCulloch v. Maryland, the Court relied on the fact that the "necessary
and proper clause" was contained in the grant of powers under art. I, § 8, rather
than in the limitation on powers under art. I, § 9, as one of the bases for concluding
that that clause was intended to enlarge, rather than to restrict the scope of
congressional power. 17 U.S. at 419.
508. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 6.
509. 328 U.S. 408 (1945).
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The power of Congress over commerce exercised entirely
without reference to coordinated action of the states is not
restricted, except as the Constitution expressly provides, by
any limitation which forbids it to discriminate against interstate commerce and in favor of local trade. Its plenary scope
enables Congress not only to promote but also to prohibit
interstate commerce .... 510
The Constitution thus contains no limitation on the affirmative
exercise of the commerce power that would preclude Congress from
exercising that power in a way that discriminates against interstate
commerce. When state regulation or taxation is expressly authorized
by Congress, it is the authorization itself that is an issue for
constitutional purposes, not the state action undertaken pursuant to
it, and that congressional authorization is not limited by the nondiscrimination principle. By authorizing discriminatory state regulation or taxation affecting interstate commerce, Congress is not
making constitutional what otherwise would be unconstitutional. The
states are precluded by the negative commerce clause from discriminating against interstate commerce or out-of-state interests in favor
of local commerce or in-state interests because of the interstate nature
of that commerce or the out-of-state nature of those interests. No
such restriction is imposed on the affirmative exercise of the commerce
power by Congress."1 '
510.

Id. at 434.

511. A congressional scheme of regulation, incorporating discriminatory state
regulation or taxation of interstate commerce, is but one example of a situation
where congressional regulation may be upheld in circumstances in which comparable
state regulation would not. This phenomenon results from the grant of certain
specified powers to Congress and from the fact that there are different limitations
on the exercise of state and federal power in the Constitution. For example, since
the Constitution, in art. I, § 10, cl. 1, expressly prohibits the states from "impairing
the obligation of contracts," but imposes no comparable limitation on the federal
government, only a state law can be challenged on that ground. A federal law
interfering with existing contractual relations can be challenged only on due process
grounds, and is likely to be sustained. Compare-Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R.,
294 U.S. 240 (1935), with Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannous, 438 U.S. 234
(1978). Similarly, in view of the plenary congressional power over immigration and
naturalization, federal discrimination against aliens challenged on fifth amendment
equal protection grounds has been sustained, while comparable state discrimination
against aliens has been held to be violative of the fourteenth amendment's equal
protection clause. Compare Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976), with Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Hampton v. Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976), and
Wong v. Campbell, 626 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981),
with Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
But see Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 105 S. Ct. 1676 (1985), where
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The Relationship Between the Nondiscrimination Principle of the
Negative Commerce Clause and the Nondiscrimination Principle of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause

The negative commerce clause and the privileges and immunities
clause serve separate, though related, functions in our constitutional
scheme. It is important to focus on the separate functions of these
provisions because, as the Court long has noted, they have a mutually
reinforcing relationship. 12 This mutually reinforcing relationship results from the fact that both provisions embody the nondiscrimination
principle. Dean Sandalow has pointed out that particular values
sometimes may be found in more than one constitutional provision,
so that there may be a choice among "overlapping" constitutional
provisions on which the Court may rely as the basis for a decision.
He states:
Often . . . the need for choice from among constitutional

provisions arises because the values that impel us toward a
particular decision may plausibly be said to receive expression
in more than one constitutional provision. Since those values
are expressed differently in the different provisions, however,
the implications of reliance upon one or another of the
provisions may differ significantly. If the implications of
resting decision upon one constitutional provision are unacceptable, it may be possible to rest decision upon another
with implications we can accept. The existence of such
"overlapping" constitutional provisions thus permits us to
achieve a more sensitive accommodation of competing values
than would otherwise be possible and thereby contributes to
our capacity to adapt the Constitution to the balance of values
that currently seems appropriate. 513

the Court invalidated on equal protection grounds an Alabama taxing scheme that
discriminated against out-of-state insurance companies doing business in Alabama,
notwithstanding specific congressional authorization of state regulation of out-ofstate insurance companies. The Court noted that although the congressional authorization exempted the insurance industry from commerce clause restrictions,
"[i]t does not purport to limit in any way the applicability of the Equal Protection
Clause." Id. at 1683. The question of whether a congressional statute specifically
authorizing the particular discriminatory taxing scheme would be invalidated as a matter
a fifth amendment equal protection was left unanswered. See id. at 1694 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
512.
513.

(1981).

See supra note 493.
Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REy. 1033, 1056-57
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The negative commerce clause and the privileges and immunities
clause are overlapping constitutional provisions in the sense that both
embody the nondiscrimination principle. One, or the other, or both
of these provisions may be relied upon to deal with particular kinds
of discrimination against out-of-state interests. The nondiscrimination
principle, as embodied in the negative commerce clause and in the
privileges and immunities clause, have different meanings that are
related to the separate functions of the provisions in our constitutional
scheme.
It should be noted at the outset that each provision has had a
different "line of growth." 5 14 The protections afforded by the negative
commerce clause apply to all entities engaged in interstate commerce.
The negative commerce clause has been relied on by the Court, in
practice, to invalidate all state regulation or taxation that has the
essential effect of discriminating against interstate commerce or outof-state interests in favor of local commerce or in-state interests
because of the interstate nature of that commerce or the out-of-state
nature of those interests. The protections afforded by the privileges
and immunities clause, in contrast, apply only to individuals and
not to corporations. 51 Moreover, the privileges and immunities clause
does not prohibit discrimination with respect to "nonfundamental
rights. 5 1 6 The Court's intepretation of the privileges and immunities
clause also has recognized that certain distinctions between residents
and nonresidents may be constitutionally permissible, because they
are "objectively reasonable" and thus are not inconsistent with the
nondiscrimination principle .117

514.

As to the "line of growth" of constitutional provisions, see id. at 1054-

56.
515. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868). See the discussion
and criticism of this position in Eule, supra note 4, at 483-89.
516. See Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
It must be noted that the distinction between "fundamental" and "nonfundamental"
rights, for purposes of a two-tier standard of due process and equal protection
review, has no application in the privileges and immunities context. It is only a
very limited category of "nonfundamenta" rights that are not entitled to protection
under the privileges and immunities clause. See Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 383-87.
517. See Sedler, Interest Analysis and Forum Preference in the Conflict of Laws: A
Response to the "'New Critics," 34 MERCER L. REv. 593, 629-31 (1983). The classic

example of an objectively reasonable distinction between residents and nonresidents
is the requirement that a nonresident plaintiff post security for costs in a court
action, although a similar requirement is not imposed on resident plaintiffs. See,
e.g., Brewster v. North Am. Van Lines, 461 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1972); see also
Kreitzer v. Puerto Rico Cars, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 498 (D.P.R. 1975), aff'd, 535
F.2d 140 (1st Cir. 1976). Another example of an objectively reasonable distinction
is that contained in a nonresident attachment statute, allowing routine attachment
of the property of nondomiciliary defendants residing outside of the state. See Central
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The different line of growth of these provisions is indicative of
the fact that they serve separate functions in our constitutional
scheme. The privileges and immunities clause is an express limitation
on the exercise of state power, designed to protect individual rights,
and by its terms is designed to deal with discrimination against
nonresidents.5 18 The nondiscrimination principle of the privileges and
immunities clause has nothing to do with commercial protectionism,
but is premised on the notion of equal treatment between residents
and nonresidents. 19 Thus, that provision is invoked most appropriately where the state has given a benefit to residents that it has
denied to nonresidents,5 20 or has imposed a burden or tax on
nonresidents that it has not imposed on residents.5 21 The differential
treatment of nonresidents violates the privileges and immunities
clause unless there is an independent reason for treating nonresidents
differently. The privileges and immunities clause, therefore, renders
unconstitutional discrimination against nonresidents on the basis of
their nonresidency such as New Hampshire's imposition of a "commuters tax" applicable only to nonresidents, 522 Alaska's ban on
nonresident employment in any enterprise connected with the Alaska
pipeline,5 23 or New Hampshire's residency requirement for admission
to the Bar. 524 It does not render unconstitutional reasonable distincLoan & Trust Co. v. Campbell, 173 U.S. 84 (1899); ITC Entertainment, Ltd. v.
Nelson Film Partners, 714 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1983).
518. "Citizenship," for privileges and immunities purposes, is construed as
being synonymous with "residence." See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council
v. Mayor of Camden, 104 S. Ct. 1020, 1026-27 (1984).
519. Privileges and immunities protection is subject to the "nonfundamental
rights" qualification. See supra note 516.
520. See, e.g., Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 105 S. Ct. 1272
(1985); Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978); Baldwin v. Montana Fish &
Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
521. See, e.g., Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975); Toomer v.
Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
522. Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975).
523. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978). A privileges and immunities
clause challenge was more appropriate than a negative commerce clause challenge
in this case. The discrimination was directed expressly against nonresident individuals, and the right to work had long been held to be a fundamental right for
privileges and immunities purposes. Because the discrimination was based expressly
on residency, the issue arose as to whether there was an independent justification
for the differential treatment of nonresidents. The Hicklin Court noted the "mutually
reinforcing relationship between the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV,
§ 2 and the Commerce Clause," and stated that this relationship made relevant
the Court's decisions involving discrimination under the negative commerce clause.
437 U.S. at 531-32. Those decisions, however, were not necessary to support the
Court's conclusion in Hicklin that there was not any independent justification for
the differential treatment of nonresidents, with respect to the opportunity to work
in enterprises connected with the Alaska pipeline.
524. Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 105 S. Ct. 1272 (1985).
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tions between residents and nonresidents where the fact of residency
is relevant to the matter in issue, such as a requirement that a
nonresident plaintiff post security for costs in a court action, although
525
a similar requirement is not imposed on resident plaintiffs.
The nondiscrimination principle embodied in the negative commerce clause relates to the historical concern with commercial protectionism. It operates to prohibit all discrimination against interstate
commerce or out-of-state interests in favor of local commerce or instate interests because of the interstate nature of that commerce or
the out-of-state of those interests. The protections afforded by the
negative commerce clause may be invoked by all entities engaged
in interstate commerce, whether individual or corporate, resident or
nonresident.5 26 The focus is on discrimination against interstate
commerce or out-of-state interests in favor of local commerce or instate interests, not on discrimination between residents and nonresidents.
The nondiscrimination principle embodied in the negative commerce clause and the privileges and immunities clause may operate
in tandem where there is express discrimination against nonresident
individuals with respect to commercial activity in the state. In that
circumstance, there is discrimination both between residents and
nonresidents, with respect to the enjoyment of a benefit in the state,
and against interstate commerce, in favor of local commerce. Thus,
both a negative commerce clause challenge and a privileges and
immunities clause challenge are appropriate; the discrimination is
5 27
In Toomer v. Witsell,528
violative of both consitutional provisions.
525. See supra note 517.
526. In Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978), resident landfill
owners in New Jersey, who engaged in interstate commerce by transporting waste
from other states to their New Jersey landfills, felt directly the discriminatory impact
of the regulation as an identified user of the New Jersey landfills as did the City
of Philadelphia. Both the landfill owners and the City could mount a negative
commerce clause challenge to the regulation. The discrimination, however, was not
between residents and nonresidents, but between local commerce and in-state
interests on the one hand, and interstate commerce and out-of-state interests on
the other hand. In Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979), the entity engaged
in interstate commerce was an Oklahoma minnow dealer, and the adversely affected
out-of-state interests-potential purchasers of Oklahoma seized minnows in other
states-were not identifiable. The Oklahoma minnow dealer could mount a negative
commerce clause challenge to the regulation, but could not mount a privileges and
immunities clause challenge.
527. In other contexts, particular forms of discrimination have been found
to be violative of both the due process and equal protection clauses. See, e.g.,
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (ban on interracial marriage violative of
equal protection clause as an indivious racial classification and violative of due
process clause as an impermissible interference with the fundamental right to
marry).
528. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
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for example, the Court held that South Carolina's attempt to charge
nonresidents one hundred times more than residents for a license to
pursue migratory shrimp in the state's coastal waters constituted
unjustifiable discrimination against nonresidents and thus violated
the privileges and immunities clause. It also could have based its
decision on the negative commerce clause, since there was express
discrimination against interstate commerce infavor of local commerce
with respect to commercial activity within the state.5 2 9 Invocation of
both grounds of challenge also would be appropriate where an
identified out-of-state individual was denied access to locally produced
goods.5 30 The point to be emphasized is that the negative commerce
clause and the privileges and immunities clause have separate, though
related, functions in our constitutional scheme. While both provisions
embody the nondiscrimination principle, each is directed towards
different kinds of discrimination. 5 3' Both provisions stem from a
"shared vision of federalism,'' 53 2 and have a "mutually reinforcing
relationship." 33 To that extent, they are "overlapping" provisions.
5 4
But each has a distinct role to play under the Constitution.
Professor Eule has proposed an approach to the constitutionality
of commercial protectionism that would eliminate the distinct func-

529. This provision was not challenged on negative commerce clause grounds.
Another provision of South Carolina's shrimping regulations, which required that
shrimp caught in South Carolina waters be packed in South Carolina ports rather
than in the ports of the shrimper's home state, was challenged and invalidated on
negative commerce clause grounds. Id. at 403-06. For a discussion of this point in
connection with the Court's subsequent holding in Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S.
137 (1970), see supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
530. This is on the assumption that access was denied on the basis of
nonresidency. In Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979), the regulation
prohibited shipping the minnows for sale outside of the state. Thus, the regulation
discriminated against interstate commerce in favor of local commerce, but did not
discriminate against nonresidents in favor of residents. If a prospective out-of-state
purchaser had been identified, that party could have challenged the Oklahoma
regulation on negative commerce clause grounds, but not on privileges and immunities grounds.
531. We have no occasion to consider in the present Article whether the
privileges and immunities clause had properly been interpreted as limiting its
protections to natural persons. For the contention that its protections should apply
to corporations, as well as to natural persons, see Eule, supra note 4, at 449-53.
532. Hicdin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 532 (1978).
533. Id. at 531.
534. The distinct functions of the privileges and immunities clause and the
negative commerce clause were emphasized by the Court in United Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 104 S.Ct. 1020 (1984). The Court held that
although a required preference for state residents in the workforce of contractors on
state-funded construction projects was not violative of the negative commerce clause,
such a required preference might be violative of the privileges and immunities clause.
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tions of the negative commerce clause and the privileges and immunities clause in our constitutional scheme. This approach would
establish the privileges and immunities clause as the "more appropriate vehicle" to deal with "commercial discrimination." 35 Professor
Eule would recast the privileges and immunities clause to include
corporations, and would relate the protections afforded by that clause
to the "representation-enforcing approach. 5 36 Under his approach,
there would be a "spectrum of standards" of review, depending on
the comparative impact of the challenged regulation on local interests,
which are represented in the state's political process, and out-ofstate interests, which are not.5 37 When the state regulation disproportionately burdens out-of-state interests in comparison with local
interests, the state would have a heavier burden of justifying the
efficacy of the means selected. 38 As the burden on local interests
from a particular regulation more closely approximates the burden
on out-of-state interests, both interests may be deemed to be adequately protected by the political process and the degree of judicial
scrutiny accordingly would be reduced.5 3 9 For example, Eule contends
that in Philadelphiav. New Jersey,140 the denial of access to New Jersey
landfill space for out-of-state waste impacted much more severely
on resident landfill users than on their out-of-state customers, so
that a reduced degree of scrutiny was appropriate. Eule suggests

The Court stated that the clauses have different objectives and establish different standards for evaluating state conduct. The Court concluded:
The Commerce Clause acts as an implied restraint upon state regulatory powers. Such powers must give way before the superior authority
of Congress to legislate on (or leave unrelated) matters involving interstate
commerce.... The Privileges and Immunities Clause, on the other hand,
imposes a direct restraint on state action in the interests of interstate
harmony. . . .It is discrimination against out-of-state residents on matters
of fundamental concern which triggers the Clause, not regulation affecting
interstate commerce.
Id. at 1028 (citations omitted). This case will be discussed at length infra notes
574-86 and accompanying text.
535. Eule, supra note 4, at 446-49. Eule notes that the privileges and immunities clause, in its original form as contained in the fourth article of the Articles
of Confederation, referred to "all the privileges of trade and commerce." Id.
536. Id. at 449-54, 456-57. Eule states: "A representation-enforcing approach
requires a court to ascertain whether the mechanisms of participatory democracy
have failed to function properly. When that failure appears, intensive judicial
scrutiny of the legislative product is warranted. When no such defect appears,
deference to the political processes is commanded." Id. at 456.
537. See generally id. at 456-74 for the application of Eule's approach.
538. Id. at 470-72.

539.
540.

Id. at 460-61.
437 U.S. 617 (1978).
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that the challenged regulation probably should have been upheld.5 4 1
Most evident under Professor Eule's approach is his conclusion that
commercial protectionism would not necessarily be unconstitutional.
It would be sustained where the political process could provide a
check, because represented local interests would suffer substantially
as much as unrepresented out-of-state interests.
The underlyink difficulty with Professor Eule's approach is the
lack of any structurally-based conceptual justification for it. Eule
does not deal with the separate roles that the privileges and immunities clause and the negative commerce clause play in our
constitutional scheme. Nor does he explain why the privileges and
immunities clause, which is directed toward discrimination between
residents and nonresidents, is more appropriate than the negative
commerce clause to deal with commercial protectionism. Eule also
neglects to set forth any basis for defining the meaning of the
privileges and immunities clause in terms of a "representationenforcing approach," rather than with reference to the nondiscrimination principle that clearly is embodied in its text. Above all,
he presents no evidence as to why the commerce clause is not
properly interpreted as embodying the nondiscrimination principle,
and why the Court should not rely on the negative commerce clause
to invalidate all discrimination against interstate commerce or outof-state interests in favor of local commerce or in-state interests.
Eule's approach thus suffers from two major structural flaws.
First, he would assign a meaning to the privileges and immunities
clause that is completely unwarranted in light of its express language.
Its language is the language of values, not the language of process.
Discrimination against nonresidents is prohibited, not because they
are unrepresented in the local legislature, but because such discrimination is inconsistent with the "vision of federalism" 5 42 that the
Constitution established and the " 'norm of comity' that is to prevail
among the States with respect to their treatment of each other's
residents. "154 The command of the privileges and immunities clause

541. Eule, supra note 4, at 463. Eule indicates similar disagreement with the
results reached by the Court in other cases. His focus is primarily on the Court's
method of analysis in these cases, but the method which he advocates would likely
lead to different results. For example, in Hughes v. Oklahoma, Eule says that the
express ban on the out-of-state shipment of seined minnows should not per se be
held unconstitutional, because local minnow dealers also were affected adversely.
Id. at 462-63. In Exxon and Cloverleaf, however, he says that the entire impact of
the regulation was felt by out-of-state interests, thereby justifying a higher degree
of scrutiny. Id. at 464-66.
542. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 532 (1978).
543. Id. at 523-24 (citations omitted).
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is clear: in the allocation of benefits and burdens, there must be
equality of treatment between residents and nonresidents unless there
is an independent justification for the differential treatment of nonresidents .5s Where there is no independent justification for the
differential treatment of nonresidents, the nondiscrimination principle
of the privileges and immunities clause has been violated, and that
violation is not lessened because some local interests also are disadvantaged by the discrimination against nonresidents.5 45 There simply is no proper basis for ascribing a process-type meaning to the
priviliges and immunities clause, nor for any balancing where an
independent justification for the differential treatment of nonresidents
cannot be shown. Thus, even if the privileges and immunities clause
is the "more appropriate vehicle" to deal with commercial protectionism, which it is not, it could not be relied on to support the
approach to the constitutionality of "commercial discrimination"
that Professor Eule advocates.
Second, and perhaps more important, Professor Eule has not
demonstrated that the privileges and immunities clause is a more
appropriate vehicle than the negative commerce clause to deal with
commercial protectionism. His contention that the negative commerce
clause should not be relied upon to deal with commercial protectionism completely ignores the nondiscrimination principle that is
derived from the historical context of the commerce clause. Perhaps
Professor Eule has failed to differentiate the nondiscrimination principle from the free trade principle. Eule has shown that the commerce
clause does not embody the free trade principle, and it is on this
basis that he dismisses the negative commerce clause, not only as
the source of constitutional protection against burdensome state
regulation, but also as the source of constitutional protection against
discriminatory state regulation.5 4 6 Since it is incontrovertible that the
commerce clause does embody the nondiscrimination principle, 47 the
commerce clause may properly be relied on in its negative aspect
as the source of a right on the part of entities engaged in interstate
commerce and out-of-state interests to be free from discrimination
because of the interstate nature of that commerce or the out-of-state
nature of those interests. The nondiscrimination principle embodied

544. This principle is qualified by the "nonfundamental rights" exception
and should not be applicable when the state is using state-owned resources for the
benefit of its own residents. See infra note 598.
545. The same is true as regards the nondiscrimination principle embodied
in the negative commerce clause. See supra notes 55 & 221 and accompanying text.
546. See supra notes 470-73 and accompanying text.
547. See supra notes 484-89 and accompanying text.
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in the negative commerce clause addresses itself precisely to commercial protectionism, making the negative commerce clause, rather
than the privileges and immunities clause, the most appropriate
vehicle to deal with commercial protectionism under our constitutional
scheme. Therefore, the approach to the constitutionality of commercial protectionism advocated by Professor Eule cannot withstand
structural analysis and must be rejected.
In summary, the privileges and immunities clause and the negative commerce clause both embody the nondiscrimination principle.
But the nondiscrimination principle of each is directed towards
different kinds of discrimination. The nondiscrimination principle of
the negative commerce clause is directed toward commercial protectionism, and the negative commerce clause has properly been
relied on by the Court to invalidate all discrimination against interstate commerce or out-of-state interests in favor of local commerce
or in-state interests because of the interstate nature of that commerce
or the out-of-state nature of those interests. The negative commerce
clause thus has a function in our constitutional scheme that is distinct
from the function performed by the privileges and immunities clause.
C.

The Constitutionality of Discrimination in Favor of Local Commerce
and In-State Interests Where the State is Acting As Market Participant
or Dispenser of Benefits

The Court has consistently held that when the state acts as a
market participant, it constitutionally can discriminate in favor of
local commerce or in-state interests at the expense of interstate
commerce or out-of-state interests. As a purchaser, the state can
limit itself to purchases from state residents 548 ,and, as a seller of
products produced by state-owned businesses, the state can limit its
sales to state residents.5 49 The state also can require that its contractors
550
give employment preference to state residents on state contracts.
In terms of the constitutional structure, it can be shown that neither
the negative commerce clause, nor the privileges and immunities
clause, can operate as a limitation on the power of a state to utilize
state resources for the benefit of its people. Therefore, there properly
can be no constitutional restriction on either the power of a state

548. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1975).
549. Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
550. White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204
(1982). However, although such preference has not been held to violate the negative
commerce clause, the Court has held that it may violate the privileges and immunities
clause. See infra notes 574-86 and accompanying text.
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to favor its residents when acting as purchaser or seller of products
produced by state-owned enterprises, or the power of the state to
give residents preference in the use of, or access to, state-owned
resources.
The Court has advanced two seemingly distinct rationales for
its conclusion that the nondiscrimination principle does not apply
when the state is acting as market participant; these may be described
as the "market freedom" rationale and the "state sovereignty"
rationale. In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp. ,551 the first case involving
the constitutionality of discrimination by the state when acting as
market participant, Justice Powell emphasized the "marked freedom"
rationale. In upholding the power of Maryland to limit its bounty
payments for automobile hulks to Maryland residents, Justice Powell
stated: "Nothing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause
prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional action, from
participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own
citizens over others.' '552 Insofar as the automobile hulks would be
processed in Maryland rather than in other states as a result of the
"Maryland only" bounty program, "[t]hey remain within Maryland
in response to market forces, including that exerted by money from
the State.'

53

In Reeves, Inc. v. Stake5 4 where the Court upheld a preference
for South Dakota residents in access to cement produced by a stateowned cement plant, Justice Blackmun added the "state sovereignty"
rationale. He stated:
Restraint in this area is also counseled by considerations of
state sovereignty, the role of each State "as guardian and
trustee for its people," and "the long recognized right of
trader or manufacturer, engaged in an entirely private business freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to
5' 5 5
parties with whom he will deal."

Both the market freedom and the state sovereignty rationales were
invoked in White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers,
Inc. ,s56 where the Court upheld, against a negative commerce clause
challenge, a municipal regulation requiring that all construction

551.
552.
553.
554.
555.
556.

426 U.S. 794 (1975).
Id. at 810.
Id.
447 U.S. 429 (1980).
Id. at 438-39 (citations omitted).
460 U.S. 204 (1982).
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projects financed in whole or in part by city funds be performed by
a work force consisting of at least fifty percent city residents.
From a structural standpoint, when the state acts as a market
participant, there is a significant difference between the market
freedom rationale and the state sovereignty rationale in regard to resident preference. The difference is highlighted in the dissenting
opinion in Reeves, where Justice Powell appeared to repudiate the
market freedom rationale he had set forth in Hughes, in favor of the
state sovereignty rationale. Justice Powell concluded that the negative
commerce clause did not operate to constrain the state when the
state was acting as purchaser, but it did when the state was acting
as seller. He reasoned that state procurement involved an exercise
of state sovereignty, rendering the negative commerce clause inapplicable, whereas the sale of products produced by a state-owned
enterprise did not involve a comparable exercise of sovereignty. He
stated:
The application of the Commerce Clause to this case
should turn on the nature of the governmental activity involved. If a public enterprise undertakes an "integral op55
1
eratio[n] in areas of traditional governmental functions,
the Commerce Clause is not directly relevant. If, however,
the State enters the private market and operates a commercial
enterprise for the advantage of its private citizens, it may
not evade the constitutional policy against economic Balkanization.
The distinction derives from the power of governments to
supply their own needs, and from the purpose of the Commerce Clause itself, which is designed to protect "the natural
functioning of the interstate market.' '558 In procuring goods
and services for the operation of government, a State may
"

557. Here Justice Powell cited National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976), where the Court held that there was a "state sovereignty" exception
to Congress' otherwise plenary power over interstate commerce, which rendered

unconstitutional the application of the minimum wages and maximum hours
provisions of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act to employees of state and
municipal governments. It may be significant that Usery and Alexandria Scrap were
decided the same day. In Reeves, Justice Powell makes clear his view that these
two cases involved comparable state sovereignty considerations. While the state

sovereignty exception of Usery has now been rejected completely, and User, has
been overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct.
1005 (1985), this does not undercut the validity of state sovereignty considerations
in the very different context where the state is utilizing state-owned resources for
the benefit of its own residents.
558. It is submitted that, at this point, Justice Powell confuses the free trade
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act without regard to the private marketplace and remove
itself from the reach of the Commerce Clause. But when a
State itself becomes a participant in the private market for
other purposes, the Constitution forbids actions that would
impede the flow of interstate commerce. These categories
recognize no more than the "constitutional line between the
State as government and the State as trader."
The Court holds that South Dakota, like a private business, should not be governed by the Commerce Clause when
it enters the private market. But precisely because South
Dakota is a State, it cannot be presumed to behave like an
enterprise "engaged in an entirely private business." A State
frequently will respond to market conditions on the basis of
political rather than economic concerns. To use the Court's
terms, a State may attempt to act as a "market regulator"
rather than a "market participant." In that situation, it is
a pretense to equate the State with a private economic actor.
State action burdening interstate trade is no less state action
because it is accomplished by a public agency authorized to
559
participate in the private market.

Justice Powell's point that the state does not have the "market
freedom" of a private entity, so as to render the negative commerce
clause inapplicable merely because the state has entered the market,
seems irrefutable.5 60 The Constitution applies to the state in whatever
capacity the state acts and, as a result, the state does not have the
same market freedom as does a private entity. 561 Just as the nonprinciple with the nondiscrimination principle. As previously demonstrated, the
"purpose of the Commerce Clause itself" is not to "protect the natural functioning
of the interstate market," but to prevent discrimination against interstate commerce
or out-of-state interests in favor of local commerce or in-state interests. See supra
note 547 and accompanying text.
559. 447 U.S. at 449-51 (Powell,-J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
560. Justice Blackmun's response to this point was merely that when the
state enters the market, it has the attributes of both a political entity and a private
business, and that it was not possible to ignore the similarities of private businesses
and public entities when they function in the marketplace. Id. at 439, n.12.
561. Similarly, the state, as an employer, is subject to constitutional restraints.
While the state can assert interests as an employer that it cannot assert as a
regulator, see Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1975) (hair style and length rule
valid as applied to uniformed police officers), it cannot, without limitation, discharge
or disadvantage its employees for reasons involving the permissible exercise of first
amendment rights, see, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)
(public criticism of governmental employer), Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1975)
(political affiliation), or of other fundamental rights, see, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1973) (mandatory maternity leave for public
school teachers after the fourth or fifth month of pregnancy).
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discrimination principle embodied in the negative commerce clause
precludes the state from requiring discrimination in favor of local
commerce and in-state interests by private market participants, the
same principle would operate to restrict the market freedom of the
state to discriminate when it is acting as a market participant.
However, when the state provides for resident preference that is
directly traceable to the expenditures of state funds, or other utilization of state-owned resources, it is doing much more than asserting
market freedom. It is engaging in an act of sovereignty by utilizing
the collective wealth of the state for the benefit of its peoples or a
segment of them. In so doing, it is performing the primary function
for which any government is established, the advancement of the
welfare of its people.
In this regard, Justice Powell's distinction between the situation
where the state is acting as a purchaser, and the situation where
the state is acting as a seller, is unsound. In both instances, the
state is engaged in an act of sovereignty by using state resources
for the benefit of the people of the state. When it limits its purchases
to state residents, as in Alexandria Scrap, it is using state funds directly
to benefit its residents; when it limits the sale of products produced
by state-owned enterprises to its residents, as in Reeves, it likewise
is using state resources to confer a benefit on its residents. Thus,
the state sovereignty rationale set forth by Justice Powell in Reeves
should lead to the same result in Reeves as it did in Alexandria Scrap.
This point was recognized by Justice Blackmun in Reeves, to the
extent that he relied on the state sovereignty rationale, rather than
the market freedom rationale, to sustain the constitutionality of South
Dakota's preference for access by South Dakota residents to cement
produced by state-owned cement plans. He stated: "At bottom, the
discrimination challenged in Alexandria Scrap was motivated by the
same concern underlying South Dakota's resident-preference policya desire to channel state benefits to the residents of the State supplying
them.' '562
In terms of constitutional structure, therefore, the Constitution
should not be interpreted as placing any restriction on the power of
a state to utilize state-owned resources for the benefit of the people
of that state. The primary reason for the existence of any government
is to advance the welfare of its people. Our constitutional structure
proceeds on the theory that state governments retain all the attributes
of sovereignty, except as expressly or impliedly limited by the

Constitution. It follows, therefore, that the reason for the existence
of separate governments in our constitutional scheme is to allow

562.

447 U.S. at 442-43 n.16.
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each state to advance the welfare of its own citizens. It is the
constitutional function of the federal government, in contrast, to
advance the interests of the nation as a whole. State sovereignty
encompasses the use of the collective wealth of that state for the
benefit of the people of that state. It is inconsistent with the principle
of state sovereignty, and with the role of the states as independent
sovereigns in our constitutional scheme, to require a state to use its
collective wealth for the benefit of citizens of other states, whose
welfare is the responsibility of their home states.
This point has been recognized explicitly with regard to entitlement to state-provided benefits under the privileges and immunities
clause. As a general proposition, the privileges and immunities clause
does not require that nonresidents be given equal access with residents
to state-provided benefits, such as welfare or attendance at a publicly
supported university. 563 This should be equally true with regards to
a claim under the negative commerce clause to benefits resulting
from the utilization of state-owned resources. 64 The nondiscrimination principle embodied in the negative commerce clause, like the
nondiscrimination principle embodied in the privileges and immunities clause, should not be applicable when the state is utilizing state
resources for the benefit of its citizens. As Professor Maltz has stated
so well, "to hold that the Constitution requires payment of benefits
to nonresidents would be totally inconsistent with the concept of
states as quasi-sovereign entities primarily responsible for the welfare
of their respective citizenries rather than that of the nation as a
whole." 5 65 In the same vein, Professor Hellerstein has stated: "To
preclude the States from preferring in-state interests in the distribution
of state natural resources would deprive the States of an important
attribute of their separate existence as independent political units in
566
the federal system."
It is submitted, therefore, that the state sovereignty rationale,
rather than the market freedom rationale, should have been the basis
of the Court's decisions in Alexandria Scrap, Reeves, and White: The
state sovereignty principle fully renders constitutional the resident
preference that was involved in those cases. In all three cases the
exercise of state sovereignty served the objective of promoting the
welfare of the residents of the state through the use of the state's

563. See Simson, supra note 4, at 395-98; Varat, supra note 4, at 552-54.
564. There is no practical difference between direct spending by the state
and the provision of a benefit that has been derived from the utilization of a stateowned resource. See Anson & Schenklan, supra note 4, at 86.
565. Maltz, supra note 4, at 68.
566. Hellerstein I, supra note 4, at 77.
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collective wealth. This exercise of state sovereignty is an integral
part of our constitutional structure, which provides for the existence
of separate sovereign states to promote the welfare of the people of
each state. 67 Thus, in terms of constitutional structure, neither the
negative commerce clause, nor the privileges and immunities clause,
should be interpreted as imposing any limitation on the power of a
state to use its collective wealth for the benefit of its residents.
Professor Varat, while conceding that "the continuation of state
government as contemplated by the Framers necessarily requires
recognition of some state authority to treat residents more favorably
than non-residents," nonetheless maintains that not all distinctions
"legitimately reflect the separate existence of the states. '5 6 He says
that "[i]n the context of state discrimination on the basis of residence,
there is an inherent conflict between the objectives of the Constitution's interstate equality provisions 569 and the continued significance
of state government. "570 Varat concludes: "Because state power to
discriminate against nonresidents, even in the state's public sector,
is at odds with the constitutional goals of national unification and
an open economy, it is necessary to decide whether the objectives
of interstate equality or the purposes of state government shall prevail
in any particular context. ' 571 He proposes a balancing approach to
the constitutionality of state resident preference programs, and sets
forth criteria by which to determine whether the interest in interstate
equality should prevail over the interest in state sovereignty in
particular circumstances .512
Critical to Professor Varat's approach, is the assumption that
state sovereignty and interstate equality are equal and competing
values in our constitutional scheme. This assumption, however,
cannot be supported in terms of the constitutional structure. In the
context of the use of the collective wealth of a state to benefit its
residents, no conflict is present between competing constitutional
values. The function of each state is to advance the welfare of the

567. The existence of separate states is recognized textually in art. IV, § 3,
cl. 2, which prohibits the formation of a new state within the boundaries of any
other state, or the combination of two or more states into a new state without the
consent of the affected states, and in art. IV, § 4, which requires that the United
States guarantee to every state a "republican form of government," and protect
each state against invasion or domestic violence.
568. Varat, supra note 4, at 517.
569. Varat is referring to both the privileges and immunities clause and the
negative commerce clause.
570. Varat, supra note 4, at 516.
571. Id. at 530.
572. Id. at 531-40.
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citizens of that state, and not the welfare of citizens of other states.
Interstate equality is not at issue in these circumstances, and thus
cannot be balanced against the state sovereignty value. Any "discrimination" against citizens of other states, resulting from the use
of a state's resources for the benefit of its own citizens, follows from
the function of state governments in our constitutional scheme and
is inherent in the existence of separate states. Thus, the application
of the nondiscrimination principle in that context would be inconsistent with our constitutional structure. Under our Constitution,
there can be no limitation on the power of a state to promote the
welfare of its residents through the utilization of its collective wealth.
The Supreme Court has accepted this proposition fully with
respect to negative commerce clause challenges to preference for state
residents resulting from the utilization of state resources, 573 but not
with respect to a privileges and immunities clause challenge. 574
In
United Building & Construction Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden,
the Court held that, although a city's requirement for employment
preference for city residents in the workforce of a contractor on
a city construction contract was insulated from challenge under
the negative commerce clause, 575 the resulting discrimination against
out-of-state residents could be violative of the privileges and immunities clause. In that case, the City of Camden required that at
least forty percent of the employees of contractors and subcontractors
working on city construction contracts be Camden residents. With only
Justice Blackmun dissenting, 576 the Court held that insofar as the employment preference operated to discriminate against out-of-state residents,
57
it was subject to challenge under the privileges and immunities clause. 7
Crucial to the Court's analysis, was a distinction between the
functions of the negative commerce clause and the privileges and
immunities clause in our constitutional scheme, and a seeming

573. See Alexandria Scrap, Reeves, and White. See also supra notes 548-50 and
accompanying text.
574. 104 S. Ct. 1020 (1984).
575. See supra note 550.
576. Justice Blackmun dissented on the ground that the privileges and immunities clause did not apply to discrimination on the basis of municipal residence.
104 S. Ct. at 1030-37 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
577. The Court remanded the case to the state court for a determination of
whether there was a "substantial reason" for the difference in treatment between
residents and nonresidents. The city had contended that the resident preference
was necessary to increase employment in the city and to arrest "middle class
flight." The Court concluded that it was impossible to evaluate the city's justification
on the present state of the record. Id. at 1029-30.
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acceptance of the market freedom rationale, rather than the state
sovereignty rationale, as the basis for the market participant exception
to the nondiscrimination principle of the negative commerce clause. 8
These two matters were related. The Court explained its decision
in White on the basis of the distinction between the government
acting as a market participant and as a market regulator. That
distinction was not found to be dispositive in the privileges and
immunities clause challenge, because "[t]he two clauses
have different
5' 79
aims and set different standards for state conduct.

The privileges and immunities clause, according to the Court,
"imposes a direct restraint on state action in the interests of interstate
harmony." '8 0 The Court went on to say:
This concern with comity cuts across the market regulatormarket participant distinction that is crucial under the Commerce Clause. It is discrimination against out-of-state residents on matters of fundamental concern which triggers the
[privileges and immunities] Clause, not regulation affecting
interstate commerce. Thus, the fact that Camden is merely
setting conditions on its expenditure for goods and services
in the marketplace does not preclude the possibility that those
581
conditions violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
The Court recognized the significance of the fact that city funds
were involved in the construction project that was the source of the
preference, but maintained that this was not sufficient to insulate
the preference from challenge under the privileges and immunities
clause. "The fact that Camden is expending its own funds or funds
it administers in accordance with the terms of a grant is certainly
a factor-perhaps the crucial factor-to be considered in evaluating
whether the statute's discrimination violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause. But it does not remove the Camden ordinance
completely from the purview of the Clause." 58 2 The Court remanded
the case for a determination of whether the discrimination against
nonresidents could be justified on the ground that it was necessary
to alleviate unemployment in the city and a resulting population
58 3
decline.

578.
579.

Id. at 1028.
Id.

580.
581.
582.
583.

Id.
Id. at 1028-29.
Id. at 1029.
See supra note 577.
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It is submitted that the effort of the city to utilize its collective
wealth to promote the welfare of its residents should not be subject
to challenge under the privileges and immunities clause, just as it
is not subject to challenge under the negative commerce clause. As
previously discussed, 584 neither the nondiscrimination principle of the
privileges and immunities clause, nor the nondiscrimination principle
of the negative commerce clause, is applicable when the state is
utilizing state resources for the benefit of state residents. Such
application is inconsistent with the state sovereignty value, reflecting
the existence of separate states and the function of state governments
in our constitutional scheme.
In this regard, the Court's seeming acceptance of the market
freedom rationale, rather than the state sovereignty rationale, as the
basis for the market participant exception to the nondiscrimination
principle of the negative commerce clause, may have influenced
strongly the privileges and immunities holding in Camden. In the
Court's view, the requirement of employment preference for residents
in the workforces of contractors on city construction projects was
merely an effort by the city to set "conditions on its expenditures
for goods and services in the marketplace. '58 5 However, the requirement of resident preference represents an act of sovereignty in
which the city is utilizing the collective wealth of the city for the
benefit of its own people. In so doing, the city is performing the
primary function for which any government is established, the
advancement of the welfare of its people.5 86 If the Court had accepted
the state sovereignty rationale as the basis for the market participant
exception to the negative commerce clause, it could have carried
that rationale over to the privileges and immunities clause challenge
as well. As things now stand, however, all state efforts to prefer
state residents over nonresidents are at least potentially subject to
challenge under the privileges and immunities clause.
The better position would hold that as long as the state owns
the resource, it constitutionally can limit to its own residents the
receipt of benefits directly traceable to that resource. If a state owns
oil deposits, for example, it should be able to limit the sale of oil
obtained from those deposits to state residents.5 7 Similarly, it should
be able to give residents preferential access to the exploitation of
those resources, such as providing that only residents can obtain

584.
585.
586.
587.
See Reeves

See supra notes 518-34 and accompanying text.
104 S. Ct. at 1028-29.
See supra notes 562-67 and accompanying text.
This point is established with respect to the negative commerce clause.
v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
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drilling leases for state-owned oil deposits. It is further contended
that just as the state should be able to lirhit the sale of oil obtained
from state-owned oil deposits to state residents when the state itself
is exploiting the resource, it should be able to impose such limits
when the resource is being exploited by private entities under lease
from the state. Either way, the oil that is available for sale comes
from state-owned oil deposits, and the state should be able to require
that its residents be given preferential access to such resources. 588
Preference for state residents in the use of or access to stateowned natural resources presumably would not violate the negative
commerce clause, regardless of whether the resource was being
exploited by the state itself or by private entities under lease from
the state.5 8 9 However, in light of the Court's holding in Camden,
such resident preference might be subject to challenge under the
privileges and immunities clause if the resource is being exploited
by private entities. In Camden, the Court held that a requirement
of resident preference in the workforce of private contractors working
on city-funded construction projects was subject to challenge under
the privileges and immunities clause. However, a requirement that
state employees be state residents, or that city employees be city
residents,' presumably would not violate that clause. 5 0 The Camden
Court noted that public employment is qualitatively different from
employment in the private sector, 91 and said that the "exercise of
power to bias the employment decision of private contractors and
subcontractors against out-of-state residents may be called to account
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause.' '592 It can be argued,
however, that as long as it is the state itself that is giving the
preference, resulting from the state's exploitation of a state-owned
resource, and the state is not trying to compel such a preference on
the part of private entities, considerations of state sovereignty may
come to the fore and insulate the preference from a privileges and
immunities clause challenge.
588. For discussions of the view that the state cannot constitutionally require
resident preference when the resource is being exploited by private entities, see
Anson & Schenklan, supra note 4, at 92-94 and Hellerstein I, supra note 4, at 79-

82.
589. This assumption is made in light of the Court's rejection of the negative
commerce clause challenge in White, 460 U.S. at 208. See also Camden, 104 S. Ct.
at 1028-29.
590. See Varat, supra note 4, at 546-48. But see Simson, supra note 4, at 39295. In McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645 (1976), the
Court held per curiam that a requirement that municipal employees be residents
of the city during the period of their employment did not violate the constitutional
right to travel.
591. 104 S. Ct. at 1028.
592. Id. at 1029.
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In Hicklin v. Orbeck,5 93 the Court held violative of the privileges
and immunities clause Alaska's attempt to require private employers
to employ residents in any work connected with the Alaska pipeline.
The Court's decision in that case was based on the fact that the
preference went far beyond work that involved exploitation of the
resource itself. 594 The Court noted that "the connection of the State's

oil and gas with much of the covered activity is sufficiently attenuated
so that it cannot justifiably be the basis for requiring private employers
to discriminate against nonresidents. 595 The Hicklin Court recognized
that state ownership of a resource is "a factor-although often the
crucial factor-to be considered in evaluating whether the statute's
discrimination against noncitizens violates the [privileges and immunities] Clause, ' 5 96 but found that this factor was not dispositive
in Hicklin because of the law's "extensive reach." The Court concluded: "In sum, the Act is an attempt to force virtually all businesses
that benefit in some way from the economic ripple effect of Alaska's
decision to develop its oil and gas resources to bias their employment
practices in favor of residents. We believe that Alaska's ownership
of the oil and gas that is the subject matter of Alaska Hire simply
constitutes insufficient justification for the pervasive discrimination
against nonresidents that the Act mandates. 59 1 Under the Hicklin
Court's approach, if the state itself had been giving the preference,
such as giving residents preferential access to exploitation of oil
deposits by way of the lease of drilling rights or the purchase of oil
produced from those deposits, the Court might have held that this
was not violative of the privileges and immunities clause. However,
in light of Camden, any required preference for state residents resulting
from exploitation of the resource by private entities presumably
would be subject to privileges and immunities clause challenge. 598
Under this view, the Court's decision in the older case of McCready
v. Virginia,599 upholding Virginia's exclusion of nonresidents from
"

593.
594.

437 U.S. 518 (1978).
The provisions of "Alaska Hire" are set out in the opinion. See id. at

529-30.
595.

Id. at 529.

596.

Id.

597. Id. at 531.
598. This proposition assumes that the benefit involved would constitute a
"fundamental right" for privileges and immunities clause purposes. The Court
might hold, however, that a particular benefit, such as obtaining oil from stateowned deposits, was not " 'fundamental' to the promotion of interstate harmony
so as to 'fall within the purview of the privileges and immunities clause.' " Camden,
104 S. Ct. at 1027-28.
599. 94 U.S. 391 (1877).
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planting oysters in state-owned tidelands, should still be considered
viable today.6t ° There, the state was giving state residents preferential
access in the exploitation of the state-owned resource. In the later
case of Toomer v. Witsell, 60 1 by contrast, the Court invalidated South
Carolina's attempt to charge nonresidents one hundred times more
than residents for a license to pursue migratory shrimp. In that case,
South Carolina owned neither the shrimp, nor the waters in which
they were taken. Therefore, state sovereignty considerations were
60 2
absent, and the discrimination was unconstitutional.
It is again submitted that as long as the state owns the resource,
state sovereignty considerations dictate that the state should be able
to limit to its own residents the receipt of benefits directly traceable
to that resource. Further, it should be able to do so whether the
resource is being exploited by private entities under lease from the
state, or by the state itself. Hicklin was decided correctly because
the resident preference involved therein was far too extensive. However, it should be constitutional for the state to require that private
entities exploiting state-owned resources give employment preferences
to state residents in work directly connected with such exploitation,
or that they give state residents or businesses preferential access to
the products derived from such exploitation. The Supreme Court
may be prepared to hold that the state constitutionally may give
preferential access to state residents with respect to the exploitation
and products of the resource itself. As things now stand, however,
any effort to compel private entities exploiting the resource to give
preferential access or treatment to state residents presumably would
be subject to challenge under the privileges and immunities clause.
Once the state disposes of a state-owned resource, that resource
no longer represents the collective wealth of the state and, for
constitutional purposes, it is no different from any other resource
owned by a private entity. 60 3 State sovereignty considerations are no
600. McCready, however, was questioned in Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. at
528-29, where the Court noted that state ownership of a resource did not completely
exempt a law concerning that resource from the prohibitions of the privileges and
immunities clause. For the view that the resident preference involved in McCready
violated the privileges and immunities clause, see Varat, supra note 4, at 557-58.

601. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
602. Although the Court based its decision on the privileges and immunities
clause, it also could have based it on the negative commerce clause, since the law
expressly discriminated against interstate commerce in favor of local commerce with
respect to commercial activity within the state. See supra notes 527-29 and accompanying text.
603. Similarly, once the government makes a bona fide sale of public property
to a private entity, the private entity can operate the property free of constitutional
constraints. See, e.g., Tonkins v. City of Greensboro, 276 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1960).
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longer applicable and the nondiscrimination principles embodied in
the negative commerce clause and the privileges and immunities
clause should preclude the state from requiring the private owner
to favor state residents. Thus, if a state transferred state-owned oil
deposits to a private entity, the state could not constitutionally
require, as a condition of the transfer, that the new owner sell the
oil only to state residents or give state residents preference in
employment involving the working of the oil deposits. This type of
situation was presented to the Supreme Court last Term in SouthCentral Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke. 60 4 In that case, Alaska
had required that timber taken from state land by private developers
under contract with the state be partially processed within the state
prior to export. The stated purpose of the requirement was to
"protect existing industries, provide for the establishment of new
industries, derive revenue from all timber resources, and manage
the State's forests on a sustained yield basis.' '605 The Ninth Circuit
had sustained the regulation on the ground that it was authorized
implicitly by Congress' policy regarding timber taken from federal
land. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that Congress had acted
only with respect to federal lands, and that it could not be inferred
that Congress thereby intended to authorize a similar policy with
respect to state lands. 60 6 The state argued that the judgment of the
court of appeals should be affirmed on the ground that the requirement was permissible because the state was acting as "market
participant rather than market regulator. '607 In an opinion by Justice
White, four Justices held that the requirement could not be sustained
under the "market participant" doctrine. 608 Justice White's analysis
utilized the "market freedom" rationale, but he concluded that,
"[t]he limit of the market-participant doctrine must be that it allows
a State to impose burdens on commerce within the market in which
it is a participant, but allows it to go no further.' '609 Market freedom
could not be used to allow the state to regulate the separate economic

604.
605.
606.
607.

104 S. Ct. 2237 (1984).
Id. at 2239.
Id. at 2243.
Id. at 2240.

608. There was no dissent on the issue of congressional authorization. Justices
Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens agreed with Justice White on the negative commerce
clause question. ChiefJustice Burger and Justice Powell, concurring in the judgment,
would have remanded the case to the court of appeals for initial consideration of
the negative commerce clause question. Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor dissented
on the ground that the resident preference came within the "market participant"
exception. Justice Marshall did not participate in the case.
609. Id. at 2245.
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relationships of its trading partners, because the state was not a
participant in the market after the transaction between it and the
6 10
purchaser of the timber had been completed.
Under our analysis, the question of "what is the market" would
not be relevant in the constitutional equation. The justification for
resident preference in benefits resulting from the utilization of state
resources is state sovereignty; once the state disposes of the resource,
state sovereignty considerations no longer are applicable. 61 1 A compelled preference for state residents in these circumstances is violative
of the nondiscrimination principle. South-Centralindicates that "downstream restrictions" probably will be found to be unconstitutional,
and that the market participant exception to the nondiscrimination
principle is likely to be limited to situations in which the state retains
ownership of the resource.
The final question involving discrimination in favor of local
commerce or in-state interests, where the state is acting as a market
participant or a dispenser of benefits, concerns the power of Congress
to prohibit such discrimination. Again, in terms of constitutional
structure, the answer seems clear. Congress, in the affirmative
exercise of its commerce power, can prohibit such discrimination.
Now that the Court has rejected completely any state sovereignty
limitation on the affirmative exercise of the commerce power, 612 there
is no structural bar to Congress' exercise of that power to prohibit
the states from discriminating against interstate commerce or outof-state interests even when the state is acting as a market participant
or a dispenser of benefits. It should be noted, in this regard, that
state resident preference in benefits resulting from the utilization of
state-owned resources is justified on the ground that it is the function
of state governments, under our constitutional scheme, to advance
the welfare of its citizens. The function of the federal government,
however, is to advance the Welfare of the "nation as a whole."
When the state gives its residents preference in benefits resulting
from the utilization of state-owned resources, the state is performing
its constitutional function; when Congress prohibits such resident
preference, it also is performing its constitutional function. However,
610.

Id. at 2246.

611. The dissenters ctntended that the state was paying the buyer of the
timber indirectly, by means of a reduced price, to hire Alaska residents to process
the timber. Id. at 2248. Under the state sovereignty rationale that we have advanced,
state sovereignty considerations would come to an end after the resource had been
transferred. Accordingly, the state could no longer, consistent with the nondiscrimination principle, require the private entity to discriminate against interstate
commerce in favor of local commerce.
612. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ot. 1005
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as a matter of federal supremacy, congressional action to advance
the welfare of the "nation as a whole" prevails over inconsistent
state action to advance the welfare of its citizens. In terms of
constitutional structure, therefore, there can be no doubt that Congress constitutionally may prohibit such state resident preferences.
D.

A Concluding Note

The relationship between the nondiscrimination principle embodied in the negative commerce clause, state sovereignty considerations, and the affirmative power of Congress is illustrated by the
following "exercise in symmetry" based on Philadelphia v. New
Jersey.613 The State of New Jersey faced the problem of competition
between out-of-state waste and New Jersey waste for access to New
Jersey landfill space. The state, concerned with conserving landfill
space and disposing of New Jersey waste, resolved the problem by
giving New Jersey waste preferential access to privately-owned New
Jersey landfills. This blatant discrimination in favor of New Jersey
waste, at the expense of out-of-state waste, was inconsistent with the
nondiscrimination principle embodied in the negative commerce
clause and, therefore, was constitutionally proscribed. 61 4 The Constitution sometimes requires a state to make hard choices. 615 At the
same time, however, it usually enables the state to make a particular
choice if it is willing to pay the political or economic price that the
Constitution requires. Thus, if New Jersey wants its landfill space
to be used only to dispose of New Jersey waste, it may accomplish
this by purchasing the privately-owned landfills through its eminent
domain power, and then limiting their use. If, however, Congress
concludes that the national interest in the "free flow of waste"
dictates that New Jersey landfill space be accessible to out-of-state
waste, it can, in the affirmative exercise of the commerce power,
prohibit the state from discriminating against out-of-state waste. By
the same token, Congress may conclude that it is in the national
interest that the waste generated in each state be disposed of in that
state, and may establish a scheme of regulation by which each state
613. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
614. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
615. One such example is the choice between prohibiting all concerted
expression in the public forum or providing access to "unpopular" concerted
expression. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. See also Kalven, The Concept
of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 30:
Everyone at some time or other loves a parade whatever its effect on
traffic and other uses of public streets. Municipalities pressed by concern
with the protest movement may be inhibited in any rush to flat nondiscriminatory prohibitions by the difficulty of distinguishing between the
parades we like and others. Equal protection may, therefore, require
freedom for the parades we hate.
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can limit the disposal of waste in privately-owned landfills to instate waste.
Under our constitutional structure, the affirmative grant of the
commerce power to Congress means that Congress has the final say
with respect to the matter of "interstate waste disposal." In the
absence of congressional regulation, the answer to the problem is,
nevertheless, found in the constitutional structure. The nondiscrimination principle embodied in the negative commerce clause predudes a state from giving in-state waste preferential access to privatelyowned landfill space. But the principle of state sovereignty operates
to permit a state to make landfill space a state-owned resource that
shall be utilized only for the benefit of its residents. The point to
be emphasized is that, in the absence of congressional regulation,
the Constitution does permit New Jersey to give New Jersey waste
preferential access to New Jersey landfill space if the state is willing
to pay the price that the Constitution requires.
CONCLUSION

This Article has explored at length the negative commerce clause
as a restriction on state regulatory and taxation power, and demonstrated that the only conceptual justification for a negative aspect
to the commerce clause that can withstand structural analysis is the
nondiscrimination principle. Since a major historical purpose for the
affirmative grant of the commerce power to Congress was to prevent
discrimination against interstate commerce or out-of-state interests
in favor of local commerce or in-state interests, the commerce clause
may be said to embody the nondiscrimination principle. Thus, it
may be relied upon in its negative aspect as the source of a right
on the part of entities engaged in interstate commerce and out-ofstate interests to be free from discriminatory state regulation or
taxation. Under this conceptual justification, the negative commerce
clause absolutely prohibits discrimination against interstate commerce
or out-of-state interests because of the interstate nature of that
commerce or the out-of-state nature of those interests.
The nondiscrimination principle justification for a negative aspect
to the commerce clause has been shown to accord substantially with
the results reached by the Court under its current articulated approach
to the negative commerce clause as a restriction on state regulatory
and taxation power. The Court's express acceptance of this conceptual
justification would establish the negative commerce clause as an
important, although narrowly focused, restriction on state regulation
and taxation affecting interstate commerce. Most importantly perhaps, the Court would finally bring order to the negative commerce
clause, and the negative commerce clause as a limitation on state
regulatory and taxation power would be firmly rooted in the structure
of the Constitution.

